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ABSTRACT 
66666.6.. o 6.0 
This study aims at collecting empirical evidence on whether or not 
financial accounting standards which exist in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia give 
rise to economic consequences. Awareness of the potential economic 
consequences of accounting standards emerged first in the United States of 
America in the 1970s, but increasingly has attracted a great deal of attention in 
many different countries over the last twenty years. The impact of accounting 
standards on management behaviour has been cited as one of the consequences. 
Factors that affect management's attitudes in choosing among 
alternative accounting methods are established through the political cost theory 
and the contracting and agency theories. Using these theories, this study 
hypothesises that company size, the presence of Government debt and/or 
donations, die ratio of foreign employees to total employees, the presence of 
management compensation plans, and insider ownership provide incentives for 
the management of Saudi joint stock companies to adopt income-increasing or - 
decreasing accounting policies. 
The results of the univariate and multivariate tests show that company 
size, ratios of foreign employees to total employees, and insider ownership are 
significant detenninants of inventory, research and development, and Zakat 
policies. These findings provide empirical support for the principal hypothesis 
of this thesis. That is, accounting standards which exist in Saudi Arabia give 
rise to economic consequences and managers of companies consider these 
consequences when selecting accounting policies. In summary, this principal 
conclusion is of critical importance to the Saudi Organization for Certified 
Public Accountants (SOCPA), given that accounting standard setting processes 
are still in their early stages of development. It supports the view that SOCPA 
should acknowledge the possible adverse economic consequences that may 
result from its accounting standards decisions. In fact, the results of this study 
justify, in the very least, a wider and more detailed study by SOCPA of the 
economic effects of its potential accounting standards. The findings may also 
call into question the financial accounting standards which have been recently 
promulgated in Saudi Arabia. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces and focuses the study of economic 
consequences of accounting standards in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The 
concept of 'economic consequences' is briefly outlined in section I. I. In 
section 1.2. we review very briefly the literature devoted to the investigation 
of possible economic consequences associated with particular accounting 
policy choices. The development of a positive theory of accounting policy 
choices which will be used as a base for drawing the research hypotheses is 
briefly discussed in section 1.3. An outline of the study objectives and 
motivations is described in sections 1.4 and 1.5, respectively. Section 1.6 
provides a brief introduction to the Saudi Arabian institutional environment 
which underscores the empirical work reported in the study. An outline of 
the research hypotheses and methodology is provided in sections 1.7 and 
1.8, respectively. The contribution our analysis makes to an understanding 
of the Saudi accounting environment is identified in section 1.9. Key 
assumptions and limitations of the study are described in sections 1.10 and 
1.11, respectively. Finally, an overview of the entire study is provided in 
section 1.12. 
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1.1 THE TERM'ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES' 
The objective of financial reporting-is to provide relevant and reliable 
accounting information about economic events to individuals or groups who 
have an interest in the activities of firms. To achieve this goal, financial 
accounting standards, which govem both what firms must disclose in their 
financial reports and also, how they must disclose their economic 
operations, must be neutral in their influence on those individuals or groups 
who use the contents of such reports as inputs to their decision making 
processes. However, this condition has long been questioned on the ground 
that particular proposals for financial accounting standards, or existing 
standards, confer benefits on some users of financial statements whilst 
penalising or imposing costs on others. The term 'economic consequences' 
has been used in the accounting literature to describe this hypothesis. 
Since the early 1970s and up to the present, the issue of economic 
consequences has placed a heavy burden on accounting standards setting 
bodies such as the FASB in the USA and the ASC in the UK, among others. 
One view on how accounting regulators should respond to this issue sees the 
establishment of an accounting standard as being fundamentally a political or 
a social decision, and thus. argues for explicit consideration of economic 
3 
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consequences in the accounting policy formulation process. For example 
Committe (1990, p. 46) criticises the FASB and writes: 
Information is valued because it is useful, and accounting 
information is useful because of its economic and societal 
consequences. To make rules without knowing or, caring about, 
and taking into consideration their consequences is not 
responsible rulemaking of any kind. A rulemaking organization 
cannot absolve itself of responsibility by hiding under an umbrella 
of alleged neutrality supported by a claim of technical expertise. A 
claim of expertise ought to increase rather than decrease a 
rulemaking's responsibility for the consequences of its work. 
1.2 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES: THE EVIDENCE 
In parallel with this theoretical criticism a substantial number of 
empirical research studies emerged which focused on linking accounting 
standards to changes in the decision-making behaviour of the users of 
financial statements. However, almost all applied economic consequences 
studies to date have concentrated on the impact of particular alternative 
accounting policies on managers' and equity investors' decisions. In general, 
these studies can chronologically be classified into three broad categories; 
income smoothing studies, stock market studies, and positive accounting 
studies. 
The major thrust of the income smoothing literature is to explain and 
predict managers' choice of accounting standards by analysing the economic 
motives that managers might have in choosing such standards. Research of 
4 
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this type has focused on the hypothesis that managers may be motivated to 
choose accounting policies which smooth reported income and which 
smooth the rate of growth in income, perhaps because this would increase 
theirjob security, the level and growth of their income and the size of their 
companies [see, for example, Gordon (1964); Gordon, Horwitz and Meyers 
(1966); Dopuch and Drake (1966); Archibald (1967); Copeland (1968); 
Copeland and Licastro (1968); Cushing (1969); Dascher and Malcolm 
(1970); White (1970); Barefield and Comýisky (1972); Beidleman (1973)]. 
Underlying the income smoothing hypothesis research are the 
common beliefs that: (1) managers are rational expected utility of wealth 
maximisers, (2) accounting reports are the only source of information 
available to investors, and (3) stock markets can be 'fooled' by changes in 
accounting policies. However, the last two propotitions of the income 
smoothing hypothesis have subsequently undermined by studies . of 
investors' reactions to accounting information based on managers' voluntary 
choices of accounting policies. The empirical evidence developed by, for 
example, Ball and Brown (1968), Brown and Kennelly (1972), Archibald 
(1972), Ball (1972), Kaplan and Roll (1972), Beaver and Dukes (1973), 
Foster (1975 and 1977), Sunder (1975), Cassidy (1976), Hong, Kaplan and. 
Mandelker (1978), and Patell and Wolfson (1981), indicates that investors: 
5 
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(1) do use accounting information, but much of the contents of accounting 
reports reaches stock markets through alternative sources, and (2) are able 
to distinguish between changes in accounting policies which are purely 
c cosmetic' and changes which reflect real economic events, suggesting that 
managers are not able to mislead investors using opportunistically chosen 
accounting policies. This empirical stock-based evidence, hence, concludes 
that financial accounting standards are not likely to alter the decisions of 
investors; i. e. they have no adverse economic consequences. 
However, tl-ýs empirical stock-based conclusion has left accounting 
researchers with no explanations for a number of fundamental questions 
concerning why managers of companies: (1) are concerned with which 
accounting methods are used in preparing their financial statements, and (2) 
lobby for or against certain proposed accounting standards. Recent studies 
have incorporated into accounting the principles of the economic theory of 
regulation and the contracting and agency theories, in an attempt to answer 
these two questions. They have generally concluded that managers' choices 
of accounting policies differ according to their firms' size, debt/equity ratio, 
and managerial compensation plan [see, for example, Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1983); Watts and Zimmerman (1986 and 1990); Christie (1990)]. 
6 
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The arguments from which these simple hypotheses have been derived are 
known as the positive accounting theory. 
1.3 THE POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY 
The positive theory of accounting policy choice is generally drawn 
from a well-known paper in which Jensen (1976, p. 11) argues: 
... research in accounting has been (with one or two notable 
exceptions) unscientific... because the focus of this research has 
been overwhelmingly normative and definitional. 
Jensen (1976, p. 13) then called for: 
... the development of a positive theory of accounting which will 
explain why accounting is what it is, why accountants do what they 
do, and what effects these phenomena have on people and resource 
utilization. 
Like the income smoothing hypothesis, the positive accounting theory 
is based on the proposition that managers adopt accounting policies which 
best serve their self-interest [Gordon (1964, p. 261); Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978, p. 113)]. However, the main focus of researchers in positive 
accounting rests on determining how accounting policies affect cash flows 
and, hence management's utility functions. The economic theory of 
regulation and the contracting and agency theories have been utilised to 
answer this question. A basic assumption of those theories is that contracting 
and monitoring costs associated with companies' political processes, and 
7 
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with companies' contractual agreements, such as debt and compensation 
contracts, are nonzero. This proposition provides an opportunity to 
hypothesise that the choice of certain accounting policies by managers is 
aimed at increasing either the company's or the managers' future cash flows. 
The three most tested hypotheses derived from the positive 
accounting theory literature are the political costs hypothesis, the bonus plan 
hypothesis, and the debt/equity hypothesis. The political costs hypothesis 
predicts that if a company is in danger of suffering expropriation of 
resources through the political process its managers will have incentives to 
adopt income-decreasing accounting policies in order to avoid these political 
costs and the subsequent nqgative wealth transfers. It has been argued that a 
company is in danger of suffering political costs if it is large, has high 
systematic risk, is highly capital intensive or is operating in a highly 
concentrated industry. 
The bonus plan hypothesis predicts that managers who are rewarded 
by accounting-based bonus schemes will have incentives to adopt income- 
increasing accounting policies so as to maximise their compensation, i. e. an 
increase in the present value of a company's reported income increases the 
present value of its management compensation. 
8 
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The debt/equity hypothesis predicts that the higher the proportion of 
debt to equity the more likely it is that managers will select income- 
increasing accounting policies in order to reduce the probability of violating 
restrictive covenants in their debt contracts. 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDV 
The principal question to be investigated in this study is whether or 
not accounting standards which exist in the Kinj! dom of Saudi Arabia 
p_ive rise to economic consequences. Our examination of the theoretical 
economic consequences literature, which is outlined in chapter two, reveals 
that the imputation of economic consequences comes either from the impact 
of financial accounting reports on the users' decision-making behaviour, or 
from the existence of a company's contractual relationships. Therefore, one 
direct way to answer the general research question can be through 
examining the behaviour of Saudi corporate managers who have the vital 
role of choosing accounting policies adopted by their companies. Following 
the positive accounting theory ideas, our research question will therefore be 
investigated through examining the hypothesis that managers of Satidi 
companies use economic criteria in choosjn2 their accountin!! policies. If 
our empirical results support this hypothesis, the argument that accounting 
standards which exist in Saudi Arabia give rise to economic consequences 
9 
Chapter One: Introduction 
would be justified. A related objective is that if managers of Saudi 
a 
companies do use economic criteria in choosing their accounting procedures, 
this study will also have the potential to obtain an empirical insight into the 
factors that are most likely to influence Saudi corporate managers' 
accounting policy choices. 
1.5 MOTIVATIONS FOR THE STUDY 
There are at least two motivations for the study. The first emerges 
from the potential important implication of the economic consequences issue 
for the accounting policyrnaking body in Saudi Arabia, given that: 
(1). The economic consequences issue has been the object of controversy in 
the accounting literature since the late 1970s and up to the present; 
(2). the economic consequences literature is huge and growing at an 
exponential rate, but relatively few researchers have given explicit 
consideration to the implication of this issue for management behaviour in 
less developed countries; and 
(3). we are not aware of any empirical study that has explicitly attempted to 
investigate economic consequences of financial accounting policies which 
are used by Saudi companies. 
10 
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The second motivation is to shed some light on the validity of the 
positive accounting theory which is described by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986, p14) as being useful because: 
-. it can provide those who must make decisions on accounting 
policy (corporate managers, public accountants, loan officers, 
investors, financial analysts, regulators) with predictions of, and 
explanations for, the consequences of their decisions. 
1.6 SAUDI ARABIAN ENVIRONMENT 
A company's accounting policy decisiong are generally related to its 
explicit and implicit political and contracting environment. Therefore, in 
order to investigate the general research question, it is necessary to have a 
good understanding of the environment which underscores the empirical 
analysis reported in the study. This section summaries Saudi Arabian 
socio/economic environment in terms of six basic points: 
1. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy created by the 
King Abd al-Aziz Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Saud in 1932. Its constitution, 
which is based on Al-Quran Al-Karimi and AI-Sunna Al-Sharifa 2, 
provides that "rule passes to the sons of the founding King Abd al-Aziz 
Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al-Saud, and to their children's children" 
1 It is the collected revelations of God to Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him. 
2 It is the sayings and actions of Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him. 
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(Saudi Arabian Basic Law of Government, 1992, chapter two, article 5). 
The Council of Ministers, which holds both legislative and executive 
powers in the Kingdom, is presided over by the present ruler of Saudi 
Arabia, King Fahd. Although there are no political parties, unions or 
franchises in Saudi Arabia, members of a number of governmental 
departments are now exerting significant influence over the formulation 
of the Kingdom's political, legal and economic policies. 
2. The present economy of Saudi Arabia has been the outcome of a series 
of five-year development plans, the last of which is the 1995-2000 
development plan. This five-year development plan officially commits 
the Government to four general economic goals: (1) a balanced budget, 
(2) finther privatisation, (3) an end to the subsidised provision of Saudi 
industry and public utilities, and (4) the replacement of foreign labour by 
Saudi workers. To achieve these goals, the Saudi Government has 
identified the following guiding principles: (1) expand privatisation by 
selling state-held shares, reducing monopoly activities and enhancing 
competition; (2) rationalise subsidies provided by the Government for 
many services and commodities; and (3) continue a 'Saudization' of the 
labour force by encouraging companies operating in the Saudi private 
sector to replace their foreign workers with Saudi citizens. The basic 
I 
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message of this plan is that the Government, having made massive 
investments in establishing modem infrastructure and pro viding an 
extensive package of financial, fiscal, tariff and other incentives, now 
wants the Saudi private sector to become the driving force behind the 
economy. 
3. In December 1995, there were 94 Saudi joint stock companies, of which 
69 were traded on the Saudi stock market. These publicly traded 
companies consisted of 11 banks, 10 electrical companies, 9 agricultural 
companies, 23 industrial companies and 16 services companies. Their 
most striking characteristics include the following: (1) most of their 
external finance has been provided by the Government in the form of 
medium- and long-term interest free loans and donations; (2) as of 
December 1995, about one-third of their shares was state-held; and (3) 
most of their managerial staff are non-Saudis. 
4. The Saudi stock market is in its infancy. Since 1990 Saudi companies' 
shares have been traded through some domestic banks which are 
electronically linked with the central computer at the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA). This share trading system has been severely 
criticised for its operational inefficiency and is considered to be -one 
t 
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major factor contributing to the 'irrational expectations' of the Saudi 
stock market. 
5. The Saudi labour market is also in its early stages of development. At the 
end of 1994 the Saudi workforce, as based on US sources, was estimated 
to be 2.7 million people. Under the 1995-2000 Saudi development plan, 
the Saudi workforce is targeted to expand at an annual rate of 4%. 
However, the present Saudi labour market suffers from the absence of 
official information regarding, for example, job opportunities and 
qualifications. 
6. The current legal and institutional framework surrounding the Saudi 
accounting and auditing profession has been the result of: (1) the 1950 
Income Tax and Zakat Law, (2) the 1965 Companies Act, (3) the 1986 
Nfinisterial decision concerning "auditing standards" and "Statement of 
Financial Acco-unting Objectives, Concepts and General Standard of 
Presentation and Disclosure", and (4) the Certified Public Accountants 
(CPA) Regulations which were introduced in 1992 with the objective of 
establishing the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants 
(SOCPA). One principal objective of SOCPA is to set accounting and 
auditing standards. Since its inception, SOCPA has issued six standards; 
(1) Foreign Currency Translation, (2) Inventories, (3) Cash Flow 
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Statements, (4) Related Party Disclosures, (5) Preliminary & Pre- 
operating Expenses, and (6) Auditing Electronic Data Processing (EDP) 
Activities. However, apart from these standards, which became 
mandatory in 1998, SOCPA requires the financial statements of Saudi 
joint stock companies to be prepared in accordance with the 1986 
"General Standard of Presentation and Disclosure" and USA Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
1.7 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical and empirical foundations for this study are mainly 
provided by the USA literature on the economic consequences of accounting 
standards and on positive accounting theory. Almost all applied economic 
consequences studies to date have used U. S. data and are normally based on 
firm size, compensation plans and leverage as the three factors that are most 
likely to affect management's attitudes towards alternative accounting 
procedures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986 and 1990). However, as the 
political and regulatory environment in which Saudi companies operate and 
the financial contracts (debt and compensation contracts) into which they 
enter are different from that of most companies in the United States, it is 
necessary to adapt the investigation to take account of these differences. 
I 
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On the political and regulatory side, we argue that the 1995-2000 
Saudi development plan provides incentives for managers of some Saudi 
companies to adopt income-decreasing accounting policies. More 
specifically, we hypothesise that if a company has large total assets, 
Government debt and/or donations in its capital structure, and higher ratios 
of foreign employees to total employees, its managers will have incentives 
to use income-decreasing accounting policies in order to avoid the 
probability of suffering negative wealth transfers or political costs wl-&h 
will be associated with the implementation of the 1995-2000 Saudi 
development plan (see section 5.1 for a description of how the 1995-2000 
Saudi development plan would subject Saudi companies to pressures from 
the political process). 
As in the case of USA companies, management compensation 
contracts, which are tied formally to reported income, are employed by a 
large number of Saudi companies. The existence of these compensation 
contracts and the weak disciplinary role of the Saudi stock and managerial 
labour markets, motivates us to generate another set of hypotheses; the 
bonus plan hypothesis and the insider ownership hypothesis (see section 
5.2.1 for a description of the theoretical reasoning underlying these 
hypotheses) 
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On the other hand, unlike USA companies, almost all Saudi joint 
stock companies have received most of their external finance from the 
Government. Therefore, it does not seem that managers' accounting policy 
choices are influenced by restrictive covenants in debt contracts as has been 
hypothesised in the USA literature (see section 5.2.2 for a description of this 
argument). 
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The sample for tfids study is drawn from the 69 Saudi joint stock 
companies which were publicly traded at the end of 1995. Of these 69 
companies, however, 21 companies which operate in the banking and 
electrical sectors are excluded because they are regulated by special unified 
accounting rules. Hence, the data on which the study is based are taken from 
the remaining 48 publicly traded companies for which the 1995 annual 
reports are available and which also disclose their accounting policy 
choices. 
The research methodology adopted consists of two phases involving 
two kinds of tests; univariate tests, and multivariate tests. These tests are 
discussed in detail in chapter six (section 6.2). 
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1.9 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The contribution our study makes to an understanding of the Saudi 
accounting environment is as follows: 
1. This study aims to examine the economic consequences of financial 
accounting standards which exist in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; thus it 
is of high interest to the Saudi accounting profession, where standard 
setting processes are still in the early stages of development. It can assist 
the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) in 
making decisions regarding new accounting standards, or in assessing the 
actual consequences of standards in comparison with their intended or 
predicted effects. More specifically, the results of this study would 
justify, in the very least, a wider and more detailed study by SOCPA of 
the effects of their accounting standards decisions. 
2. Given that the existence (or absence) of economic consequences in Saudi 
Arabia will be investigated by examining the hypothesis of whether or 
not managers of Saudi companies use economic criteria in choosing their 
accounting policies, this study makes at least three contributions to the 
development of the current positive accounting literature. First, since 
almost all accounting policy choice studies have been conducted using 
USA data, this study will contribute to the, fund of knowledge by 
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extending accounting policy choice research to Saudi data. Second, 
focusing on Saudi companies gives an opportunity to test the robustness 
of positive accounting hypotheses outside the United States, where the 
political and contracting environment and the market in which accounting 
information is used may be very different 3. Last, this study introduces 
new environinent-oriented hypotheses to the positive accounting 
literature. 
3. This study is the first economic consequences study to adopt an in-depth 
empirical analysis of the Saudi private sector. 
1.10 KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
Explicit assumptions made in this study are as follows: 
1. It is assumed that the 1995-2000 development plan is a politically 
sensitive subject in Saudi Arabia and that financial accounting information 
reported by Saudi joint stock companies affects their exposure to political 
influences. 
2. As is the case with economic consequences studies generally, it is 
assumed that the participants in the political process who might propose 
3 Tawfik and Kadous (1991) are the first to empirically test the validity of applying the positive 
accounting theory hypotheses in Saudi Arabia. They studied the effect of firm-specific variables as 
well as environmental variables on the selection of both single policy choice and portfolio strategy 
choice by management in Saudi Arabia. Section 3.3.2 provides a detailed review of this study. 
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negative wealth transfers will not adjust for the managers' accounting 
policy choices unless the benefits from doing so exceed the costs. Also, it 
is assumed that either the compensation plans do not specify the 
accounting policy set ex-ante or that the compensation committees who 
typically administer such plans do not adjust, ex-post, for changes in 
accounting policies. 
3. This study assumes that managers of Saudi companies trade-off the 
expected impact of the economic influences of political costs and 
compensation when selecting an accounting policy. This is because the 
selection of a particular accounting policy often has opposing effects on 
political variables as against compensation variables. Thus, it is assumed 
that managers will choose the accounting policies that best balances 
these conflicting influences. 
1.11 LIMITATIONS 
Limitations of this study include the following: 
1. As already noted, this study collects empirical evidence on the existence 
of economic consequences and therefore does not deal with the analysis 
of how such economic consequences, if there are any, can be 
incorporated into the process of setting or choosing accounting standards. 
I 
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2. This study does not attempt to develop prescriptions for the improvement 
of external reporting practices in Saudi Arabia nor does it deal with 
normative accounting issues. 
3. Since a rigorous link between the theory and the empirical analysis has 
not been established, our empirical results may be limited by the 
traditional econometric problems related to measurement errors and 
omitted variables. 
4. Since this study is based on the politically sensitive effect of the 1995- 
2000 Saudi development plan, this limits our conclusions to the Saudi 
environment and to the 1995-2000 period. 
5. Since the sample used in' this study is based on Saudi joint stock 
companies, our results may not be generalised to other business 
environments. 
1.12 AN OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this study is constructed as follows: 
Chqpter Two describes the theoretical foundations of the study. Chapter 
Three explores the empirical foundations of the study. Chapter Four sets the 
scene for the study by describing the recent status of Saudi Arabia's 
political, legal, economic and accounting environment. The research 
hypotheses are established in Chapter Five and the research, methodology is 
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described in Chqpter Six. The summary statistics for each independent 
variable together with a discussion of the univariate and multivariate test 
results are reported in Chqpter Seven. Chqpter Eight contains conclusions on 
the major findings of the study and areas for future research. 
i 
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2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the theoretical foundations of the study by 
reviewing the economic consequences literature. The review begins with an 
outline of the most commonly identified approaches to the formulation of 
accounting policy. This review is fairly brief and intended to give the broad 
background information which is essential to an understanding of how the 
economic consequences literature has emerged. The second section explores 
the economic consequences literature under four headings; namely, the 
reasons for interest in economic consequences issues, definitions of 
economic consequences, classification of economic consequences, and the 
issue of how financial accounting standards bodies ought to respond to the 
economic consequences literature. The third section looks at the 
development of what is called 'a positive theory of the determination of 
accounting standards' in the USA literature, which incorporates into 
accounting the contracting and monitoring costs in the political and 
contracting processes, in order to explain and predict the effects of various 
accounting standards on the behaviour of different - decision-makers, 
particularly corporate managers. 
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2.1 HOW SHOULD ACCOUNTING POLICY BE DEVELOPED? 
Accounting policy, like all policy decisions, is a process of choice 
among alternatives. In this context, the major question that arises is: how 
should accounting policy be developed? This topic has received much 
attention during the last 50 years and several approaches to it have been 
suggested. ' The more commonly and recently identified approaches to 
accounting policy development include: (1) the technical framework 
approach, (2) the economic consequences approach, and (3) the critical 
approach. 
The technical approach focuses on the decision-usefulness of 
accounting information. Its basic idea is based on the premise that what 
information financial reporting should provide depends on the needs of those 
for whom the information is intended which, in turn, is determined by their 
economic activities and decisions. The FAS13 Conceptual Framework 
Project, for example, serves as a good example of this approach. The FASB 
Statement No. 1. Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business 
Enterprises, describes the environmental context where economic decisions 
are to be made to identify who are potential users of financial reports. The 
primary and secondary qualitative characteristics identified in the FASB 
Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics' of Accounting InforMation', 
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and the guidance suggested by the FASB Statement No. 5, Recognition and 
Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises, stunmarise 
the criteria to be used when accounting policy choices are made. These 
criteria determine what economic objects and events are likely to be useful 
to users, and how and when these objects and events should be described 
and measured. The ten basic elements identified in the FASB Statement No. 
64. Elements of Financial Statements, classify the identified economic 
objects and events of interest to users. Supporters of the technical approach 
argue that accounting policy should be established and evaluated within this 
conceptual framework if accounting standard setters want to justify their 
accounting policy choices [see, for example, Gellein (1978); Solomons 
(1978 and 1986)]. 
Although the decision-usefulness approach may be used to justify 
some technical aspects of accounting standards, it has been criticised for 
providing little insight in explaining: (1) the political forces that influence the 
development of accounting standards and practice, and (2) the undesirable 
social-welfare effects associated with the use of accounting reports. For 
example, May and Sundern (1976, p. 750) contend that: 
4 The FASB Statement No. 6 replaces Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 3 and 
extends its scope to include not-for-profit organisations. 
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In practice as well as in theory, the social welfare impact of 
accounting reports apparently is recognized. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that the [Financial Accounting Standards Board] is a 
political body and, consequently, that the process of selecting an 
acceptable accounting alternative is a political process. If the 
social welfare impact of accounting policy decisions were ignored, 
the basis for the existence of a regulatory body would disappear. 
Therefore, the FASB must consider explicitly political (i. e. social 
welfare) aspects as well as accounting theory and research in its 
decisions. 
Because of these fundamental limitations, the economic consequences 
approach has been suggested as an expansion of the decision-usefulness 
approach and is seen as an alternative approach for understanding and 
valuing the role of financial accounting reports in a broader societal context 
[see, for example, Gerboth (1973); Horngren (1973); May and Sundem 
(1976); Rappaport (1977); Taylor and Turley (1986); Whittred and Zimmer 
(1988); Committe (1990); Whittred, Zimmer and Taylor (1996); Sunder 
(1997)]. Supporters of this approach base their arguments on the fact that 
accounting standards affect the decision-making behaviour of prepares and 
users of accounting reports, and as a consequence, affect: (1) the distribution 
of wealth among individuals, and (2) the allocation of resources in an 
economy. In this view, an important implication is that accounting standards 
are not always neutral in that they impose benefits on some groups in society 
to the detriment of others. The theoretic4l arguments underlying the 
economic consequences approach will thus be discussed in -detail in the 
following sections. 
t 
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Closely related to the economic consequences approach is the critical 
perspectives theory of accounting policy. This approach has recently 
emerged as an expansion of the decision-usefulness approach. It, like the 
economic consequences approach, recognises that accounting is influenced 
by the social and political environment in which it is practised (Hunt and 
Hongler, 1990, p. 55). The critical approach, however, goes fin-ther and 
views accounting as a means, of aiding and legitimising the present social, 
economic and political arrangements as well as the ideology which 
underpins it [see, for example, Tinker, Lehman and Neiniark (1980); Tinker, 
Merino and Neimark (1982); Steffy and Grimes (1986)]. In this context, 
supporters5 of t1iis approach argue that "the themes of power, class, conflict, 
politics and ideology" in a society should be recognised and incorporated 
into the field of accounting (Steffy and Grimes, 1986, p. 322). 
2.2 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES: THE CONCEPT 
All decisions regarding accounting policy should have economic 
consequences. If there were no economic consequences, there 
The critical accounting research has increasingly attracted much attention [see, e. g., Burchell, 
Clubb, Hopwood and Hughes (1980); Cooper (1980 and 1984); Tinker (1980 and 1985); Tinker, 
Lehman and Neimark (1980); Tinker, Merino and Neimark (1982); Hopwood (1983 and 1987); 
Cooper and Sherer (1984); Neimark and Tinker (1986); Chua (1986a and b); Steffy and Grimes 
(1986); Cooper and Hopper (1987); Laughlin (1987); Hopper, Storey and Willmott (1987); Lehman 
and Tinker (1987); Williams (1987); Hines (1988 and 1989a); Hunt and Hongler (1990); Robson 
(1991,1992); Chua and Degeling (1993); Laughlin (1995); Lodh and Gaffikin (1997); Gallhofer 
and Haslam (1997); Cooper (1997)]. However, this type of research is still in its early stages of 
development and what it is ultimately about seems to be an unresolved issue (Lodh and Gaffikin, 
1997, p. 436). 
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would be no reason for the policy decision (Hendriksen, 1982, p. 
121), 
As the above quotation implies, accounting standard decisions are important 
because of their potential economic consequences. However, some 
consequences are undesirable. The issue of 'adverse economic 
consequences' (of financial accounting standards) emerged first in the 
United States in the 1970s (Zeff, 1978, p. 56), but increasingly has attracted 
a great deal of attention, not only in the United States, but also in many 
different countries (Taylor and Turley, 1986, p. 90). This section considers 
the economic consequences literature under four headings: 
1. The reasons for interest in the economic consequences of financial 
accounting standards; 
2. definitions of economic consequences; 
3. classification of economic consequences; and 
4. the issue of how financial accounting regulators should respond to the 
economic consequences implied by accounting standards. 
2.2.1 The Importance of The Economic Consequences Issue 
Why the economic consequences issue "has become the central 
contemporary issue in accounting" (AAA, 1978, p. 4), can be discussed 
from a number of standpoints, but perhaps it may best be seen from the 
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standpoint of the impact of accounting standards on social-welfare. From a 
social welfare viewpoint, the objective of financial reports is to provide 
relevant and reliable accounting information about economic events to the 
governmental departments which are responsible for achieving national 
goals, and to other individuals or groups who have a direct interest in the 
activities of firms. To acl-iieve this goal, financial accounting standards, 
which govem both what firms must disclose in their financial reports and 
also, how they must disclose their economic operations, must be neutral in 
that such standards should lead to desirable effects (or should, as least, not 
be responsible for undesirable effects) on the interests of both the national 
economy and individuals or groups who use the contents of financial reports 
as inputs to their decision making processes. However, this criterion has 
been questioned on a number of grounds: - 
1. It has been demonstrated that accounting standards do have an adverse 
effect on the achievement of national goals. An example occurred in the 
USA in 1978, when the FASB issued Statement No. 192 "Financial 
Accounting and Reporting hy Oil and Gas Producing Companies". This 
statement requires that oil and gas exploration costs must be accounted 
for under the successful-efforts method. Before this standard, 'oil and gas 
companies voluntarily adopted either the successful-efforts method or the 
30 
Chapter Two: Economic Consecluences: The Concep 
full-cost method, in their primary financial statements. Basically, the 
successful-efforts method expenses the oil and gas exploration costs of 
unsuccessful wells (dry wells) and capitalises only the exploration costs 
of successful wells (wet wells). On the other hand, the full-cost method 
capitalises the oil and gas exploration costs of both successful and 
unsuccessful wells (wet and dry wells) and amortises the costs against 
future revenues produced from successful wells (wet wells). From a 
national objectiyes point of view, however, it was claimed that tl-ýs 
mandated switch from the full-cost method to the successftil-efforts 
method, would have adverse effects on the ability of exploration-oriented 
companies to raise capital and expand exploration activities and compete 
with other companies. For this reason, the Departments of Justice and 
Energy, the Federal Trade Commission, and exploration-oriented oil and 
gas companies applied great pressure on the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to overrule FASB Statement No. 19 and permit both 
of the two methods. In the USA numerous other examples can be cited. 
Cases in point include the investment tax credit (APB Opinion No. 2, 
1961), research and development costs (FASB Statement No. 2,1974), 
accounting for contingencies (FASB Statement No. 5,1975), foreign 
currency translation (FASB Statement No. 8.1975), and inflation 
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accounting. The UK experience in the formulation of accounting 
standards also provides further support for the view that accounting 
standards can impede national ob ectives. For example, SSAP 11, 
Accounting for Deferred Taxation, and SSAP 13, Accounting for 
Research and Development Costs, were both amended because they were 
thought to be incompatible with national objectives [Hope and Gray 
(1982); Sutton (1984); Zeff (1988)]. In this regard, Zeff (1988, pp. 21-22) 
comments on SSAP 11: 
In 1978 the Accounting Standards Committee responded to 
pressures from industry, banking and government to reject 
"comprehensive" deferred tax accounting in favour of "partial" 
deferred tax accounting... Nor was the Government pleased with 
SSAP 11. Since industry had been accorded sizeable tax relief 
both for depreciable assets and stock in trade, Government was 
not comfortable with the prospect of the same companies issuing 
published accounts in which large notional tax expenses would be 
shown, as if the tax relief had never been given. 
2. Investors are considered to be the most important users of financial 
statements, and hence decisions regarding accounting policies are 
intended to improve the information available to diem. This improvement 
in inforination should assist investors to achieve more efficient stock 
portfolios and, through the market mechanism, affect the allocation of 
resources in the economy. However, a number of studies have presented 
evidence which shows that changes in accounting policies, which create 
different accounting numbers, often confuse investors and cause security 
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prices to react inefficiently, reflecting the changes in accounting numbers 
rather than the changes in the economic characteristics of the companies 
concerned. The result is, therefore, an inefficient allocation of society's 
resources. For example, Dyckman and Smith (1979), Collins and Dent 
(1979), Lev (1979), and Larcker and Revsine (1983) conducted tests to 
see if the issuance of the exposure draft preceding the issue of FASB 
Statement No. 19 had an adverse effect on the returns of USA oil and gas 
companies using the full-cost method. These studies have generally 
concluded that there was evidence of a market reaction6. Moreoven, when 
the SEC later allowed the full-cost method to be used (FASB Statement 
No. 25), Smith (1981) and Collins, Rozeff, and Salatka (1982) observed a 
reversal of the earlier adverse impact. Lobo and Song (1989) also 
examined the controversial issue of the effect of FASB Statement No. 33, 
"Financial Reporting and Changing Prices ". Their study was conducted 
at the aggregate level of the security market and reported evidence of 
stock price reaction to releases of information on current costs. 
3. In addition to the effect of changes in accounting policies on the decisions 
of investors, many other types of decisions are affected by accounting 
6 These studies, among others, provide conflicting results to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
(EMH) and the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM), which assert that changes in accounting 
policies, with no known cash flow consequences, should have no effect on stock prices. 
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policies. The effects of accounting procedures on a company's contractual 
relationships may be deemed to be one important area. These effects 
result from the fact that the contractual relationships between a 
company's shareholders and management and those between a company's 
debtholders and its shareholders are Erequently expressed in terms of 
accounting numbers or financial statement ratios. Changes in the 
accounting policies for calculating these numbers or ratios may effectively 
alter the wealth or cash flows of the parties to these contracts. We discuss 
this issue in more detail in section 2.3.3, but at this stage it may be noted 
that evidence on these effects suggests that negative economic 
consequences have resulted from certain accounting standards. Such 
evidence is discussed at length in chapter three. 
4. There is another ground for considering the economic consequemes of 
accounting standards. Solomons (1986, p. 222) notes that: "public utility 
pricing may be affected by the picture of profitability a regulatory 
commission sees when it examines a utility's financial statements". This 
hypothesis is supported by the empirical evidence. For example, when the 
rate-of-retum regulation was first established in the United States, Jarrell 
(1979) found that electric. utilities used certain income-decreasing 
accounting policies in order to reduce the reported rate of return and 
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hence improve the rationale for a rise in electricity prices. McInnes (1990) 
demonstrated that such a situation also exists in the UK gas industry. In 
his longitudinal study, McInnes investigated the accounting policy 
changes made for the UK gas industry from 1969 to 1974 and found that 
certain accounting policies were used in order to enhance the 
"justifications for increases in gas prices" (Mchmes, 1990, p. 315). 
In sum, interest in economic consequences issue may be explained by 
the fact that accounting policy decisions have important implications for the 
achievement of national goals, capital market efficiency, contractual 
relationships, and public utility pricing. 
2.2.2 Definitions of Economic Consequences 
The term 'economic consequences' may be defined in a number of 
ways. Zeff (1978, p. 56), who was one of the first to specifically define the 
term, offers the following definition: 
By 'economic consequences' is meant the impact of accounting 
reports on the decision-making behavior of business, government, 
unions, investors and creditors. It is argued that the resulting 
behavior of these individuals and groups could be detrimental to 
the interests of other affected parties. 
TWs definition focuses on the effect of accounting data presented in external 
L*-- 
financial reports on the way users of such reports view the economic 
position and prospects of the companies with which they deal, and how such 
t 
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a view affects their decision-making behaviour. For example, the adoption of 
the last-in, first out (LIFO) inventory method during an inflationary period 
probably results in changes in the investors' evaluation of the risk or returns 
associated with a company's equity securities. Similarly, the reporting of 
current values during an inflationary period, which generally leads to a lower 
reported net profit, may influence the government's willingness to subject 
the company to certain tax and other regulations. It may also affect the 
banks' willingness to enter into credit arrangements with the company, and 
potential employees' preferences for working for the company. Furthermore, 
it is argued that the accounting infon-nation contained in financial reports 
may also influence the decisions-making behaviour of the preparers of such 
reports. Prakash and Rappaport (1977, p. 30) offer the term 'information 
inductance' to describe this feedback effect: "We use the term 'information 
inductance' ... to refer to the complex process through which the behavior 
of an information sender is influenced by the information he is required to 
communicate". The FASB Statement No. 5. Accountingfor Contingencies, 
serves as a good example of 'information inductance'. This standard 
prohibits the so-called self-insurance reserves and requires loss 
contingencies to be charged to income. It was claimed that these 
requirements have forced some USA insurance companies to purchase 
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insurance policies which were not in the best interests of their shareholders 
(Solomons, 1978, p. 145). 
Whittred, Zimmer and Taylor (1996) look at economic consequences 
from a different angle. They (1996, p. 16) offer the following implicit 
definition: 
Our discussion serves to illustrate two points: 
(1) Property rights/sharing rules in many private contracts are 
defined over accounting numbers. 
(2) Changes in the rules/standards for calculating these numbers 
can effectively redistribute wealth between the parties to the 
contracts. These wealth transfers, the economic consequences of 
accounting method choice, are ultimately the source of the 
incentive to possess financial rule-making authority, or at least to 
influence the deliberations of rule-making bodies. 
Here, Whittred, Zimmer and Taylor define the term 'economic 
consequences' by reference to the contractual relationships between 
shareholders and management and those between debtholders and 
shareholders. As we see in section 2.3.3, contracts between shareholders 
and management often include bonus plans or stock option plans designed to 
encourage managers to act in the best interests of shareholders. These plans 
are frequently expressed in terms of accounting numbers, such as corporate 
net profit before extraordinary gains and losses. Similarly, contracts between 
shareholders and debtholders often contain restrictive covenants designed to 
reduce the ability of shareholders to expropriate the, wealth of debtholders. 
These restrictive covenants are frequently expressed in - terms of financial 
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statement ratios, such as the debt/equity ratio. Changes in the accounting 
policies for calculating these numbers or ratios may effectively alter the 
wealth or cash flows of the parties to these contracts. 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, p. 77) provide a definition which 
appears to embrace the two definitions of economic consequences cited 
above: 
Accounting choices have economic consequences if changes in the 
rules used to calculate accounting numbers alter the distribution 
of a firm's cash flows, or the wealth of parties who use those 
numbers for contracting and decision making. 
The words 'contracting and decision making' appear to cover both the 
contractual relationships between shareholders and other parties and the 
effect of accounting data published in financial statements on the behaviour 
of decision-makers who use such statements. 
2.2.3 Classification of Economic Consequences 
Economic consequences can be classified according to their causes or 
their outcomes. The first type of classification was given by Benston and 
Krasney (1978) who argue that economic consequences arise because of 
two effects: direct and indirect. Direct effects are defined as "those that 
clearly and rapidly affect the transfer of resources among individuals", and 
indirect effects are defined as "those that change the way people view the 
economic status and progress of an enterprise and, as a consequence, affect 
38 
Chapter Two: Economic Consequences: The Concept 
their behavior toward the enterprise" (Benston and Krasney, 1978, pp. 162- 
163). The definition of the direct effects appears to refer to those economic 
consequences issues that arise because of the contractual relationships 
between a company's shareholders and some other party. This is clearly 
identified when Benston and Krasney (1978, pp. 162-163) state: 
Other examples are the rates allowed to utilities by regulatory 
agencies in the absence of specified regulatory accounting 
requirements, and effects on existing contracts when a change of 
accounting rules impinges a restrictive covenant. 
The definition of the indirect effects explicitly refers to those economic 
consequences issues that arise from decisions taken by users of financial 
statements in response to the accounting information provided. 
Blake (1992) also used this type of classification- the causes of 
economic consequences. He classified economic consequences issues into 
three categories: those that arise because of (1) compliance/analysis costs, 
(2) the mechanistic application of regulation or contracts, and (3) decisions 
taken by users of financial statements. He argues that because the costs of 
changes in accounting disclosure regulations are largely borne by companies 
and may positively or negatively affect analysts, these costs give rise to 
economic consequences. He (1992, p. 307) also argues that economic 
consequences issues may arise because the numbers reported in the accounts 
of a company affect its regulatory and contractual mechanism, and "because 
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of decisions taken by some readers of accounts in response to the 
)7 information provided' 
The second type of classification- the outcomes of economic 
consequences- was first suggested by Selto and Neumann (1981) who see 
income and wealth distribution and resource allocation as the fimdamental 
elements within the economic consequences concept. Therefore, they 
classify economic consequences in terms of effects on the distribution of 
income and wealth, and effects on resources allocation, either among firms 
or within the firm. They (1981, p. 318) distinguish between these two effects 
by stating that: 
... resource allocation effects are those which affect the aggregate 
wealth of the economy (e. g. GNP), and income distribution effects 
are those which transfer or redistribute that wealth among 
individuals. 
They also classify economic consequences according to the parties who are 
affected by publicly reported accounting information. Those parties are 
classified into three broad categories: "(1) suppliers of information, (2) 
7 In order to test these three causes, Blake (1992) selected twenty economic consequences issues 
which have arisen over the development of accounting regulations in the UK since the formulation 
of the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC). He found that ten economic consequences issues 
resulted from decisions made by users of accounts; nine issues resulted from the mechanistic 
application of regulation or contracts; and one issue falls under the compliance/analysis costs 
heading. 
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users, and (3) potential suppliers, users and other parties" (Selto and 
Neumann, 1981, p. 317)8. 
2.2.1 Accountin Reimlators and the Economic Consequences Issue 
To what extent should accounting regulators take economic 
consequences issues into consideration when choosing among proposed 
accounting standards? A number of positions can be taken on this issue. 
Since the late 1970s and up to the present, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) has been confronted with three broad views on 
how it should respond to economic consequences issues: 
1. One view sees the investigation of economic consequences as being 
irrelevant to the accounting regulatory process, and insists that accounting 
standards should be based on generally accepted practices and that 
disputes over accounting policies should be resolved by reference to a 
comprehensive conceptual framework of accounting theory. 
2. A second view sees the establishment of accounting standards as being 
fimdamentally a technical matter, but also acknowledges the possible 
8 These two types of classification are then used to construct a matrix format in order to identify 
economic consequences of accounting, information which have been neglected by accounting 
researchers. 
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adverse economic consequences that may result from proposed 
accounting standards. 
3. A third view contends that because self-interested groups put pressure on 
the FASB to adopt the accounting standards that yield the most desirable 
economic consequences for that group, the FASB should weigh up the 
economic consequences of potential accounting standards. That is, 
economic consequences considerations should be adopted as a means of 
justifying and rationalising the issuance of accounting standards. 
The first view is supported by Gellein (1978) who argues that 
accounting standards should be based primarily on technical considerations 
because it is difficult to prove that adverse consequences do exist or may 
exist, and even if they are known to exist, it is difficult to know what weight 
to give them in accounting policy decisions. Solomons (1978, p. 151) also 
takes a similar position and argues that: "the criteria by which rules are to be 
judged is not the effect which they may or may not have on business 
behaviour. It is the accuracy with which they reflect the facts of the 
situation. ". Latter, Solomons (1986, p. 235) wrote that: 
To subvert accounting measurements in the supposed interests of 
one group or another cannot fail to undermine the integrity of 
accounting and to rob it of its credibility. This brings us back to 
the importance of neutrality. Neutrality in accounting means 
freedom from bias, not lack of purpose. There may still'be 
winners and losers after a change in an accounting rule; but the 
integrity of the system serves everyone's interest in the long run. I 
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In support of informal or implicit recognition of the economic 
consequences of accounting standards the following arguments have been 
put forward: 
In summary, the accounting standards setters must first develop 
and articulate the conceptual framework within which they are 
going to resolve difficult accounting issues. Then, as they 
undertake specific problems they should make themselves aware 
of the economic and social ramifications of alternative decisions 
that might be made (Wyatt, 1977, p. 94). 
To what degree should the FASB have regard for economic 
consequences? To say that any significant economic consequences 
should be studied by the board does not imply that accounting 
principles and fair presentation should be dismissed as the 
principal guiding factor in the board's determination ... While 
some observers might opt for determining accounting standards 
only with regard to their consequences for economic and social 
welfare, the FASB would surely preside over its own demise if it 
were to adopt this course and make decisions primarily on other 
than accounting grounds (Zeff, 1978, p. 63). 
These political pressures cannot be ignored, and individuals and 
corporations should have an opportunity to be heard; but 
accounting policy should not be established by political process 
alone. Technical considerations including the results of theory 
and research should be of primary importance with the objective 
of producing the greatest benefit to society (Hendriksen, 1984, p. 
133). 
The third view which supports explicit recognition of the economic 
consequences of accounting standards has been represented by Gerboth 
(1973, p. 479) who argues: "In the face of conflict between competing 
interests, rationality as well as prudence lies not in seeking fmal answers but 
rather in compromise-essentially a political process". Horngren (1973, p. 
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61), who was one of the first to specifically refer to the economic 
consequences issue, also writes: 
The setting of accounting standards is as mush a product of 
political action as of flawless logic or empirical findings. Why? 
Because the setting of standards is a social decision. Standards 
place restrictions on behavior; therefore, they must be accepted 
by the affected parties. 
Similarly, Rappaport (1977, p. 98) criticises the FASB and states: 
In brief, while accounting policymakers can claim to be value free in 
their standard setting activities by choosing to ignore the 
consequences of their information choices, the consequences 
themselves will nonetheless take place. A responsible position of 
accountability calls for the explicit consideration of economic 
impact of financial accounting standards by all accounting 
policymaking bodies. 
As a response to such a criticism, the FASB has organised a conference on 
economic consequences issues and sponsored special research studies 
directed towards detecting any economic consequences accounting 
standards might have on management behaviour or securities Markets. In 
1978, the FASB acknowledged that accounting standards might give rise to 
economic consequences; nevertheless, the FASB found it very difficult to 
know how such economic consequences can be incorporated into the 
process of setting or choosing accounting standards (FASB, 1978, p. vi). 
In the UK, although there has not been the same degree of interest in 
the economic consequences of accounting standards, one may interpret 
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ED29, Accounting for Leases and Hire Purchase Contracts, as being 
implicit acknowledgement by the ASC of the relevance of this issue: 
While the ASC has no doubt that capitalisation of assets held 
under finance leases is the appropriate technical and practical 
solution to the accounting problem, A must nevertheless be 
recognised that there are some who argue that this solution 
(while technically sound) might have undesirable economic 
consequences ... Commentators who submit reasoned opinions 
that there would be an unacceptable danger of adverse economic 
consequences are invited to consider what course should be taken 
in a standard in place of capitalisation (ASC, ED29,1981, para. 
33). 
This statement, however, implies that accounting standard setting in the UK 
rests primarily on technical considerations. In general, interest in economic 
consequences has been most evident in the USA rather than in the UK 
because: 
The ASC is a wholly private body. No powers have been 
delegated to it by government. In consequence, a new accounting 
rule must command a higher level of support before it can be 
introduced than is the case with the FASB. Moreover, as noted 
earlier, the penalties it can impose on those that flout its rulings 
are severely limited. Since non-compliance is a feasible 
alternative, producers have less incentive to lobby against 
proposed standards and there is less call for public interest 
66excuses" (Sutton, 1984, p. 92). 
2.3 THE POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY 
The brief summary of the economic consequences literature given 
above indicates that its impetus comes from two sources. One is the impact 
of financial accounting statements on the users' decision-making behaviour. 
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The other is the existence of corporate contractual relationsMps. Therefore, 
one direct way to collect empirical evidence on the existence of economic 
consequences following from accounting standards is through examining the 
behaviour of companies themselves. The philosophy underlying this idea is 
well-known as the positive theory of accounting policy choices. In order to 
collect such evidence, the positive accounting theory focuses on the 
behaviour of corporate managers because of their ability to influence 
economic variables and also, because of their vital role in choosing 
accounting policies adopted by companies. This theory also utilises the 
principles of the economic theory of regulation and the contracting and 
agency theories in order to link accounting standards to changes in the 
managers' decision-making behaviour. This section considers in detail the 
concepts of the positive accounting theory under four headings: 
1. Development of the positive accounting theory; 
2. the political process; 
3. the contracting process; and 
4. an overview of the positive accounting theory. 
2.3.1 Development of The Positive Accountimi Theory 
The first attempt to develop a positive theory of accountmg is due to 
Hepworth (1953) who argued that managers are concerned, with smoothing 
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their firms' income series. This argument was extended by Gordon in 1964. 
Gordon argued that managers may be motivated to choose accounting 
policies which smooth reported income and which smooth the rate of growth 
in income, because they are rational expected utility of wealth maximisers. 
On the basis of this proposition a number of empirical studies 9 examined the 
income smoothing hypothesis. The results from these studies generally 
indicated that managers' accounting policy choices were aimed at increasing 
their job security, the level and growth of their income and the size of their 
companies. These studies are also based on two major assumptions. One is 
that accounting reports are assumed to be the only source of information 
available to investors. The other is that stock markets could be 'fooled' by 
changes in accounting policies. However, subsequent studies of investors' 
reaction to publicly available financial reports have undermined these two 
propositions, at least to some degree. The best-known study of the 
relationship between stock prices and accounting reports is that by Ball and 
Brown (1968) who looked particularly at annual earnings for a sample of 
USA companies. They examined the stock market reaction to unexpected 
changes in annual earnings and found - that investors do use accounting 
9 See, e. g., Gordon, Horwitz and Meyers (1966); Dopuch and Dralce'(1966); Archibald (1967); 
Copeland (1968); Copeland and Licastro (1968); Cushing (1969); Dasher and Malcolm (1970); 
White (1970); Barefield and Comisky (1972); Beidleman (1973). 
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information but market prices adjust rapidly to the information contained in 
accounting reports. This evidence indicates that much of the accounting 
reports' information has already reached the stock market through 
alternative sources. Brown and Kennelly (1972) observed similar results 
with- quarterly earnings. Patell. and Wolfson (1981) also investigated the 
relationship between earnings announcements and the variance of share 
returns and noted similar results. The findings of these studies indicate that 
the first proposition of the income smoothing hypothesis does not hold up. 
Furthermore, studies of investors' reaction to accounting information based 
on managers' voluntary choices of accounting policies have also undennined 
the second proposition of the income smoothing hypothesis. According to 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis, changes in accounting policies with no 
known cash flow consequences should have no effect on security prices. The 
empirical evidence developed by, for example, Archibald (1972), Ball 
(1972), Kaplan and Roll (1972), Beaver and Dukes (1973), Foster (1975 
and 1977), and Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (1978) indicates that investors 
are able to distinguish between changes in accounting policies which are 
purely 'cosmetic' and changes which reflect real economic events. This 
evidence indicates that investors are able to make adjustments to earnings 
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and so, managers are not able to mislead investors by manipulating earnings 
by changing their accounting policies. 
However, subsequent studies of the relationship between accounting 
policy choices and movements in stock prices have yielded conflicting 
results. The empirical evidence developed by, for example, Dyckrnan and 
Smith (1979), Collins and Dent (1979), Lev (1979), Smith (1981b), Collins, 
Rozeff, and Salatka (1982), and Larcker and Revsine (1983), indicates that 
changes in some accounting policies have had an effect on security prices. 
These studies have identified apparently systematic stock price movements 
in response to accounting policy changes that have no known cash flow 
consequences. However, even if we assume that these findings are wrong, 
there remain a number of fundamental questions concerning why managers 
of companies: (1) are concerned with which accounting policies are used in 
preparing their financial statements, and (2) lobby for or against certain 
proposed accounting standards. Recent research has incorporated into 
accounting the principles of the economic theory of regulation and the 
contracting and agency theories in order to answer these two questions. 
Like in the case of the income smoothing literature, this positive accounting 
research assumes that management acts so as to maximise its own utility. 
However, the main focus of this research rests with deten-nining how 
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accounting policies affect cash flows and, hence management's utility, to 
obtain an insight into factors that influence a manager's choices of 
accounting procedures. To answer this question, it is assumed that the 
contracting and monitoring costs associated with companies' political 
processes, and with companies' (debt and compensation) contracts are 
nonzero. This nonzero cost assumption suggests that certain accounting 
methods have the potential to redistribute wealth, and hence the company's 
or the managers' future cash flows. The following sections consider the 
arguments underlying this type of research in more detail. 
2.3.2 The Political Process 
The traditional economic theory of the political process asserts that 
regulators and legislators act in the 'public interest' by maximising social 
welfare [see, for example, Posner (1974); McCraw (1975)]. Under this 
'public interest' theory, regulators and legislators consider the expected 
social costs and benefits of their actions, including their review of 
accounting policies. However, the inconsistencies between this theory and 
the evidence has led to the formulation of an alternative economic theory of 
the political process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979, p. 283). This theory 
asserts individuals in the political process maximise their own utility [see, 
for example, Olson (1971); Stigler (1971); Peltzman (1976)]. Under this 
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'self-interest' theory, the political process is seen as "a competition among 
individuals for wealth transfer" (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 224). As a 
result,, individuals involved in the political process incur information costs 
(the costs of becoming informed), lobbying costs (the costs of taking some 
actions) and coalition costs (the costs of fonning coalitions) (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986, p. 222). As defined by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, 
pp. 83 and 88) we call the sum of these costs "the contracting and 
monitoring costs" in the political process. These nonzero contracting and 
monitoring costs are critical if accounting policy choices are to have 
economic consequences. This is generally explained via two causal links 
between firms' cash flows and their reported accounting numbers: 
1. Political visibilitv 
Given the assumption. of the 'self-interest' theory that individuals in 
the political process seek to maximise their own wealth, Watts and 
Zimmerman (197 8) and others argue that companies which report high net 
income are politically visible. Hence, they are more likely to be subject to 
wealth redistribution (political costs) by individuals in the political 
process through the imposition of more regulations, special taxes on 
reported earnings or arguing for various forms of special social 
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responsibilitieslo. For example, given the 'self-interest' theory, some 
voters have an incentive to lobby for the imposition of a regulation on an 
industry or a company. This, in turn, induces politicians to propose such 
regulations, perhaps because this would increase "their probability of re- 
election", and/or because the politicians would "expropriate some of the 
transfers, and increase the resources under their control" (Holthausen and 
Leftwich, 1983, p. 88). To avoid drawing the lobbyists' attention to 
themselves, managers of those politically visible companies have 
incentives (1) to employ income-decreasing accounting policies, and (2) 
to lobby against proposed accounting standards which would increase 
their reported net income. However, changes in accounting policies affect 
the political visibility of companies only if the contracting and monitoring 
costs in the political process are nonzero. Otherwise, voters can 
c6costlessly" form coalitions, gather information about the effects of the 
accounting procedures on their welfare, and lobby for a regulation. 
Further, if the contracting and monitoring costs are not nonzero, 
politicians themselves can "costlessly" adjust for changes in accounting 
policies. Collectively, it is argued that if coalitions, lobbying and 
10 Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p. 8) argue that the likelihood that reported "high" income will 
be used by individuals in the political process as excuses for imposing regulations increases with 
the size of the company. 
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becoming informed are costly, voters as well as politicians will trade off 
the effects of accounting policy changes on their welfare against the costs 
of forming coalitions, lobbying and gathering information and the costs of 
adjustment. For example, Downs (1957a and 1957b) argues that a voter 
has little incentive to incur costs to gather information relevant to his vote 
because his effect on an election outcome is very small. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) also argue that politicians will adjust for changes in 
accounting policies up to the point where the marginal costs of doing so 
equals the marginal benefit. In this context, it is argued that managers who 
use (or lobby for) income-decreasing accounting policies, in order to 
reduce the political visibility of their companies, believe that there is some 
probability that politicians will not adjust reported earnings numbers. This 
assumption has allowed positive accounting researchers to test the 
hypotheses that if a company is large, has high systematic risk, is highly 
capital intensive or is operating in a highly concentrated industry, its 
managers are more likely to choose income-decreasing accounting 
policies in order to avoid the political scrutiny which may result in new 
regulations adversely affecting the company's future cash flows. 
t 
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2. Government reimlation 
Another implication for the 'self-interest' theory is via the linkage 
between accounting numbers and the cash flow induced by rate-of-return 
regulations. In the USA the rate-of-return regulation sets maximum prices 
designed to provide electric utility companies an allowed rate of return on 
their capital invested, as measured by accounting numbers. If an electric 
company wants to increase its utility prices, it must show that either its 
costs have increased or its capital employed (its rate base) has increased. 
This regulation gives the managers of regulated companies incentives to 
choose accounting policies which either increase the company's reported 
costs or increase its investment in order to enhance the arguments for a 
rise in electricity prices, i. e. a rise in the company's cash flows (Jarrell, 
1979). For the same reasons the managers of regulated companies have 
incentives to Jobby for or against proposed accounting standards which 
have effects on the companies' reported costs or investment base. 
However, under either of the two cases, the utility regulators" decisions 
on whether or not to grant a price rise to a regulated company depends on 
whether consumers exert political pressure on the regulators and coalesce 
and lobby against the price rise. In turn, given the nonzero contracting and 
monitoring assumption, this depends on whether the expected benefits 
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that the consumers would receive in the form of lower prices are greater 
than the contracting and monitoring costs that they would incur from 
forming coalitions and lobbying and gathering information about the 
proposed price rise. Similarly, the utility regulators will adjust for changes 
in accounting policies up to the point where the marginal costs of doing so 
equals the marginal benefit to them. If the consumers have expended 
resources (resulting from forming coalitions, lobbying and becoming 
informed) for exerting political pressure on the regulators, it is more likely 
that the regulators would make adjustments for changes in accounting 
policies as the marginal benefits from doing so are increased. 
Alternatively, if the consumers have not exerted political pressure on the 
regulators, allowing the utility's rates to increase is more likely to be in 
the interest of regulators because the marginal costs of adjusting for 
changes in accounting policies are greater than the marginal profits. Watts 
and Zimmennan (1978, p. 117) point out that rational consumers would 
not incur large contracting and monitoring costs for a small rate increase 
because "the per capita coalition costs each consumer (or some group of 
consurners)" bears are likely to be much greater than "the small per 
capita benefits" each consumer receives "via lower regulated rates". 
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Knowing this, the regulators would not make adjustments for changes in 
accounting policies, i. e. granting the proposed price rise. 
2.3.3 The Contracting Process 
Coase (1937) observes that, in a world without contracting costs, 
there would be no need for firms to intennediate between consumers and the 
owners of factors of production, and all decisions would be based on a 
complete set of costlessly observable market prices. Therefore, he argues 
that firms owe their existence to contracting costs. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) develop this contracting costs proposition to a view of the firm as a 
nexus of (explicit and implicit) contracts embodying the property rights of all 
individual participants in that firm. Jensen and Meckling argue that because 
of the lack of a complete contract, each set of the participants in the firm 
will pursue their own interests at the expense of other participants. 
Therefore, this self-interest behaviour produces conflicts. In the context of a 
firm in the private sector, there are two possible conflicts. The first is the 
conflict between management and shareholders; decisions that maximise 
managers' expected utility do not necessarily maximise the shareholders' 
expected utility. This conflict gives rise to. the so-called agency costs of 
equity. These costs include the reduction in a firm's value when 
sI hareho Id ers perceive managers as not acting -1 in the shareholders' best 
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interests; specifically where managers act inefficiently or do not invest in 
profitable projects, as the shareholders would like. Jensen and Meckling 
argue that these costs are borne by managers if no action is taken to reduce 
them by monitoring and bonding contracts. Therefore, it is argued that in 
order to reduce these agency costs, managers will voluntarily enter into 
monitoring and bonding contracts which seek to guarantee that they will not 
exploit shareholders. An example of such contracts is a management 
compensation plan which provides that a portion of management's rewards 
be related to its reported earnings. 
The second possible conflict is the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and debtholders; decisions favourable to shareholders are not 
necessarily in the best interests of debtholders. This conflict gives rise to the 
so-called agency costs of debt. These costs arise because of, for example, 
excessive dividend payments, disposal of all or part of the assets of the firm, 
under-investment, bankruptcy and reorganisation, etc". - Jensen and 
Meckling also argue that these costs are borne by shareholders/managers 12 if 
no action is taken to reduce them by monitoring and bonding devices. Thus, 
For a detailed description of such costs see Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Smith 
and Warner (1979) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986), among others. 
12 Note that in analysing the shareholder/debtholder conflict, it is normally assumed that managers 
act as if they own 100% of the firm's equity (i. e. acting on behalf of shareholders). This allows us 
to ignore the agency costs of equity (Whittred, Zimmer and Taylor, 1996, p. 36). 
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it is assumed that managers have incentives to enter into monitoring and 
bonding contracts in order to reduce the agency costs of debt. Writing 
restrictive covenants in debt agreements is an example of these contracts. 
However, accounting numbers are often used to set the covenant 
conditions of both compensation and debt contracts and to monitor whether 
or not these conditions have been breached. This implies that accounting 
policies that underlie the accounting numbers are selected as a part of the 
wealth-maximising process. Thus, managers' wealth can be affected by 
changes in accounting policies and hence there are incentives for managers 
to use certain accounting policies in such a way as to enhance the 
company's or their future cash flows. However, this would occur only if the 
contracting and monitoring costs in the contracting process are nonzero; that 
is, if designing, negotiating, writing, renegotiating and evaluating compliance 
with the terms of contracts are costly (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, p 
78). The links between these nonzero contracting and monitoring costs and 
changes in accounting policies may be explained ffirther as follows: 
1. Management compensation plans 
Compensation schemes often include bonus plans and/or stock option 
plans designed to allow managers a share of a firm's profits. These 
schemes are typically stated in terms'of ac'coun'ting, ne't'profit, 'o'r'rat'e'of 
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return on book value of assets. Hence, such compensation schemes can be 
affected by accounting policy choices. Therefore, managers may be 
motivated to influence the remuneration they receive by choosing (and 
lobbying for) accounting policies that are perceived to increase the 
present value of their compensation packages 13 . However, changes 
in 
accounting policies affect the present value of the managers' 
compensation packages only if it is costly to negotiate and monitor the 
terms of compensation plans, and if it is costly to renegotiate and ad ust 
the effect of changes in accounting policies on the compensation plans. If 
negotiating and monitoring the terms of compensation plans are costless, 
ex ante accounting policies can be precisely specified, so that managers' 
remuneration will not be affected by any future accounting policy 
changes. Similarly, if renegotiation and adjustment are not costly, the 
effect of changes in accounting policies on the compensation plans can be 
completely offset, ex post. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that 
shareholders (or members of a compensation committee) will adjust for 
changes in accounting policies up to the pointwhere the marginal cost of 
doing so equals the marginal benefit. In this context, Watts and 
13 Note that, even if there is no explicit or implicit links between financial statement variables and 
management compensation plans, the effect of reported accounting profit on'a firm's political 
visibility could result in management considering this factor in accounting policy choices. 
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Zimmerman (1978) and others argue that managers who use (or lobby for) 
income-increasing accounting policies, believe that there is some 
probability that shareholders (or members of a compensation committee) 
will not adjust the compensation plans. This assumption has allowed 
positive accounting researchers to deduce the following testable 
hypothesis: managers of companies with management compensation plans 
are more likely to adopt income-increasing accounting policies than 
managers of companies without management compensation plans. 
2. Debt aueements 
Debt agreements often contain restrictive covenants stated in terms of 
accounting numbers and designed to limit management's ability to create 
wealth transfers between debt and equity holders. Examples of typical 
covenants found in debt agreements include restrictions on the payment of 
dividends, the issuance of new debts, the disposition of assets and merger 
activity. Watts (1977) suggests that these constraints may explain 
management's accounting policy choices. Changes in accounting policies 
used to calculate the accounting nurnbers in debt agreements induce 
effective changes in the restrictions of these agreements, which in turn 
alter the economic wealth or cash flows of 411 parties (managers, 
shareholders and debtholders) to these debt agreements, and the 
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probability of default on loan covenants. Therefore, 
managers/shareholders' wealth can be affected by changes in accounting 
policies and hence there are incentives for managers to use (or lobby for) 
accounting policies that would lead to an increase in the company's cash 
flows. However, accounting policy choices affect a company's cash flows 
only if the contracting and monitoring costs are nonzero. As Holthausen 
and Leftwich (1983, pp 86-87) put it: 
If negotiating and monitoring debt agreements are costless, then 
the lending agreement can specify, ex ante, accounting rules so 
precisely that the restrictions will be unaffected by subsequent 
voluntary or mandatory accounting rule changes. Alternatively, if 
renegotiation is costless, borrowers and lenders can (costlessly) 
negate accounting rule changes as they occur. Finally, with 
costless recapitalization, the borrower can negate the accounting 
changes (costlessly) by repurchasing the debt, and reissuing it 
subject to a new agreement incorporating the modified accounting 
rules. 
Like management compensation plans, it is argued that parties to these 
debt agreements trade off the effects of accounting policy changes on an 
debt agreement against the costs of negotiation and monitoring, 
renegotiation or recapitalization. Watts and Zimmerman (197 8) and others 
argue that managers who use (or lobby for) income-increasing accounting 
policies believe that there is some probability that debt agreements will 
not be adjusted. This assumption has allowed positive accounting 
researchers to hypothesise that the higher the leverage, (the long-term 
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debt/total assets ratio) of a company, the more binding are the debt 
covenants and thus the more likely that the company's managers will opt 
for income-increasing accounting policies. 
2.3.4 An Overview of The Positive Accounting Theory 
The positive accounting theory is associated with the names of Ross 
Watts and Jerold Zimmerman. In their first article, Towards a Positive 
Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards, Watts and 
Zimmennan (1978, p. 112) note that: 
Such a theory will help us to understand better the source of the 
pressures driving the accounting stand ard-s etting process, the 
effects of various accounting standards on different groups of 
individuals and allocation of resources, and why various groups 
are willing to expend resources trying to affect the standard- 
setting process. 
They (1978, p. 113) also note that because rhanagers play "a central role in 
the deten-nination of standards", concentration on their incentives is 
sufficient for that understanding. In their book-length exposition, Positive 
Accounting Theory, Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 5) explicitly credit the 
formulation of the positive accounting theory to developments in economics 
and finance. Of partic ular importance are: 
1. The economic theories of regulation; 
2. the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH); 
t 
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3. the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM); 
4. the theory of rational expectations; and 
5. contracting and agency theory. 
The economic theories of regulation fulfil a crucial role in positive 
accounting theory. The developments in these theories have allowed positive 
accounting researchers to assume that: 
1. Individuals in the political process are motivated only by their self- 
interest, i. e. not by their public interest. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and the Capital Assets Pricing 
Model (CAPM) also play an important role in the formulation of the positive 
accounting theory. The EMH, briefly stated, states that stock prices 
accurately reflect all available information, and, if so, no one can 
consistently earn an above average return and stock prices will adjust 
rapidly and in an unbiased fashion to new information. This theory allows 
positive accounting researchers to investigate two major questions: (1) are 
variations in accounting earnings unrelated to variations in stock prices?, and 
(2) whether or not changes in accounting policies. and the earnings they 
imply systematically affect or mislead stock markets? The CAPM has been 
used to provide the linkage between accounting ntunbers and stock prices., 
Watts and Zimmennan (1986, p. 73) note that: 
t 
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Under the multiperiod CAPM, the market value of the firm is a 
function of the firm's expected future cash-flows and the expected 
rate of return. In the CAPM world-there is no reason to expect a 
change in an accounting procedure to carry any implications for 
cash flows. In that world there are no transactions costs, no costs 
of contracting and no information processing costs. Information is 
assumed costless and available to all investors. Since it costs 
investors the same amount (zero) to process accounting earnings 
calculated under different methods, there is no reason for a firm's 
manager to prefer one accounting method over another. So 
without additional assumptions, an accounting change has no 
implications for stock prices in the CAPM world. 
Since several studies have shown that stock prices are affected by changes 
in certain accounting policies, which according to the EMH and the CAPM 
should provide no beneficial effects for stock prices, and since positive 
accotmting'researchers are concerned with explaining why managers prefer 
some accounting policies over others, this has led to: (1) extend the theory 
of rational expectations to the market for managers (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986, pp. 183-185) and to the individuals in the political process (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986, p. 227) in order to drop the CAPM assumption of zero 
information costs, and (2) use the contracting and agency theory in order to 
relax the CAPM assumption of zero contracting costs. These two theories 
have, therefore, allowed positive accounting researchers to introduce the 
following core assumptions: 
2. Individuals in the political and contracting processes are rational and 
aware of the nature of their relation with each other; 
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3. contracting and monitoring costs in the political process (information, 
lobbying and coalition costs) and in the contracting process (designing, 
negotiating, writing, renegotiating and evaluating compliance with the 
terms of contracts) are nonzero; 
4. given the assumptions (1-3), individuals in the political and contracting 
processes will adjust a company's accounting numbers for changes in 
accounting policies only up to the point where the marginal cost of 
adjustment is equal to its marginal benefit; and 
5. managers believe that there is some probability that the intended impact 
of accounting policies on the financial reports will not be adjusted by the 
affected parties. 
The conjunction of these assumptions has allowed accounting 
researchers to deduce the following testable hypotheses which have been the 
basis for several positive accounting studies: 
Size Hyj2othesis. Ceteris paribus, the larger the firm, the more likely the 
manager is to choose accounting procedures that defer reported earnings 
from current to future periods (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 235). 
Bonus Plan H jpothesis- Ceteris paribus, managers of firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift 
reported earnings from future periods to the current period (Watts and 
t 
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Zimmerman, 1986, p. 208). 
pothesis. Ceteris paribus, the larger a firm's debt/equity DebtlEguity Hy 
ratio, the more likely the firm's manager is to select accounting 
procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the cuff ent 
period (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 216). 
Finally, it is clear that managers should trade-off between the 
conflicting pressijres that result from the political and contracting processes 
when selecting an accounting policy. For example, the selection of a 
particular accounting policy may increase benefits under the bonus plan but 
also increase the probability of a debt covenant constraint violation or 
political intervention. Hence, managers are assumed to choose the 
accounting policy that best balances these conflicting interests. It should be 
noted, however, that positive accounting researchers to date have been 
unable to construct an intertemporal model to show how this will be done. In 
this regard, Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 152) note that this task is not 
easy although "it seems essential to significant advances in both the theories 
of the firm and of accounting". 
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3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the foundations for the empirical work 
contained in the present study. Over the last three decades a substantial 
number of applied economic consequences studies have emerged. Most of 
these studies have focused on linking accounting standards to changes in the 
decision-making behaviour of the users of financial statements; more 
specifically, they have concentrated on the impact of particular accounting 
policies on managers' and equity investors' decisions. In general, these 
studies can be chronologically classified into three broad categories; income 
smoothing studies, stock market studies, and positive accounting studies. 
The income smoothing research has focused on the hypothesis that 
managers would be motivated to choose accounting policies which smooth 
reported income and which smooth the rate of growth in income, perhaps 
because this would increase their job security, the level and growth of 
corporate income and growth and size of their companies 14 . 
Studies of investors' reactions to accounting infonnation based on 
managers' voluntary choices of accounting policies have subsequently 
showed that investors are able to distinguish between changes in accounting 
14 Op. Cit. (9). 
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policies which are purely 'cosmetic' and changes which reflect real 
economic events, suggesting that managers are not able to mislead investors 
through opportunistically chosen accounting policies, i. e. changes in 
financial accounting standards are not likely -to alter the decisions of 
investors and hence have no economic consequences's. 
Over the last twenty years a large volume of research has sought to 
answer a number of fundamental questions concerning why managers of 
companies: (1) are concerned with the choice of accounting policies 
although there will be no stock price effects resulting from cosmetic changes 
in accounting policies, and (2) lobby for or against certain proposed 
accounting standards. Studies which have attempted to answer these two 
questions have applied 'the nonzero contracting and political cost 
perspective' and generally concluded that managers do so either to increase 
the present value of their compensation packages in which certain 
accounting variables are key components, or because they believe that users 
will react to the publicly disclosed accounting information in a certain way 16 . 
Is See, for example, Archibald (1972), Ball (1972), Kaplan and Roll (1972), Beaver and Dukes 
(1973), Foster (1975 and 1977), Sunder (1975), Cassidy (1976), and Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker 
(1978). 
'6 See, for example, Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), Watts and Zimmerman (1986 and 1990), and 
Christie (1990). 
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Our study falls into the last category and hence this chapter reviews 
the applied economic consequences. research which utilises the costly- 
contracting and political cost hypothesis ideas. This research has been 
classified into the following categories by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983): 
(1) Studies which examine the effects of existing or proposed accounting 
standards on the magnitude and direction of the abnormal returns of firms, 
and how these effects relate to firms' specific characteristics; 
(2) studies which test the economic determinants that motivate 
management's lobbying behaviour on a new accounting standard; and 
(3) studies which attempt to identify the economic factors that motivate 
management to voluntarily adopt a particular accounting policy. 
Following this three fold classification scheme, we organise this 
chapter into four sections. The first section covers studies which have 
applied the nonzero contracting and political cost perspective to explain 
stock price effects associated with 'cosmetic' changes in accounting 
policies. In this section we first provide a linkage between stock market 
theories and the concept of the economic consequences and the positive 
accounting theory. We then review studies of price changes accompanying 
c voluntary' and 'mandatory" accounting policy changes, and provide a brief 
summary of them. 
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The second section looks at a number of studies which have been 
conducted to understand and predict lobbying activities. This section is 
divided into three subsections. The first focuses on the descriptive research 
which has attempted to identify who lobbies. The second subsection reviews 
some important and recent studies which have empirically tested the 
economic factors that might be behind lobbying behaviour. The third 
subsection contains a brief summary, 
The third section reviews studies which test the validity of using the 
costly-contracting and political cost hypothesis ideas to explain why 
managers prefer certain accounting policies over others. In this section we 
begin our review with an examination of studies which attempt to 
understand and predict management's accounting policy decisions in 
developed countries such as the USA, the UK, Australia and New Zealand. 
We then review a number of studies which have attempted to evaluate the 
robustness of using the nonzero contracting and political cost hypothesis to 
explain the choice of accounting policies in less developed countries such as 
Taiwan, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Finally, we provide a summary of the 
findings of the studies reviewed in this section. 
The fourth section serves two purposes. First, it summarises the 
consistency of the empirical evidence across studies using the three fold 
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classification scheme presented earlier. Second, it identifies the most tested 
hypotheses which may be relevant to the design of our own study. 
Finally, it is worth emphasising that: (1) because the literature in this 
area is huge and growing at an exponential rate, it is not practical to attempt 
to review it all. We have selected a number of studies which seem most 
relevant to our own work; that is, studies which adopt the costly-contracting 
and monitoring cost perspective in an attempt to demonstrate the'existence 
of economic consequences; (2) all the major accounting journals for the 
period 1990 to 1998 have been systematically reviewed in order to identify 
whether any recent findings or developments are relevant; (3) as is the case 
with the economic consequences literature generally, most of the studies 
reviewed in this chapter relate to the USA; nevertheless, some studies 
conducted in other countries have been found useful and hence incorporated 
into our review; and (4) given the different socio-economic environment in 
which Saudi companies operate, the results of the studies reviewed in this 
chapter need to be cautiously interpreted in the context of the Saudi Arabia 
environment. 
3.1 EVIDENCE ON STOCK PRICE REACTION 
There are few areas in finance and accounting that have received as 
much attention as the relationship between stock prices -and accounting 
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numbers. Since the late 1960s, a large volume of research has investigated 
this relationship, in an attempt to explain stock price effects associated with 
changes in accounting policies. In this section, we review examples of 
studies that have analysed this relationship within the economic 
consequences and positive accounting theory frameworks (i. e. studies that 
test specific contracting and political cost hypotheses). Within these 
frameworks, the major concern is why stock market prices react to changes 
in accounting policies even though the changes have no significant direct 
effects or implications for the firm's future cash flows. In this regard, 
researchers have distinguished 'voltmtary' accounting policy changes and 
c mandatory' accounting policy changes because the anticipated stock price 
effect depends upon the type of change: 
The analysis of the stock price effects of procedure changes 
depends on whether the changes are made voluntarily by the 
managers or are mandated by a FASB statement or SEC release 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 217). 
Therefore, the discussion below is spilt between studies of price changes 
accompanying 'voluntary' accounting policy changes and studies of price 
changes accompanying 'mandated' accounting policy changes. Before 
reviewing these studies, we first provide a linkage between stock market 
theories and the economic consequences and positive accounting theory 
hypotheses. We believe that this linkage is necessary and may be instructive 
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as an aid to understanding the arg-Lunents underlying the studies reviewed in 
this section. 
3.1.1 Stock Market Studies: A Positive Accounting Approach 
As already noted in chapter two (section 2.2.2), the ten-n 'economic 
consequences' may be defined in terms of the impact accounting standards 
have on preparers and users of financial accounting reports as well as the 
public as a whole. The empirical testing of the economic consequences 
hypothesis has been largely based on the competing hypotheses of the nalve 
investor and inefficient capital markets. It is widely believed that investors 
pay attention to the reported net income figure (or earnings per share) alone 
and largely ignore accounting rules upon which it is based. This view is 
based on the presumption that a stock market is composed of a large number 
of individual investors, most of whom are relatively unsophisticated and 
therefore have only limited ability to understand and interpret financial 
reports properly 17 . 
The result, it is argued, is that these nalve investors may 
be unduly influenced by changes in accounting policies. That is, an earnings 
increasing accounting change is accompanied by a positive abnormal stock 
return and an earnings decreasing accounting change is accompanied by a 
17 Archibald (1972, p. 24) referred to this view as "the naive investor hypothesis". 
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negative abnormal return, regardless of the effect of the change on the firms' 
cash flows. 
In an efficient market, stock prices incorporate all information in a 
rapid and unbiased manner, and investors cannot use this information to 
obtain consistently higher stock returns than justified by an investment's 
risk. These ideas are known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The term 
cmarket efficiency' refýrs to the rapidity and accuracy of price adjustment to 
new information. That is, markets that adjust more rapidly and accurately to 
information are considered to be more efficient. In this view, three forrns of 
market efficiency have been identified: (1) the 'weak' form indicates that 
stock prices fully reflect all information embodied in the past stock prices 
and volumes; (2) the 'semistrong' fon-n indicates that stock prices fully 
reflect all publicly available information; and (3) the 'strong' form indicates 
that stock prices fully reflect all information, both public and private. 
Because accounting information is generally publicly available, it falls under 
the gambit of semistrong-form market efficiency. Many empirical studies 18 
have supported semistrong market efficiency, and demonstrated that 
18 See, for example, Archibald (1972), Ball (1972), Kaplan and Roll (1972), Beaver and Dukes 
(1973), Foster (1975), Sunder (1975), Cassidy (1976), Dukes (1976), Foster (1977), and Hong, 
Kaplan and Mandelker (1978). For analysis of these studies, see Beaver (1981,, pp. 150-158). 
1 
75 
Chapter Three: Economic Consecluences: The Evidence 
investors are able to distinguish between the 'real' and the 'cosmetic' effects 
of accounting procedures used in financial accounting reports. 
Many changes in accounting policies appear to be cosmetic, having 
no significant impact on firms' cash flows. Under the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, such cosmetic changes should have no effect on stock prices. 
:- If equity markets are efficient, available information is 
incorporated in stock prices and the mandatory changes in 
accounting principles should not result in abnormal price 
movements unless the change induces unanticipated effects on 
cash flows to or from the firm and its equity-holders (Leftwich, 
1981, p. 4). 
In fact, many empirical studies have demonstrated that there is a market 
reaction to cosmetic changes in accounting policies19. The results of these 
studies generally reflect a belief that stock markets are inefficient and 
investors concentrate their attention on the bottom-line income figures. For 
example, the idea that expensing oil and gas exploration costs of 
unsuccessftil wells (dry wells) and capitalising only the exploration costs of 
successful wells (wet wells) would have adverse effects on. the stock prices 
of the American oil exploration companies, is in fact contrary to the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis, since neither the successful-efforts method nor the full- 
cost method should affect corporate cash flows. However, under the positive 
" As well as those mentioned in the following subsections see also the results of, Dyckman and 
Smith (1979), Collins and Dent (1979), Lev (1979), Smith (1981), Collins, Rozeff, and Salatka 
(1982), Larcker and Revsine (1983), and Lobo and Song (1989). For a brief analysis of these 
studies, see chapter two (section 2.2). 
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accounting theory, seemingly cosmetic changes in accounting policies can 
indirectly affect firms' cash flows and hence stock prices by altering the 
agency costs, taxes, regulatory comniission actions, and political costs. 
hanges in accounting policies may alter the accounting numbers in debt 
and management compensation contracts, and hence have indirect cash flow 
effects, which in turn may (or may not) produce stock market responses. 
Similarly, accounting policy changes may alter the revenues of regulated 
utility firms, and hence have indirect cash flow effects. Additionally, 
changes in accounting procedures may affect the political costs incurred by 
firms from government actions, and hence the firms' cash flows could be 
affected. Collectively, the positive accounting theory asserts that accounting 
policy changes, even seemingly cosmetic policy changes, may have 
significant direct or indirect cash flow effects and hence stock price effects. 
Studies reviewed below have used this view in order to explain stock price 
effects associated with changes in accounting policies. In general, these 
studies use cross-sectional regression models which can be characterised as: 
ej = F(firm specific variables) + Wi i= 1'..., n, 
where e, = abnormal rate of return for fin-n i and Wj= disturbance term. 
This functional form is generally assumed to be linear in order that the 
linear regression model can be used to test whether the hypothesised firm 
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specific variables such as size and the debt/equity ratio have explanatory 
power. 
3.1.2 Studies of Voluntary Accountin2 Changes 
The only paper which examines the variation in firms' abnormal 
returns around the time of a voluntary change in accounting policieS20 is that 
of Holthausen (1981) who investigated 125 firms that voluntarily changed 
their depreciation accounting method during the period 1954-1977 from 
accelerated to straight-line depreciation for financial reporting purposes 
onl Y21. Holthausen asserted that such a change would lead to an increase in 
reported earnings and assets, and hence hypothesised that the effect of the 
change: 
1. Would result in an increase in firms' political costs, and thus a decrease 
in share prices; 
2. with respect to debt covenants, would result in a transfer of wealth from 
debtholders to shareholders and a reduced probability of technical 
default, thus increasing stock prices; and 
20 In fact, there are several studies which have investigated stock price reactions to voluntary 
accounting policy changes. See, for example, Archibald (1972), Ball (1972), Kaplan and Roll 
(1972). However, because these studies are not related to the work on economic consequences of 
accounting policy choices, they are not reviewed in this subsection. 
21 Without changing their tax-accounting method. 
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3. with respect to management compensation plans, would result in the 
transfer of wealth from shareholders to managerS22, thus decreasing stock 
prices. 
Holthausen used multiple regression analysis, where the stock price 
changes associated with the switchback announcement were regressed on 
the earnings effect of the change, the debt/equity ratio, the proportion of 
public to private debt, the existence of an earnings-based compensation 
plan, and size. His findings indicated that the abnormal returns immediately 
surrounding the announcement of the change in depreciation method were 
negative and insignificant. Furthermore, the negative abnormal returns were 
not found to be systematically associated with the political costs, debt 
contracts or the existence of an earnings-based management compensation 
plan. Therefore, he concluded: 
*** If managements do 
in fact change depreciation techniques 
because of the provisions of bond indenture agreements or 
management compensation contracts, the tests in this paper are 
not powerful enough to detect their importance (Holthausen, 1981, 
p. 75). 
It should be emphasised, however, that it is very difficult to design 
powerfid enough tests to measure the stock price effect of voluntary 
accounting changes. One major problem is the possibility that the 
11 Since earnings increase and hence so do managerial bonuses. 
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hypothesised stock price effects are very small relative to the variance in 
equity returns and hence difficult to observe. This difficulty of detecting the 
hypothesised effects is also: 
... increased by the fact that the market is likely to expect the 
change. If a firm is in danger of violating a debt/equity constraint 
because of recent losses, the market will expect the change with 
high probability (and impound its effect in the stock price). There 
will be little surprise (and hence little stock price effect) when the 
firm actually changes procedures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 
218). 
3.1.3 Studies of Mandatory Accountin2 Chanes 
Unlike voluntary changes, more successful tests may be possible in 
the case of mandatory accounting changes. Given that mandated changes 
may adversely or beneficially affect firms, there will therefore be more 
systematic cross-sectional variation between firms; hence, the stock price 
effects are more likely to be observable. Therefore, several researchers in 
accounting have focused on the stock price effects associated with mandated 
accounting changeS23 . However, few studies have applied the costly- 
contracting and political hypothesis ideas to explain this relationshi p24. 
Gopalakrislinan and Sugrue (1992) examined the impact of the FASB 
23 See, for example, Collins and Dent (1979), Dyckman and Smith (1979), Lev (1979), Collins, 
Rozeff, and Salatka (1982), Larcker and Revsine (1983), and Lobo and Song (1989). 
24 As well as those mentioned below see also the results of, Leftwich (1981), Collins, Rozeff, and 
Dhaliwal (1981), and Lys (1984). Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 295-307) provide a detailed 
review of these three early studies. 
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Statement No. 87, "Employers' Accounting for Pensions", on the private 
lending agreements and stock prices of 26 firms which they believed had the 
highest probability of debt covenant violations during the period 1981-1985. 
They argue that reflecting pension liabilities in the balance sheet, rather than 
in the footnotes, can affect the debt/equity ratios of firms and hence their 
conformity to exiting debt covenants. 
The FASB received hundreds of comments from large firms 
indicating that the new pensions rule would bring negative 
economic consequences particularly in the form of reduced slack 
in accounting-based debt covenants, higher likelihood of technical 
default, costly renegotiations and depressed stock prices 
(Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue, 1992, p, 752). 
Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue investigated eight event dates25 which 
followed the standard period of deliberation for the exposure draft, including 
the issue of the exposure draft itself, and employed a Multivariate 
Regression Model26 in their statistical analysis. Their findings lend no 
support to the debt covenant hypothesis: 
... even though 
SFAS No. 87 mandated some radical changes in 
the area of pension accounting and had a serious impact on the 
financial statements for the twenty six firms examined, it appears 
to have little economic consequences through its impact on slack 
present in accounting-based debt covenants (Gopalakrishnan and 
Sugrue, 1992, p. 767) 
25 See Gopalalaishnan and Sugrue (1992, p. 755) for the list of events. 
26 Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1992, p. 774, footnote No. 19) also used Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression techniques and the results were not significantly different from those of the 
Multivariate Regression Model. 
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EI-Gazzar (1993) investigated the effect of complying with the FASB 
Statement No. 13, "Capitalization of Leases ", on the lessee's stock returns 
and the tightness of debt covenant constraints. He argues that reflecting 
financing on the face of, rather than off, the balance sheet may increase the 
possibility of technical default: 
Capitalization of off-balance sheet leases increases assets and 
liabilities and typically reduces reported income and retained 
earnings. These changes increase the likelihood of violating debt 
covenant restrictions if debt agreements use rolling GAAP (EI- 
Gazzar, 1993, p. 259). 
Unlike the earlier research into mandatory accounting changes, El- 
Gazzar casts doubt on the adequacy of the debt/equity ratio as a proxy for 
closeness to debt covenant violations. Consequently, he analysed the actual 
format of the debt contracts and developed a more precise measure of the 
effect of the FASB Statement No. 13 on the tightness of debt covenant 
constraintS27 . El-Gazzar 
found that the abnormal returns for two of the seven 
events investigated were significant. He (p. 270) then investigated these two 
events and concluded that: "the percentage increase in the tightness of debt 
covenant restrictions is correlated with changes in security prices that 
accompanied the regulatory events of SFAS No. 13". 
27 See EI-Gazzar, (1993, pp. 266-267). 
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In a follow-up study, Mohnnan (1993) investigated the actual details 
of the debt contracts of the USA oil and gas companies which had been 
regulated by the FASB Statement No. 19, "Financial Accounting and 
Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing Companies". The results from this 
study indicated that: 
... changes in the probability of debt covenant violations are 
related to the stock price response to an accounting policy 
decision, but that a leverage variable does not provide an 
adequate proxy for this effect (Mohrman, 1993, p. 287). 
Unlike the studies reviewed above, Espahbodi, Espahbodi and 
Tehranian (1995) investigated the stock price changes associated with two 
generally income-increasing accounting standards, namely the FASB 
Statements No. 96 and No. 109. Those two standards do not restrict the 
acceptable set of accounting policies; rather, they replace one acceptable 
procedure with another. Basically, the FASB Statements No. 96 and No. 
109, unlike APB Opinion No. 11, require that the deferred tax liability be 
adjusted for changes in tax rates and laws, and allow American companies 
to report the cumulative effect of the change from APB Opinion No. II to 
the FASB Statements No. 96 or No. 109 either to appear on the income 
statement, or as an adjustment to beginning retained earnings. 
. 
Espahbodi, 
Espahbodi and Tehranian argue that such a switch in the method of 
accounting for income taxes would increase income and/or retained earnings 
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and decrease liabilities, and hence hypothesise that firms are expected to 
exhibit significant positive abnormal rates of return around the issuance of 
the Exposure Drafts leading to the FASB Statements No. 96 or No. 109. 
They calculated the abnormal rates of return for a sample of 500 firms and 
found that the three-day abnormal returns around the issuance of the 
Exposure Drafts leading to the FASB Statements No. 96 and No. 109 have 
the expected signs and are significantly different from zero at the 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. Espahbodi, Espahbodi and Tehranian (p. 667) also 
found that a firm's abnormal return is: 
... positively related to the existence of postretirement benefits 
(POSTRET), net operating loss carryforwards over total assets 
(CARRYFWD), and debt ratio (DEBTA); and negatively related 
to acquisitions over total assets (ACQU), and the market value of 
the firm (MKTVAL). ' 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1996) examined the equity price reaction 
to the FASB's 1993 Exposure Draft proposing the recognition of an expense 
for the estimated value of employee stock options". They (p. 3) argue that 
this new financial reporting rule would "permanently reduce income and 
retained earnings" and, based on contracting and political cost hypotheses, 
would cause a fall in the stock prices of all firms that now had to expense 
employee stock options. Three different samples were used to test for the 
2 fi 8 Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1996) also examined the characteristics of irms lobbying against 
this Exposure Draft. Their finding on this issue are discussed in section (3.2.2). 
t 
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economic consequences of expensing employee stock options: (1) a sample 
of 347 firnis submitting opposing letters to the FASB's 1993 Exposure 
Draft; (2) a sample of 136 biotechnology firms; and (3) a sample of 598 
firms from five industries which are found to be the most intensive users of 
employee stock options. Dechow, Hutton and Sloan identified three event 
dates that could have influenced the market's expectations about the new 
restricted financial reporting rule. The first event date is the announcement 
of the FASB vote to move forward with expensing employee stock options. 
The second event date is the release of the FASB's 1993 Exposure Draft. 
The last event date is when the FASB dropped its proposal for mandatory 
expensing of employee stock options. The overall results of Dechow, Hutton 
and Sloan (1996, p. 19)'s study indicate that there is no systematic evidence: 
.:. that expensing employee stock options would engender 
significant economic consequences through the size and debt 
hypotheses popularized in the academic literature [and]... that 
investors reacted to news concerning mandatory expensing of 
stock options. 
3.1.4 Summarv 
The studies reviewed above have examined the cross-sectional 
variations in fmns' abnormal returns around the announcement of a 
voluntary or mandatory change in accounting policies. The accounting 
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changes around which abnormal returns are measured include the voluntary 
change from accelerated to straight-line depreciation, and the mandatory 
changes required by SFAS Nos. 87,13,19,96 and 109, and the FASB's 
1993 Exposure Draft on accounting for employee stock options. The proxies 
used as explanatory variables are firms' contractual agreements and political 
visibility. The evidence generated from these studies is generally mixed. 
Overall, the results of the mandated change studies are more consistent with 
the economic consequences framework than that of Holthausen (1981)'s 
voluntary change study and show that, on average, the cross-sectional stock 
price effect variation is related to some political and contracting variables, 
particularly the debt covenant variables. 
3.2 EVIDENCE ON LOBBYING BEHAVIOUR 
The view that the setting of financial accounting standards is a 
political rather than a technical process has long been recognised, 
particularly in the USA and the UK. The technical view sees the setting of 
accounting standards as being a process of identifying 'best' accounting 
practice in which case the accounting standards setting process can be 
served better by the development of accounting concepts and technical rules. 
On the other hand, the political view sees accounting standard setting, as 
being a process of imposing restrictions on behaviour in which case it is 
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important that accounting standards should be accepted by the affected 
parties. The actions which those affected parties take to persuade accounting 
regulatory bodies to promote or avoid new standards are collectively called 
lobbying activities. Such lobbying actions take a variety of fon-ns ranging 
from written submissions to formal and informal pressures on elected 
representatives or government agencies. Apart from written submissions, 
almost all forms of lobbying activity are extremely difficult to observe or 
measure. The results are that studies on lobbying behaviour are limited and 
have all been based on the formal written submissions to accounting 
regulatory bodies. In general, research into lobbying behaviour can be 
divided into two categories; descriptive research and empirical research. 
3.2.1 Descriptive Studies on Lobbying Behaviour 
Descriptive research has used the formal written submissions on 
exposure drafts that are made to the ASC in an attempt to identify the nature 
and extent of lobbing attitudes. Hope and Briggs (1982), for example, 
examined the ASC's issue of deferred taxation and documented the 
following influences: 
1. The ASC's first proposal for an accounting standard on deferred taxation 
was the issuance of ED 11 in 1973, which required provision in full for 
deferred taxation by the deferral method. Hope and Briggs (1982, p. 88) 
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attribute this choice to the influence of the APB in the USA and the 
Accountants International Study Group. 
2. Two years later, following criticism from both industrial and professional 
bodies,, the ASC issued SSAP 11 which required provision in full for 
deferred taxation and allowed companies to use either the deferral 
method or the liability method. 
3. In 1977, the ASC, as a response to industrial opposition, issued ED19 
which reversed the requirements mandated by S SAP 11. ED 19 specified 
conditions for partial provision for deferred taxation and required the 
application of the liability method. 
4. ED 19 had been extensively criticised by practitioners, and as a response, 
the ASC agreed to reverse the most controversial elements of ED19 and 
introduced a second standard (SSAP 15 in 1978). SSAP 15 required 
provision for deferred taxation on timing differences, but allowed 
companies to choose either the deferral method or the liability method. 
5. Finally, ED33, issued in 1983, required the application of the liability 
method and specified some changes in the conditions for partial 
provision. 
In general, Hope and Briggs (1982, p. 93) concluded that "professional and 
business opinion" is the main factor influencing the ASC's change of 
t 
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approach on the accounting treatment of deferred taxation. Hope and Gray 
(1982) also note a similar result with the development of an accounting 
29 
standard on accounting for research and development (R&D) expenditure 
Their (p. 55 1) conclusion summarises the findings of the study: 
... the analysis of the formal evidence submitted to ED14 and 
ED17 suggests that the ASC changed its position on the issues of 
accounting treatment and disclosure of R&D because of the 
wishes of industry - in particular because of the representations of 
the aerospace industry. 
This conclusion has led Hope and Gray (p. 551) to ask the following 
question: what are "the reasons for the intervention of the aerospace 
industry" In his analysis of lobbying of accounting standard-setting bodies 
in the UK and the USA, Sutton (1984, p. 93) provides the following answer: 
The analysis of the characteristics of lobbyists suggests the 
following generalisations: 
(1) Producers of financial statements are more likely to lobby (i. e. 
find the activity more profitable) than consumers of such 
statements; 
(2) Large producers are more likely to lobby than small 
producers; 
(3) Undiversified producers are more likely to lobby than 
diversified producers. 
29 The issue of research and development (R&D) costs was first considered in 1975 and later in 
1976 when the ASC issued ED14 and ED17. These two exposure drafts were then used as a basis 
for the issuance of SSAP 13 in 1977 and for its revision in 1989. 
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3.2.2 Empirical Studies on Lobbying Behaviour 
The second category of research provides an empirical assessment of 
the question cited above by Hope and Gray (1982). Specifically, this 
research attempts to address the question: what are the economic 
determinants of management's lobbying behaviour on a proposed accounting 
standard? This empirical research has been mainly conducted in America 
and uses the formal written submissions to the FASB's discussion 
memorandums on the issue of certain accounting standards. 
The earliest paper which predicts management lobbying behaviour 
was Watts and Zimmerman (1978). 'Iliey assert that a firm's lobbying 
position on a proposed accounting standard is determined by the perceived 
impact of such a standard on Ole taxes, regulation, polifical costs, 
information production costs and management compensation plans of the 
firm. On the basis of this assumption, Watts and Zimmerman (p. 118) 
hypothesise that: 
1. Large firms will lobby for a proposed accounting standard that would 
reduce reported earnings, because the benefits to the larger firms provided 
by lower reported earnings due to tax, regulation and polifical 
considerations are greater than the additional costs to be incurred in the 
form of adjustment for management compensation plans, information 
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production costs, and costs of lobbying; and 
2. all other fmns will lobby against a proposed accounting standard that 
would reduce reported earnings if the additional infonnation production 
costs justify the costs of lobbying. 
These hypotheses were empirically tested by examining 52 corporate 
lobbying positions submitted to the FASB on the discussion memorandum 
proposing General Price-Level Adjusted (GPLA) financial statements. These 
firms were then classified according to the impact of the GPLA standard on 
their net earnings and ranked by their asset size using each firm's Fortune 
500 rank. Watts and Zimmerman (p. 126) found results consistent with their 
hypotheses and reported: 
This suggests that reduced political and/or tax costs outweigh 
information production and/or management compensation factors 
in determining management's position on GPLA only for, very 
large firms. For most other firms, information production costs 
dominate. 
In a follow-up study, Dhaliwal (1982) argues that in addition to the 
variables examined by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), the capital structure of 
a firm may be an important determinant of management's lobbying position 
on a proposed accounting standard. He argues that a firm's support or 
opposition to, a proposed accounting standard depends upon the firm"s debt 
covenant constraints, the size of the firm and the existence of management 
compensation plans tied to reported earnings. The evidence adduced by 
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Dhaliwal to support 'his argument was drawn firom the lobbying positions 
taken by a sample of 44 unregulated firms in 1977 when the FASB was 
considering a standard that would have called for interest costs associated 
with capital expenditures to be capitalised. Prior to this standard, firms in the 
USA could voluntarily choose, within GAAP, to capitalise or expense 
interest costs related to capital expenditures. Dhaliwal asserts that 
capitalising interest would increase the current period's reported net income 
of affected firms and have a material effect on the contractual agreements 
(e. g. management compensation plans and debt contracts) in which certain 
financial accounting variables are key components. On the basis of this 
assumption, he (p. 259) hypothesises that firms supporting the adoption of 
capitalisation of interest costs had higher debt/equity ratios, were smaller in 
terms of the book assets value (the size hypothesis) and had management 
compensation plans tied to accounting data, than firms opposing 
capitalisation of interest costs. The results of both the univariate and 
multivariate tests are consistent with the debt/equity hypothesis and the size 
hypothesis. However, like Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Dhaliwal's results 
lend no support to the management compensation hypothesis. However, in a 
more recent study, Kirsch, Evans and Doupnik (1990) cast some doubt on 
both the size hypothesis and the debt/equity hypothesis. Kirsch, Evans-and 
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Doupnik examined 72 USA-based multinational companies (MNC) lobbying 
opinions submitted to the FASB before the issuance of Statement No. 52, 
"Foreign Currency Translation ". They argue that because FASB Statement 
No. 52 permits translation gains and losses to be removed from the income 
statement to the owners' equity section in the balance sheet, its adoption 
could have a major impact on both firms' net income and balance sheet 
values. On the basis of this argument, they evaluated the following 
hypotheses: 
HI. Proportionately more firms with accounting based-objectives 
lobbied the FASB in support of proposed accounting standard 
SFAS 52 than firms with economic based-objectives. 
H2. Firms supporting the adoption of SFAS 52, which permits 
the inclusion of translation gains and losses in equity, had higher 
debt/equity ratios. 
H3. Firms supporting the adoption of SFAS 52 had a higher 
percentage of sales from foreign operations. 
H4. Firms supporting the adoption of SFAS 52 had a higher 
percentage of net income from foreign operations. 
H5. Firms supporting the adoption of SFAS 52 had a higher 
percentage of net assets from foreign operations. 
H6. Proportionately more firms supporting SFAS 52 had 
management compensation plans tied to accounting data. 
The results of the study indicate that the coefficients of the net income 
variable (hypothesis No. 4) and management compensation variable 
(hypothesis No. 6) are statistically significant at approximately the 0.05 
t 
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level, but do not have the predicted signs (i. e. the results of these two 
hypotheses show a statistically significant inverse relationship). The 
remainder of the variables are not statistically significant at or below the 
0.15 level and their signs in relation to those predicted are mixed. These 
findings can be interpreted as contradicting the Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) and Dhaliwal (1982) findings with respect to the size and debt/equity 
hypotheses. However, these conflicting results might be due, in part or fully, 
to differences in samples and limitations in the statistical techniques used. 
SFAS 52 lobbying effort patterns may not be generalizable to 
other accounting policy interventions. The method employed to 
classify firms as accounting-based or economic-based may have 
resulted in some misclassifications. Important relevant variables 
may have been omitted from the discriminant model. Since the 
sample was non-random, the results may not be generalizable to 
other MNCs (Kirsch, Evans and Doupnik, 1990, p. 169). 
As already noted in section 3.1.2, Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1996) 
document empirical evidence not only on the relation between finn 
characteristics and the market reaction to the FASB's 1993 Exposure Draft, 
but also on the characteristics of firms' lobbying attitudes against this 
standard. They argue that since this Exposure Draft requires the estimated 
value of employee stock options to be recognised as an expense, the income 
and retained earnings of firms affected by this standard would be decreased. 
Based on this argument, they (pp. 5-6) developed the hypotheses that firms: 
t 
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[11 in which top executives receive relatively large amounts of 
compensation in the form of employee stock options are more 
likely to lobby against mandatory expensing of employee stock 
options; 
[21 that are cash constrained and therefore anticipate requiring 
additional financing, are more likely to lobby against mandatory 
expensing of employee stock options; and 
[31 facing tight retain ed-earn ings-b as ed debt covenants are more 
likely to lobby against mandatory expensing of employee stock 
options. 
By comparing the compensation profiles of 310 firms submitting comment 
letters opposing the 1993 Exposure Draft to a size- and industry-matched 
control sample, Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (p. 14) found strong support for 
the hypothesis that firms' top executives are more likely to attempt "to avoid 
recognising an expense for their option-based compensation". Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan (p. 15) also provided a multivariate analysis for a sample 
of 5,047 firms using logistic regressions and reported that there is "no 
evidence that lobbying behavior is consistent with ... contracting 
hypotheses". 
3.2.3 Summarv 
In section 3.2, we have reviewed two categories of study. The first is 
descriptive and deals with the question of who are likely to lobby against or 
for accounting standards proposed by the ASC. The results of these studies 
have generally indicated that corporate lobbying behaviour is highly 
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observable and played an important role in the reformulation of certain 
accounting standards in the UK. The second category of study has explained 
and predicted management lobbying behaviour as a function of fmn-specific 
factors. The evidence adduced by this empirical research suggests that, on 
average, management's lobbying behaviour on a proposed accounting 
standard may be explained by the size of the affected firms and the existence 
of debt covenant constraints written in terms of accounting numbers. 
3.3 EVIDENCE ON MANAGEMENT'S PREFERENCES 
The strongest evidence consistent with economic consequences of 
accounting policy choices emerges from studies which attempt to predict 
why corporate managers prefer some accounting methods over others 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, p. 91). Basically, these studies, pioneered 
by Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) and known as 'accounting policy 
choice studies', assess whether accounting policy choices are consistent 
with the hypotheses proposed by the positive accounting theory. Therefore, 
this type of research is very closely related to our study, and hence will be 
reviewed in depth. Our review begins with a chronological examination of 
accounting choice studies which test the validity of using the costly- 
contracting and political hypothesis ideas to explain and predict 
management's accounting policy decisions in developed countries such as 
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the USA, the UK, Australia and New Zealand. We then review a set of 
studies which attempt to evaluate the robustness of using the costly- 
contracting and political cost hypotheses to explain the choice of accounting 
policies in developing countries such as Taiwan, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, 
where a firm's debt and compensation contracts and the political and 
regulatory environment in which it operates may be very different from those 
which apply in the USA and other developed countries. Finally, we provide 
a summary of the findings of the studies reviewed in this section. 
In general, accounting policy choice studies use univariate tests and 
cross-sectional regression models to investigate possible economic 
consequences in greater detail by attempting to answer questions like: (1) 
what are the economic consequences of accounting methods which influence 
a firm's managers to voluntarily adopt some methods over others? And, how 
does a particular accounting policy choice relate to firms specific 
characteristics; (2) do firms with a management compensation plan tied to 
accounting earnings and with larger debt/equity ratios use income-increasing 
accounting policies?; (3) do firms with larger total assets (or total sales) use 
income-decreasing accounting methods? The regression models adopted in 
the accounting choice studies generally use an accounting policy choice 
represented by a 0/1 dichotomous, 'dummy', variable as the left hand side 
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(dependent) variable and certain firm specific variables, such as the 
existence of a management compensation plan tied to accounting earnings, 
debt/equity ratios and size, as the right hand side (independent) variables. 
3.3.1 Accounting Choice Studies in Developed Countries 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), hereafter H-Z, examined the ability 
of contracting and political cost variables to explain the cross-sectional 
variation in each of the following four accounting policies: (1) inventory 
methods; (2) depreciation methods; (3) investment tax credit methods; and 
(4) the amortisation period for past service pension costs. The dependent 
variables which were assumed to be income-increasing accounting policies 
include: (1) FIFO, (2) straight-line depreciation, (3) flow-through method of 
the investment credit, and (4) amortisation periods of more than 30 years for 
past pension costs. LIFO, accelerated depreciation, the deferral method for 
the investment tax credit, and amortisation periods less than or equal to 30 
years for past pension costs, are considered to be income-decreasing 
accounting policies. The contracting and political cost variables which were 
used as independent variables in the H-Z probit analysis include: 
(1). &izL. Based on the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), H-Z hypothesise that because the political costs firms 
bear are a function of their size, managers of larger fmns are more likely to 
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choose an income-decreasing accounting policy. 
(2) ELisk- H-Z argue that firms with relatively high systematic risk will 
appear to earn higher returns to compensate themselves for the additional 
systematic risk they bear. Therefore, they hypothesise that riskier firms are 
more likely to be subject to political costs, and hence their managers are 
more likely to choose income-decreasing accounting policies. 
(3) Capital intensily: H-Z also suggest that capital intensive firms will appear 
to earn higher profits than labour intensive firms because the total cost of 
capital is not a recognised expense in computing net income. Therefore, they 
hypothesise that these firms are more likely to be subject to political costs 
and are more likely to reduce their reported earnings. 
(4) Concentration ratio: H-Z argue that because managers of firms earning 
monopoly rents and reporting them will increase the possibility of anti-trust 
litigation and encourage entry by other firms into the industry, they are more 
likely to choose accounting methods which reduce reported income to 
forestall entry as well as anti-trust action. 
(5), Eamings-based compensation plan- Based on the work of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), H-Z argue that the existence of a management 
compensation plan tied to accounting earnings is likely, to be an important 
determinant of management's accounting policy decisions. They hypqthesisq 
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that managers of firms with an earnings-based compensation plan are more 
likely to use income-increasing accounting policies. 
The sample used consisted of 300 non-regulated USA firms that 
disclosed the choice of the four accounting methods in their 1975 financial 
reports. The size of these 300 firms was measured by both sales and total 
assets. The beta coefficient from the market model and the gross fixed 
assets/sales ratio were used as proxies for the risk and capital intensity, 
respectively. The concentration ratio was used as a proxy variable for the 
ability of a firm to earn monopoly rents and was defined as the percentage of 
total industry sales made by the largest eight firms in the industry. H-Z also 
recognised the significant effect of tax rates on inventory method choice and 
hence included the ratio of income taxes paid to earnings before taxes as an 
independent variable when investigating this choice. 
The results of the Chi-square tests indicate that their model is 
statistically significant at. the 1% level for depreciation, the 5% level for 
inventory, and the 10% level for the investment tax credit and past service 
amortisation methods. However, the independent variables are not 
significant in every model. The coefficients of the depreciation model show 
that the size and beta variables are significant at the *5% level and that the 
capital intensity and earnings-based compensation plan are significant at the 
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10% level, but the coefficient associated with the concentration ratio 
variable is not significant, although it has the predicted direction. The results 
of the model describing inventory choice show that the signs of the size, 
capital intensity and concentration ratio coefficients are as hypothesised, but 
only the capital intensity and concentration ratio variables are significant; 
and then only at the 10% level. The results of the choice between the flow- 
through method and the deferred method for investment tax credit indicate 
that the size and capital intensity variables are the only significant variables, 
but only at the 10% level, although all the coefficients have the predicted 
signs. Finally, the results of the past service amortisation model show that 
the only significant variable is the eamings-based compensation plan, 
although it is significant only at the 10% level. However, the signs of the 
remaining coefficients are as predicted. 
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) argue that the mixed results of their 
1979 study emerged from their implicit assumption that each accounting 
policy choice is made independently. Therefore, in their 1981 follow up 
study, they impose the assumption that managers choose accounting policies 
on a portfolio basis, and hypothesise that if a firm is politically sensitive but 
has no earnings-based compensation plan, its managers are more likely to 
C 
choose a portfolio of accounting methods that would minimise the present 
t 
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value of the reported earnings. And, if the firm has a compensation plan but 
is not politically sensitive, its managers are more likely to choose a portfolio 
of accounting methods that would maximise the present value of the 
reported earnings. Because many firms may be both politically sensitive and 
also have compensation plans, Zmijewski and Hagerman argue that 
managers may not choose an extreme portfolio of accounting methods (i. e. 
all the methods in the portfolio increase earnings or all the methods decrease 
earnings); rather, they may strike a trade-off between the political costs and 
contracting effects of earnings, thereby constructing an "optimal" income 
strategy. Based on this and some other assumptionS30, Zmijewski and 
Hagerman used the four accounting methods examined in their 1979 study to 
develop a variety of alternative income strategies. They (p. 139) hypothesise 
that if the "proposed income strategies are representative of management's 
income strategies", then the following equation "would be able to classify 
firms according to their choice of a particular strategy": 
STRATEGYi =a +j8j BONUS +, 82CONST RATIO + P3BETA +, 84SIZE 
+j8i CAP INTSTY +, 86DIE RATIO + w, 
where: 
STRATEGYi = Income strategy (i= 5,7, or 9). 
30 For a description of these assumptions and how Zmijewski and Hagerman developed their 
dependent variable, STRATEGYt, see Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 249-253). 
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BONUS =1 if there is a management profit-sharing compensation 
plan; 0 if there is no profit-sharing plan, 
CONST RATIO = The percentage of total industry sales made by the 
largest eight companies in the industry, 
BETA = Systematic risk, 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of net sales, 
CAPINTSTY = Gross fixed assets divided by net sales, 
D/E RATIO = Total debt divided by total assets, 
w= Error term. 
To test this hypothesis, Zmijewski and Hagerinan used the same 300 
firms they used in their 1979 study. They also used probit analysis to 
estimate the effects of the independent variables on the portfolio of 
accounting policy choices. Their results indicate that management 
compensation plans, concentration ratio, size, and the total debt/total assets 
ratio have a significant impact on the choice of a firm's income strategy. 
This evidence motivates Zmijewski and Hagerman (p. 147) to suggest that 
firms do in fact choose an overall income strategy as hypothesised. 
Deakin (1979), Dhaliwal (1980) and Lilien and Pastena (1982) 
examined the effect of the firm's specific characteristics on the choice 
management makes between the full cost and the successful-efforts methods 
of accounting for oil exploration costs. As already noted in chapter two 
103 
Chapter Three: Economic Consequences: The Evidence 
(section 2.2.1), before the issuance of the FASB Statement No. 19, 
"Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing 
Companies", mandating the adoption of the successful-efforts method, USA 
oil and gas companies voluntarily used either the successful-efforts method 
or the full-cost method in their primary financial statements. Firms using the 
full cost method argued that the mandated switch from the full-cost method 
to the successful-efforts method would have adverse effects on their ability 
to raise capital, expand exploration activities and compete with other 
companies. Based on this argument, Deakin (1979, p. 726) hypothesises that 
management's preferences for the choice between the full cost or successful- 
efforts methods depend on "aggressiveness in exploration, perceived need 
for access to public markets, size, age of company and relative extent of 
development drilling". These variables are tested by using multiple 
discriminant analysis and a dichotomous classification test on a sample of 53 
oil and gas companies. The Chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the model cannot distinguish full cost firms from successful-efforts firms at 
the 1% level. However, the overall results indicate that only the 
debt/revenue ratio, age of company, and ratio of capital expenditure to 
revenues are statistically sigaificant at the 5% level. That is, firms using the 
full cost method are more highly leveraged, smaller and spend more per 
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revenue dollar on capital investments than do firms using the successful- 
efforts method. 
Dhaliwal (1980) focuses on the ability of the firm's capital structure 
to explain management's preferences for the choice between the full-cost 
and the successful-efforts methods. As already noted in chapter two (section 
2.2.1), it has been argued that firms using the full-cost method would report 
larger and less volatile earnings, higher net assets and a higher shareholders' 
equity than companies using the successful-efforts method. Dhaliwal, 
therefore,, hypothesises that managers of highly leveraged firms would prefer 
the full-cost method to the successful-efforts method. This hypothesis is 
tested by using the matched-pairs mest. After controlling for the effect of 
firm size, Dhaliwal (p. 82) concludes that "the average debt-to-equity ratio 
of firms using the full-cost method is significantly greater than that of firms 
using the successful-efforts method". This finding is consistent with the 
debt/equity hypothesis that the higher the debt/equity ratio, the more likely 
the managers are to use income-increasing accounting policies. 
Lilien and Pastena (1982) extend the work of Deakin and Dhaliwal 
and examine the full-cost and successful-efforts methods, in more detail. 
They point out that prior to the SEC's promulgation of Accounting Series 
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Releases (ASR) 31 Nos. 253 and 258 in August 1978, there was a wide 
diversity of choiceS32 managers of oil and gas firms could use to maximise or 
minimise reported earnings. However, these two new rules required oil and 
gas firms to adjust their retained earnings retrospectively to reflect what they 
would have been if the new rules had been in effect all along. These retained 
earnings adjustments allow Lilien and Pastena to measure the extent to 
which managers of oil and gas firms maximised or minimised reported 
earnings prior to the release of ASR 253 and ASR 258. They hypothesise 
that: (1) size and age are positively correlated with the choice of successfiil- 
efforts and intramethod choices which minimiSe reported earnings, and (2) 
leverage and exploration risk are positively correlated with the selection of 
full cost and intramethod choices which maximise reported earnings. 
Revenues and the debt/equity ratio are used to test the size hypothesis and 
the leverage hypothesis, respectively. The dry wells/total wells ratio is used 
to proxy for firms' exploration risk. The sample consists of 102 firms which 
adjusted their 1978 retained earnings so as to conforni with the requirements 
of ASR 253 or ASR 258. The results of the three statistical techniques used- 
probit, regression and discriminant analysis- indicate that the four variables 
31 ASR 253 and 258 overturned FASB Statement No 19 and specified particular versions of 
successful-efforts and full-cost. 
32 See Lilien and Pastena (1982, pp. 148-151, Tables 1 and 2) for a list of these, choices. 
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are statistically significant and the coefficients have the signs hypothesised. 
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey (1981) provide further evidence to support 
the position that size and leverage affect managers' choices of accounting 
policies. They investigate management's preferences for the choice between 
capitalising or expensing interest costs associated with capital expenditures. 
Before 1974, managers of non-regulated USA firms were free to choose 
either method of accounting for such interest costs. In 1974, the SEC issued 
ASR 163 which imposed a moratorium on firms adopting interest 
capitalisation. Bowen, Noreen and Lacey examine the effect of management 
compensation plans, debt contract, and political costs on managers' 
decisions to capitalise or expense interest costs prior to the SEC 
moratorium. They hypothesise that because interest capitalisation increases 
current period reported earnings, managers of firms with bonus plans are 
more likely to use interest capitalisation. Three hypotheses about debt 
contracts are also developed and tested. They hypothesise that the 
propensity to capitalise interest is greater (1) for firms with a low ratio of 
inventory of payable funds, (2) for firms with a low ratio of current earnings 
to interest expenses, and (3) for firms with a low ratio of net tangible assets 
to funded long-term debt. In assessing the effects of political costs, Bowen, 
Noreen and Lacey test two ftu-ther hypotheses. The first is based on the 
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results of Watts and Zimmerman (1979) that the largest firms in the oil and 
gas industry are less likely to capitalise interest than other firms. The second 
hypothesis predicts that larger firms in all industries are less likely to use 
interest capitalisation. To test these six hypotheses, Bowen, Noreen and 
Lacey draw a sample of 91 unregulated-firms that did, and did not, capitalise 
interest in 1974, and use a matched-pairs design to control for the possible 
correlation between industry membership and interest capitalisation. The 
univariate tests of the bonus plan hypothesis find an association between the 
presence of a bonus plan and the method chosen to account for interest 
costs. Furthermore, the univariate tests of the three hypotheses relating to 
debt contracts are all significant. The results indicate that firms capitalising 
interest costs have a small inventory of cash from which to finance dividends 
payments (significant at the 2% level), lower current income to interest 
expense ratios (significant at the 6% level), and lower net tangible assets to 
funded long-term debt ratios (significant at the 0.1% level). The results of 
the univariate tests on the size hypotheses indicate that oil and gas firms 
with larger sales are unlikely to capitalise interest (significant at the 1% 
level), but that larger firms in all industries are more likely to use interest 
capitalisation (significant at the 10% level, but in the wrong direction). 
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey also apply a probit analysis to explain the choice 
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of capitalising or not capitalising interest costs and the results are consistent 
with the univariate tests. 
Using the results of Williamson (1964 and 1967), amongst others, 
Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1982) introduce the effect of ownership 
control status of firms into the choice of accounting policies. They test this 
new factor by examining whether or not owner-controlled and manager- 
controlled firms use different depreciation methods for reporting purposes. 
Their hypothesis predicts that mapager-controlled firms are more likely than 
owner-controlled firms to adopt depreciation methods that will shift reported 
earnings from later periods to current periods (i. e. straight-line depreciation). 
This hypothesis is based on the belief that: (1) high insider ownership 
reduces the importance of accounting numbers in compensation contracting, 
and hence managers of owner-controlled firms are less likely than managers 
of manager-controlled firms to adopt accounting methods which increase the 
present value of their compensation packages, and (2) managers of manager- 
controlled firms have a pecuniary interest in reducing the probability of 
employment termination as a result of reporting poor performance. Dhaliwal, 
Salamon and Smith test their ownership control hypothesis by using 42 
manager-controlled firms and 41 owner-controlled firms which adopted 
accelerated depreciation for tax reporting purposes in 1962. Firms are 
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classified as owner-controlled if one party owns 20 percent or more of the 
voting stock, or if one party owns 10 percent or more of the voting stock and 
also is a member of the board of directors. Firms are classified as manager- 
controlled if no one party controls more than 5 percent of the voting stock. A 
probit analysis is used with the dependent variable being I if the firrn used 
the accelerated depreciation method for tax purposes, and the straight-line 
method for reporting purposes, and 0 if it used the accelerated depreciation 
method for both tax and financial reporting purposes. The independent 
variables are total assets, debt/equity ratio, and a firm control variable that 
takes the value 0 if the firm is owner-controlled and I if it is manager- 
controlled. The Chi-square test indicates that the model is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of the size and debt/equity 
variables have the hypothesised signs and are significant at the 15% and 1% 
levels, respectively. The coefficient for the firm control variable also has the 
predicted positive sign and is statistically significant at the 3% level. 
In chapter two (section 2.2.1) we discussed some aspects of the 
debate which accompanied the development of some accounting standards 
in the USA and noted in particular the views which claim that the FASB 
Statement No. 19, "Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas 
Producing Companies", would have undesirable effects on the ability of 
I 
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exploration-oriented companies to raise capital, expand exploration activities 
and compete with other companies. Similarly, it was claimed that the FASB 
Statement No. 2, Accountingfor Research and Development Costs, which 
was issued in 1974 and required firms to expense research and development 
(R&D) costs in the year incurred, would force firms which were capitalising 
R&D to reduce their expenditure on R&D. Empirical evidence, however, 
lends no support to these claims 33 . This evidence motivated accounting 
researchers to investigate whether the political and contracting costs of firms 
are the real reasons behind the choice between capitalising or not 
capitalising R&D expenditures. For example, Daley and Vigeland (1983), in 
a study of 135 capitalising firms and 178 expensing firms that reported 
research and development expenditures in 1972, recognise that capitalising 
R&D expenditures increases current reported income and retained earnings. 
Therefore, following the contracting and political cost hypotheses, they 
hypothesise that firms which capitalised R&D had: (1) higher ratios of 
private debt to total tangible assets, (2) higher ratios of public debt to total 
tangible assets, (3) higher ratios of cash dividends to unrestricted retained 
earnings, (4) lower ratios of income before extraordinary items to interest 
expense, and'(5) small sales. They regress the research and development 
33 See, for example, Dukes, Dyckman, and Elliott (1980). 
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method choice (one for capitalising firms, zero for expensing firms) on these 
five factors and find that all coefficients have the hypothesised signs, and all 
but the coefficient of the ratio of cash dividends to unrestricted retained 
earnings variable are significant at the 5% level. 
Two other controversial accounting standards which have been the 
subject of academic investigation are SSAP 21, Accountingfor Lease and 
Hire Purchase Contracts, and FASB Statement No. 13, Capitalization of 
Leases. Ashton (1985) examined economic factors that affected UK fm-ns' 
choices in accounting for leases prior to the implementation of SSAP 21 in 
1984. He notes that lease capitalisation increases book asset and liability 
values and typically reduces reported income and retained earnings. Hence, 
following Hagerman and ZmiJewski (1979), he regresses the lease 
accounting choice (one for operating approach, zero for capitalisation 
approach) on firm size, concentration ratio, capital intensity ratio, beta, and 
whether there is a management compensation plan tied to accounting 
earnings. He estimates his model on a sample of 44 UK firms included'in the 
Survey of Published Accounts, 1983184. Applying Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and probit analyses, Ashton (p. 237) reports that "all the equations 
showed the contrary; extremely small coefficients of determination were 
found in all cases and none of the coefficients were significant". However, 
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in a similar United States study, El-Gazzar, Lilien and Pastena (1986), using 
a sample of 134 USA firms, provide empirical evidence to support the 
position that political costs, leverage effects, and management bonus 
incentive variables do explain management's choices in accounting for 
leases prior to the implementation of FASB Statement No. 13 34 , 
"Capitalization of Leases" in 1976. This new accounting standard forced 
lessees to capitalise many leases that were formerly classified as operating 
leases. EI-Gazzar, Lilien and Pastena (1986) argue that this standard is 
expected to increase lessees' book assets and liabilities values and to reduce 
their reported income and retained earnings. Hence, using the positive 
accounting theory arguments, they hypothesise that firms (1) with the 
highest debt/equity ratios after capitalisation, and (2) with bonus plans based 
on income after interest expenses are more likely to use the operating lease 
approach for lease accounting prior to the proclamation of FASB Statement 
No. 13. They also test two hypotheses on political costs. One is that larger 
firms are more likely to report lower earnings by capitalising leases to 
reduce their political costs. The second hypothesis is that firms with high 
effective tax rates are more likely to capitalise their lease obligations. The 
financial data necessary for the determination of firms that did and did not 
34 The requirements of FASB Statement No. 13 are essentially the same as those in SSAP 21. 
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capitalise leases prior to the adoption of FASB Statement No. 13 and for the 
calculation of the independent variables, were obtained from the 1976 
financial statements of 134 lessees. The results of probit analyses indicate 
that the operating method is positively correlated at the 1% significance 
level with both the debt/equity ratio and the existence of bonus plans based 
on income after interest expenses. The empirical results also show that the 
effective tax rate is negatively correlated (1% significance level) with choice 
of the operating lease approach, but do not support the size hypothesis when 
sales are used to surrogate for political costs. 
The issue of accounting for foreign currency translation has also been 
0 
an area of considerable controversy in the United States, leading to a 
number of attempts by the FASB to resolve the problems associated with the 
diverse foreign currency translation methods used by multinational 
companies. In 1975, the FASB issued Statement No. 8 which required 
multinational companies to immediately include all translation gains and 
losses in current income. Although this standard was strongly criticised on a 
number of grounds, the primary concern related to the heightened volatility 
in reported earnings which it implied. In response to such criticisms, the 
FASB issued Statement No. 52 in 1981. The main thrust of this standard is 
that it allowed multinational companies to directly report gains or losses on 
t 
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foreign currency translation in owners' equity. Ayres (1986) examined the 
economic characteristics of firms that adopted FASB Statement No. 52 
earlier than was formally required. He hypothesised that as the requirements 
of FASB Statement No. 52 would increase reported income, firms that 
voluntarily adopted the standard in 1981 were likely to be smaller, have less 
stock owned by directors and officers., have a smaller percentage growth in 
pre-adoption earnings, and be more contractually constrained on dividend 
payments and interest coverage ratios than later adopters. The results of the 
logistic model using a sample of 103 firms adopting in 1981, and 129 firms 
adopting in 1982 or 1983, show that all the coefficients of the independent 
variables have the hypothesised signs and are statistically significant at the 
5% level or less. In a similar study, Ndubizu (1990) also observed that early 
adopters of FASB Statement No. 52 tended to be smaller, had a smaller 
earnings growth rate in the pre-adoption period, had higher dividend 
constraints, and had smaller changes in earnings volatility than later 
adopters., 
Wong (1988) notes that the accounting methods used for reporting 
export tax credits by New Zealand companies have been continually debated 
in New Zealand, principally because of their potential -economic 
consequences. According to the New Zealand 'Income Tax Act 1976, 
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exporters of goods are entitled to tax credits for their performance in 
generating foreign currency. Two accounting methods are available for 
reporting these export tax credits in financial statements. The first is the 'tax 
reduction' method whereby the export tax credits are offset against the 
income tax expense. The second is the 'credit to sales' method whereby the 
export tax credits are added to sales, leaving the income tax payable at the 
gross amount. Wong hypothesises that as the 'credit to sales' method, 
compared to the tax reduction method, increases pre-tax income and, hence, 
increases the reported tax rate and interest coverage, this method is more 
likely to be used by firms which: (1) want to raise their reported tax rates to 
a level which minimises public criticism toward them for receiving material 
amounts of export tax credits, and (2) are closer to their interest coverage 
constraints. More specifically, Wong hypothesises that the 'credit to sales' 
method is more likely to be used by firms with low reported tax rates, with 
large sales figureS35 , with 
large amounts of export tax credits relative to their 
reported earnings, and with high net income before interest and tax / interest 
ratios. The results of the Mann-Whitney U test and the t test using a sample 
35 Wong (p. 41) notes that "while the 'credit to sales' method may benefit low tax rate, politically 
sensitive firms through an increased reported tax rate, it also increases sales which could increase 
political costs because of increased visibility. Managers must tradeoff the costs and benefits of this 
method. However, I expect the higher political costs associated with increased size to be 
outweighed by the benefits from an increased reported tax rate. " 
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of 29 firms that applied the 'credit to sales' method in 1984 and 66 firms 
that adopted a different method, reveal that the differences in means of the 
four independent variables have the hypothesised signs and are statistically 
significant at the 5% level or less. Wong also runs a logit model and finds 
that all the coefficients have the predicted sips, with both the reported tax 
rate and size coefficients being statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Trombley (1989) extends positive accounting research to the selection 
of an adoption date for FASB Statement No. 86, "Accountingfor the Costs 
of Computer Software to be Sold, Leased or Otherwise Marketed", which 
required that certain costs of developing software for sale be capitalised 
starting from January 1,1986. Prior to this time, most computer firms had 
been expensing software development costs as they were incurred. 
Trombley (p. 529) therefore hypothesises that as this standard was an 
"income-increasing accounting choice", early-adopting firms (1) are smaller 
than later-adopting firms, and (2) their financial statements are audited by 
CPA firms with a stated preference for capitalisation of software costs. The 
second hypothesis is reasoned on the ground that firms in the software 
industry are generally small and have less sophisticated financial 
management; and as a consequence, they may rely on their auditors for 
advice about the adoption of new accounting standards. The sample consists 
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of 53 firms, of which 14 opted for early adoption of FASB Statement No. 
86. The size of firms in the sample is measured by sales, while the position 
of auditors is determined by examining letters of comment received by the 
FASB during the exposure draft period. In addition to these two independent 
variables, proxies for management compensation plans, debt contracting and 
percentage of ownership by directors and officers are also included in the 
final model as control variables. The results of the t tests of differences in 
means for the five explanatory variables indicate that they have the 
hypothesised signs and are statistically significant at the 5% level or better 
for the size, preferences of auditors, debt contracting, and ownership 
percentage variables. Trombley also runs a multivariate model and finds that 
the results of the OLS regression are generally consistent with the findings 
of the t tests. 
Using the insider ownership hypothesis developed by Dhaliwal, 
Salamon and Smith (1982), Dyl (1989) and Niehaus (1989) examined the 
effect of the firm's ownership structure on its management's preference for 
the choice between the last-in-first-out (LIFO) and the first-in-first-out 
(FIFO) inventory valuation methods. They argue that, on the one hand, the 
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use of FIFO rather than LIFO generally results in lower cash floWS36 and 
hence imposes a significant agency cost on the firm's owners in the form of 
a reduction in the market value of the firm's shares. Therefore, it is expected 
that the firm's owners are more likely to prefer the use of LIFO instead of 
FIFO for inventory valuation. On the other hand, if the firm has a 
management bonus plan and its compensation committee does not adjust for 
the inventory method chosen, then the firtn's managers are more likely to 
prefer the use of FIFO because it generally produces higher reported 
earnings than does LIFO. Hence, if LIFO is the tax minimising method, the 
inventory method choice gives rise to a conflict of interest. Dyl (1989, p. 
142) hypothesises that managers of widely held firms are more likely to use 
the FIFO inventory valuation method than are the managers of closely held 
firms because "in a widely held firin no single owner or co-ordinated group 
of owners is likely to have both the ability and sufficient economic 
incentives to assiduously monitor the behavior of the firtn's managers". 
Unlike Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1982)37 , 
Dyl measures a firm's 
ownership concentration as the percentage of the firm's shares owned by the 
single largest stockholder. He finds that the difference between the mean 
36 That is because FIFO generally results in higher reported earnings and hence, higher tax 
expense payments than does LIFO. 
37 See page 109. t 
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values for a group of 100 firms which used the FIFO method in their 1981 
financial'statements and for a group of 213 firms which used the LIFO 
method, is as hypothesised, but it is statistically significant only at the 10% 
level. However, after controlling for the size and debt/equity ratio variables, 
Dyl shows that in a multivariate discriminant analysis, 'the ownership 
concentration variable becomes statistically significant at the 5% level. Finn 
size, as measured by total assets, is also found to be statistically significant 
at the 1% level, suggesting that it is the most important determinant of the 
inventory method choice. The debt/equity ratio variable, however, is not 
significant although it has the predicted sign. In a similar study, Niehaus 
(1989, p. 283) also provides ftirther empirical support for the ownership 
concentration hypothesis and concludes that "the probability of choosing 
LIFO initially decreases as managerial ownership increases". 
Nathan and Dunne (1991) provide evidence of underlying contracting 
cost determinants in the choice of the accounting treatment for business 
combinations. They argue that when the price paid for a target fin-n exceeds 
the book value of the net assets, (1) the pooling of interests method yields a 
higher net income than does the purchase method, and (2) the use of the 
purchase method yields an opportunity to write up the target's assets to 
market value; and hence, management of acquiring firms considers these 
t 
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economic consequences of the pooling-purchase choice when structuring an 
acquisition. Nathan and Dunne used a logistic regression model to analyse a 
sample of 134 stock-for-stock acquisitions between 1963 and 1985. The 
results indicate that the existence of acquirer leverage-based debt covenants, 
and acquirer leverage variables have the predicted signs and are significant 
at the 5% level, suggesting that acquiring firms with debt covenants 
restricting leverage and with closeness to debt covenant violations prefer 
purchase to pooling to benefit from the write-up of the target's assets. 
Lemke and Page (1992) seek to detennine economic and financial 
factors that drive certain UK companies to comply or not to comply with 
SSAP 16, 'Current Cost Accounting'. This standard calls for a complete 
profit and loss account and complete balance sheet on a current cost basis 
that may be presented as supplementary information with the traditional 
financial statements based on historical costs. Compliance with this standard 
was required for years beginning on or after January 1,1980. Lemke and 
Page (p. 89) hypothesise that as the "three so-called 'operating adjustments' 
usually resulted in CCA reporting lower net income than historical cost 
accounting (HCA)", compliance with SSAP 16: (1) is positively correlated 
with firms' political visibility, and (2) is negatively correlated with firm's 
debt/equity ratios and dividend payment ratios. They also expect that as the 
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depreciation and cost of sales adjustments result in a lower income figure, 
firms with higher fixed assets/total assets ratios and inventory/total assets 
ratios are more likely to comply with SSAP 16. To tests these hypotheses, 
Lemke and Page apply univariate tests on a sample of 154 firms that 
complied with SSAP 16 in 1983 and prior years and 51 firms that did not 
comply with the standard during the same period. The overall results 
indicate highly significant differences between means (at the 1% level) for 
the variables sales, debt/equity ratio, dividend payment ratio, and fixed 
assets/total assets ratio. In addition to the univariate tests, Lemke and Page 
use their hypothesised variables in a logit model to explain what drives 
certain UK firms to voluntarily adopt current cost accounting. The results 
confirm the univariate tests. 
Following specific suggestions by Watts and Zimmerman (1990), 
Christie (1990), and Leftwich (1990), attention has recently focused on two 
major issues confouriding research into accounting policy choices. The first 
of these involves the distinction between managerial opportunism (using 
accounting policies to transfer wealth to managers from debt- and share- 
holders) and contractual efficiency (using accounting policies to maximise 
the value of the firm) as determinants of accounting policy choice. As Watts 
and Zimmerman (1990, p. 143) noted, this problem produces model 
t 
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specification errors: 
Implicitly researchers are holding constant the firm's investment 
opportunity set and contracts and interpret the compensation 
plan variable as managerial opportunism. But, the debt and 
political variables can represent both efficiency and opportunism. 
Thus, the model is misspecified. 
However, it is widely recognised that distinguishing between managerial 
opportunism and efficiency reasons is difficult in both theory and empirical 
work (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Smith, 1993; Holthausen, 1990). For 
example, Smith (1993, pp. 290-291) describes this difficulty and states: 
Even in theory, it is difficult to distinguish between opportunism 
and contracting efficiency as determinants of accounting policy 
choice. Given positive contracting costs, there will be a positive 
efficient amount of opportunism. Distinguishing between 
opportunism and efficiency is difficult in empirical work also. For 
example, a significant relation between accounting policy choice 
and leverage could indicate that managers of firms with high 
leverage act opportunistically in selecting accounting techniques 
to reduce costs imposed by constraints in debt covenants. 
Alternatively, it could indicate that corporations for which a 
particular set of accounting techniques is efficient also tend to be 
those firms for which high leverage is efficient. 
Nevertheless, recent research tends to develop efficiency hypotheses and 
assumes that managers adopt accounting policies that maximise the value of 
their firms. For example, Mazay, Wilkins and Zimmer (1993) analyse the 
accounting policy choice of listed Australian firms in the year 1984 in which 
the Australian standard on investments in associated companies first took 
effect. This standard required the use of the cost method in the primary 
financial statements and the provision of supplementary equity accounting 
t 
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disclosures. Mazay, Wilkins and Zimmer observe that in 1984 there was a 
high frequency of non-compliance which took the form of either using the 
equity method in the investor company's primary financial statements, or 
adopting the cost method without supplementary equity accounting 
disclosures. They argue that the use of the equity method by the investor 
companies is determined by contractual efficiency and hypothesise that the 
choice of the equity method is determined by (1) the extent of ownership of 
associates by an investor company, (2) the number of associates reported by 
the investor, (3) the proportion of investor assets attributable to investments 
in associates, (4) whether the associates are listed on a stock exchange, and 
(5) whether the investor firm guarantees the debts of its associates. To test 
these hypotheses, the authors selected a sample of 20 firms which 
implemented the equity method in their 1984 primary financial statements, 
and 27 firms which used the cost method only. Applying a multivariate 
analysis, Mazay, Wilkins and Zimmer (p. 54) conclude that "the choice to 
adopt equity accounting in Australia in 1984 is positively related to the 
materiality of investments in associates and the existence of guarantees, and 
is negatively related to the proportion of listed associates". These results 
support their premise that the use of the equity method by the investor 
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companies is determined by contractual efficiency 38 
The second major issue confronting accounting researchers in the 
accounting choice literature is the difficulty of observing both contracting 
costs and political costs; and as a consequence, researchers tend to rely 
upon proxies for these costs. Almost all recent studies are designed to make 
steps towards solving this problem. In particular, these studies focus on 
examining the nature of costs associated with the violation of accounting- 
based covenants in debt contracts [e. g. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994); 
Sweeney (1994); Smith (1993); Beneish and Press (1993); and Chen and 
Wei (1993)], and the appropriateness of using the debt/equity ratio as a 
proxy for the expected costs associated with the violation of accounting- 
based debt covenants [e. g. Duke, Franz and Hunt (1995); El-Gazzar and 
Pastena (1990); and Duke and Hunt (1990)]. Since these recent studies are 
partially relevant to our present study, it may be worthwhile summarising the 
evidence they report: 
(1) Because renegotiations are less costly in private debt contracts, technical 
defaults occur more frequently in private debt contracts than in public debt 
38 Mazay, Wilkins and Zimmer (1993) also recognise that the managers of an investor company 
may choose the method of accounting for its associates to opportunistically transfer wealth to 
themselves, and hence hypothesise that equity accounting is more likely the higher the ratio of debt 
to assets, and the smaller the investor firm. Their findings do not support these opportunistic 
hypotheses. 
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contracts; 
(2) the covenants of net worth, working capital, leverage, and interest 
coverage are the most frequently violated of all covenants; 
(3) fmns frequently violate more than one covenant; 
(4) the violation of covenant constraints generally results from the disclosure 
of poor operating performance rather than changes in accounting standards; 
(5) the debt/equity ratio is a valid proxy for the costs of leverage associated 
with changes in accounting policies; and 
(6) there is a significant relation between the debt/equity ratio and the 
tightness of the actual covenant. 
3.3.2 Accounting Choice Studies in Developing Countries 
The positive accounting theory, as an approach for the determination 
of financial accounting standards, emerged first in the United States (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978), but increasingly has attracted a great deal of 
attention, not only in the United States, but also in many developed 
countries. In Us context, a major issue that frequently arises is whether the 
hypotheses of the positive accounting theory are valid in less developed 
countries, where firms' contractual agreements and the political and 
regulatory environment in which they operate may be very different from 
that of most firms in developed countries and on which the empirical 
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research reviewed above is founded. Examples of studies which have 
addressed this issue include Ariyo (1988), Shiue (1989), and Tawfik and 
Kadous (1991). 
Ariyo (1988) examined three economic variables hypothesised to be 
related to the choice of depreciation methods by public companies in 
Nigeria. These included the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (to test the 
leverage hypothesis), and company size and capital intensity (to test the 
political cost hypotheses). Following Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), 
Ariyo used both sales and assets as a measure for firm size and the gross 
fixed assets/sales ratio for capital intensity. The sample consisted of 47 
firms, of which 13 used the accelerated depreciation method and, hence, 
could be classified as being in the income-decreasing category. Applying a 
step-wise regression technique, Ariyo found that leverage and capital 
intensity account for about 50% of total variation in the choice of 
depreciation methods by public firms in Nigeria. However, of the four 
variables examined, all were significant (at the 95% confidence level) in the 
univariate test. Interestingly, the results of the univariate test indicate that 
highly leveraged firms are more likely to use an income-decreasing 
depreciation method (the accelerated method), and that firms with higher 
sales are more likely to use an income-increasing, depreciation method (the 
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straight-line method). These findings are in contrast with the common 
findings reported in the applied positive accounting literature. Ariyo 
attributed these "unusual" findings to the nature of the Nigerian 
environment. He (pp. 95-96) stated: 
The reasons for this "unusual" finding ... are mainly environment- 
related ... For example, the political cost of size (as measured by 
sales) in the Nigerian environment is virtually zero, given the 
absence of the usual agitation by lobbyists for wealth transfers for 
which other countries (specially the United States) are noted. 
Rather, corporate managers have an economic incentive to declare 
higher income with higher sales. This allows them to pay higher 
dividends and, hence, avert a possible decline in favorable proxies 
and in the weakening of their personal position ... With respect to leverage,... discussions with several bank loan off"icers indicate 
that, in the Nigerian environment, banks are concerned mainly 
with cash flow generated from operations. Hence, the adoption of 
an income-reducing depreciation method enables the debtor-firm 
to report higher cash flow figures (measured as net income plus 
depreciation) than those employing the income-increasing 
depreciation method, given a positive tax rate. 
Shiue (1989) addresses the issue of the applicability of the positive 
accounting theory's implications to Taiwan by examining the relationship 
between size and leverage and firms' reported income strategies. He 
identified two accounting policy choices: depreciation (straight-line versus 
accelerated), and inventory (moving-average and/or FIFO versus weighted- 
average). The straight-line depreciation method and the moving-average 
(and/or FIFO) method are treated as income-increasing policies and the 
accelerated and weighted-average methods are treated as income-decreasmig 
policies. After drawing a sample of 113 firms and adopting Zmij ewski and 
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Hagerman (1981 's income strategy approach, Shiue (p. 91) found that 
There exists no relationship between Taiwanese corporations 
selecting accounting alternatives that increased or decreased 
reported earnings and the size of corporations as measured by net 
sales ... Again the researcher failed to reject... the alternative 
hypothesis that firms with higher leverage tend to select 
accounting standards that increase reported earnings, 
and (p., 96) concluded "that some implications of positive theory of 
accounting simply do not apply to Taiwan". 
Tawfik and Kadous (1991)39 , 
hereafter T-K, are the first to 
empirically test the validity of applying the positive accounting theory in 
Saudi Arabia. They argue that managers of Saudi companies are influenced 
by environmental factors rather than economic motives in choosing among 
alternative accounting methods. Six economic motives and three 
environmental variables were examined to explain the use of the following 
three accounting policies by management of Saudi firms during the 1986-89 
period: (1) inventory methods (cost versus the lower of cost or market); (2) 
39 We would like to note that we have found two versions of this study; one is written in Arabic and 
the other is written in English. Our review is mainly based on the Arabic version because it has 
been published; nevertheless, the identifiable similarities and differences between the two versions 
of the study will be stated when it is applicable. Also, we would like to emphasise that we are not 
aware of any other empirical study that has attempted to investigate the economic consequences of 
accounting standards applied by Saudi Companies, or to contribute to the development of the 
positive accounting theory in Saudi Arabia. However, we do acknowledge that AI-Rwita (1993) in 
part address these issues by conducting a case study on five Saudi banking institutions. He (p. 41) 
used the agency theory framework to investigate "the implications of ownership structure on firm 
governance structure, management behavior, and firm performance". His findings, which may be 
relevant to our study, are that management of Saudi banks with large insider ownership are more 
likely to be constrained to pursue goals that are in the best interest of shareholders. It may also be 
worth noting that we have read two theoretical papers written in Arabic by Serag (1989) and 
Alameen (1992). These two papers provide a typical overview about accounting theories, including 
the positive accounting theory. I 
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research and development methods (capitalising versus expensing); and (3) 
Zakat methods (distributing versus expensing)40 . T-K treated the cost, 
capitalising and distributing methods as income-increasing accounting 
policies and the lower of cost or market method and expensing research and 
development and Zakat as income-decreasing policies. Variations in these 
three accounting policies were identified by verifying the 1986-1989 
published annual reports of 28 Saudi companies. These financial reports 
were also used to calculate the six economic motives and the three 
environmental variables which served as the independent variables in T-K's 
model. These nine independent variables were classified into three 
categories: 
(1) Political cost variables. T-K hypothesise that a Saudi company was in 
danger of suffering political costs during the 1986-1989 period if it was 
large, was highly capital intensive, was operating in a highly concentrated 
industry, and if a high percentage of its outstanding shares was owned by the 
Saudi Government. Managers of firms with these characteristics are 
hypothesised to use income-decreasing accounting methods. T-K (p. 122) 
measured firm size as "the average of total assets during the study period 
40 For a detailed description of the Zakat methods, see sections (4.3.1 and 6.1.2.3). 
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[1986-19891". capital intensity ratio as "the average of net fixed assets to 
total assets during the study period", concentration ratio as "the average of 
the total sales made by the largest two firms in an industry to total sales 
made by all firms in the industry during the study period", and governmental 
stock ratio as "the percentage of shares owned by the Government". In 
addition to these four political variables, T-K (p. 109) also classified and 
used the variable "earnings direction" as a political cost variable. They (p. 
122) measured this variable4l as "change in earnings for each firm during the 
study period (3= constant increase in reported profits, or constant decrease 
in reported losses; 2= insignificant change in earnings; 1= if a fin-n reported 
a profit and loss during the study period; O= constant decrease in reported 
profits, or constant increase in reported losses)". 
(2) Contracting cost variable. Based on the work of Dhaliwal (1980), T-K 
hypothesise that Saudi firms with high debt/equity ratios are more likely to 
use income-increasing accounting policies. They (p. 122) measured this 
variable as "the average of external debts to total assets, during the study 
period". 
41 This variable as well as the governmental stock ratio variable were dropped in the English 
version, creating the main difference between the two versions of T-K's study. Nevertheless, 
the overall results of the English version are consistent with the findings of the Arabic version. 
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(3) Environmental variables. T-K developed three environment-oriented 
variables to explain accounting policy decisions in Saudi Arabia. They 
hypothesise that a Saudi firm is more likely to adopt accounting methods (1) 
that represent its managers' conservative attitude towards accounting 
policies, (2) that are commonly used by the industry in which it operates, 
and (3) that are preferred by its auditor. T-K (p. 11 ý2 computed the "degree 
of conservatism7' variable as "the percentage of the nurnber of conservative 
accounting policies to total number of accounting policies as reported by 
each firni in its annual reports (1986-1989)", and the "common practice" 
variable as "the percentage of the number of accounting policies adopted by 
the firm in agreement with the industry common practice". The preferences 
of auditors were determined by reviewing the results of a questionnaire sent 
to the auditors of each firm in the sample (1= auditors' preferences agree 
with firm' s preferences; O= otherwise). 
Using a Weighted Least Square (WLS) technique, T-K first regressed 
each one of the three accounting policies on the nine independent variables 
cited above, and then, using Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981)'s income 
strategy approach, they regressed a portfolio of the three accounting 
methods on the nine independent variables. The results of both the single 
42 These quotations are taken from the English version. 
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accounting policy choice and portfolio strategy choice are summarised in 
Table (3.1). 
Table (3.1) 
A summarv of the 9/7, S estimation technique results for Tawrik an 
Kadous (1991) samp 
Single Policy Choice Portfolio Strategy Choice 
Independent Variables Inventory R&D Zakat Four Five six 
Size NS NS* NS* NS* NS NS 
Capital intensity NS* 0.001 NS* NS* NS* NS* 
Concentration Ratio NS 0.10 NS NS NS NS 
Government Ratio NS* NS* NS* NS* NS* NS* 
Eamings Direction NS NS* NS NS NS NS* 
Debt/Equity Ratio NS* 0.001 NS* NS* NS* NS* 
Conservatism Degree 0.001 0.001 NS 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Common Practice NS 0.05 NS NS* NS* NS* 
Auditor Preferences NS 0.001 0.001 0.10 NS NS 
R2 0.78 0.998 0.998 0.826 
0.773 0.731 
0.01 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
F-test 
Notes: 
1. The decimals reflect the levels of significance. 
2. The under-lined decimals reflect the levels of significance when signs are not as 
predicted. * 
3. NS signifies not significant, but sign in predicted direction. 
4. NS* signifies not significant and sign not in predicted direction. 
E 
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As Table (3.1) indicates, in the six regression models run, only two 
economic variables are significant, the capital intensity ratio and debt/equity 
ratio. However, the sips of these two variables are not as predicted. Given 
this and the results of the three environmental factors, T-K (pp. 136-139) 
concluded that the environmental variables are the most important factors 
influencing accounting policy choices in Saudi Arabia. However, T-K 
recognised that some of the WLS assumptions might be violated because of 
the use of dichotomous dependent variables. Therefore, they ran a probit 
3 model obtaining the results summarised in Table (3.2ý . 
Table (3.2) 
A summarv of the probit estimation technique results for Tawrik and 
Kadous (1991) samp 
Single Policy Choice 
Independent Variables Inventory R&D Zakat 
Size NS* NS* NS* 
Capital intensity 0.001 01001 0101 
Concentration Ratio 0.001 0.05 NS* 
Government Ratio 0.001 NS* 0.001 
Earnings Direction 0.001 0.05 NS* 
Debt/Equity Ratio 
43 T-K did not report the results of the probit model in the case of the portfolio strategy choice. 
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0.001 0.01 NS* 
Conservatism Degree 
0.001 0.10 NS 
Common Practice 
0.001 NS* NS 
Auditor Preferences 
0.001 0.05 0.01 
II 
Notes: 
1. The decimals reflect the levels of significance. 
2. The under-lined decimals reflect the levels of significance when signs are not 
as predicted. 
3. NS signifies not significant, but sign in predicted direction. 
4. NS* signifies not significant and sign not in predicted direction. 
Using the results of the probit model, which did not confirm the 
findings of the WLS model, T-K (p. 139) pointed out in their overall 
conclusion that: 
Although the results of the study confirm that the environmental 
variables (such as the degree of conservatism and preferences of 
auditors) have the most important. effects on accounting policy 
decisions in Saudi Arabia, there are a few economic variables 
influencing accounting policy choices... the coefficient of earnings 
direction variable has the correct Sign although other variables 
(debt/equity ratio, capital intensity ratio, and concentration ratio) 
are inconsistent with their predicted directions. 
Because T-K's study is closely related to our research in the sense 
that we are investigating the existence (or absence) of economic 
consequences in Saudi Arabia by examining the hypothesis of whether or 
not managers of Saudi companies use economic criteria in choosing their 
accounting policies, it may be helpful if we outline some reasons that might 
explain why T-K did not find that the economic variables they studied, had a 
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consistent relationship with the income effect of the accounting policies they 
examined. These possible limitations can be discussed under four headings: 
(1) The WLS model versus the Probit model. The literature (e. g. Watson, 
1979; and Gujarati, 1995) has demonstrated that there is a major problem 
associated with using the WLS estimation technique on dichotomous 
dependent variables44. It is demonstrated that with extreme values for the 
unconstrained independent variables, the WLS procedure would not 
guarantee that the estimated probabilities, say Pi, will lie between 0 and I- 
The more common and more sensible procedure to overcome this problem is 
to use logit or probit techniques which guarantee that the estimated 
probabilities, Pi, will lie between the limits 0 and L Hence, this implies that 
if the WLS technique satisfies the 0-1 constraint on Pi, one would expect 
the results of the explanatory variables based on the WLS and probit (or 
logit) techniques will be identical, as Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) and 
others observed. With respect to T-K's study, Tables (3.1) and (3.2) indicate 
that the results of the WLS model are quite different from those of the probit 
model. Therefore, one would be wise to ignore the results of the WLS 
estimation technique and concentrate on the findings of the probit model. 
(2) Multicollineari1y. As is the case with any set of related data, researchers 
44 See chapter six (section 6.2.2.1 ) for a detailed description. 
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typically suspect that their independent variables may be correlated to the 
point of causing significant multicollinearity within their regression analysis. 
Their concern about multicollinearity emerges from the fact that if there is 
high (significant) multicollinearity, the estimated standard errors increase 
dramatically thereby increasing the probability of accepting the null 
hypothesis (i. e. increasing the probability of accepting a false hypothesis- a 
type II error). Evidence on this issue is often obtained by a preliminary 
examination of the correlation matrix of the independent variables. Because 
T-K did not perform (and reportý5 such preliminary multicollinearity 
analysis, one suspects that their regression analysis could suffer from 
multicollinearity problems. In fact, the suspicions are only increased when 
one considers the results reported in Table (3.1). Although the majority of 
the coefficients in the six models are statistically insignificant at an 
individual level on the basis of the t test, the reported R2 values are very 
high and the F values are highly significant. Gujarati (p. 331) reports 
this is one of the signals of multicollinearity-insignificant t values but a high 
overall R2 (and a significant F value)! ". Therefore, one has to be extremely 
cautious in interpreting the significance of the results of both the WLS and 
45 T-K also did not report evidence on multicollinearity problem in the English version of their 
paper. 
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probit models reported in the T-K's study. 
3. The dependent variables. T-K stated on pages 123 and 129 of their paper 
that variations in the three accounting policies, which served as the 
dependent variables in their models, are identified by inspecting the 1986- 
1989 published annual reports of 28 Saudi companies. In this context, they 
did not implicitly or explicitly state whether these identified variations in the 
three accounting policies, are found in the years 1986,1987,1988, or 
198946 . This ambiguity might have caused errors in classifying firms into the 
income-increasing category or the income-decreasing category (i. e. error in 
the left-hand-side variable-the well known errors in variables problem). 
(4) The independent variables. There are two explicit assumptions which 
underlie T-K's political cost hypotheses. The first is that the political costs 
affecting Saudi firms during the 1986-89 period were constant. In this 
regard, no explanations were given to justify such a crucial assumption. The 
second explicit assumption is that the political costs were a positive function 
of the average of firms' (1) total assets, (2) capital intensity ratio, and (3) 
concentration ratio. This assumption is inconsistent with the positive 
accounting literature. For example, consider the size hypothesis which, 
46 In the English version of their paper, T-K also did not state the year of investigation. They only 
noted that (p. 5) "the sample used in this study was taken from the published annual reports of the 
Saudi corporations covering the period 1986-1989". 11 
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according to Watts and Zimmerman (1978,1986, and 1990), predicts that 
larger firms will tend to adopt income-decreasing accounting policies 
because they are more visible than smaller firms and therefore more likely to 
be subject to political intervention resulting in expropriation of wealth. Now, 
if one uses the average of four-years' total assets, distinguishing between 
large and small firms in a sample of 28 companies becomes very difficult. 
This is, perhaps, the reason why T-K found that the size variable, which is 
one of the most important determinants of accounting policy choice in other 
countrieS47 . 
is particularly insignificant in all their models. Furthermore, 
unlike USA companies, almost all of Saudi joint stock companies receive 
most of their external finance from the Government in the form of medium- 
and long-term interest free loans. Therefore, one would find it very difficult 
to believe that managers' accounting policy decisions in Saudi Arabia were 
influenced by the restrictive covenants of their firms debt contracts as has 
been hypothesised in the USA. 
3.3.3 SUMMARY 
Beginning with Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), the above section 
reviewed several studies that have attempted to understand and predict 
47 See, for example, Holthausen and Leftwich (1983); Watts and Zimmerman (1986 and 1990); 
Christie (1990, Table 1); and Whittred, Zimmer and Taylor (1996, chapter 2). 
1 
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management's accounting policy decisions in developed and less developed 
countries. The theme that underlies these studies is that accounting policy 
decisions are determined by political costs, which typically cause firms to 
use accounting procedures that reduce current earnings, and debt and 
compensation contracts, which generally encourage firms to use accounting 
procedures that increase current earnings. In relation to studies which have 
been conducted in developed countries, the empirical evidence is generally 
consistent with: 
(1) The size and concentration ratio hypotheses. The larger a firm's size, 
and the higher the firm's concentration ratio, the more likely its managers 
are to use income decreasing accounting policies. However, although these 
two political cost variables are likely to be among the most important 
determinants of accounting policy choice, researchers tend to emphasise the 
existence of other important factors, since the nature and level of political 
costs depends on the political and legal environment in which firms operate; 
(2) the debt/equity hypothesis. The higher a firm's debt/equity ratio, the 
more likely its managers are to use income increasing accounting policies. 
The debt/equity ratio is one of the most tested variables although previous 
research has cast some doubts on its appropriateness as a proxy for the 
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expected costs associated with the violation of accounting-based debt 
covenants. However, recent studies which have examined the details of 
individual debt agreements have found that the debt/equity ratio is a valid 
proxy for the costs of leverage associated with changes in accounting 
policies and is significantly related to the tightness of the actual covenant; 
(3) the compensation plan hypothesis. Managers of firms with an earnings- 
based compensation plan are more likely to use income increasing 
accounting policies. The consistency of this hypothesis is also supported by 
the findings of Christie's (1990) aggregated study, who summarised much of 
the applied economic consequences literature and noted that managerial 
compensation is one of six variables with significant explanatory power 
across studies; and 
(4) insider ownership. The lower a firm's insider ownership, the more likely 
its managers are to use accounting policies that increase the present value of 
their compensation packages. 
In relation to studies which have attempted to evaluate the robustness 
of using the costly-contracting and political hypothesis ideas to explain 
accounting policy decisions in less developed countries, the empirical 
evidence in all, results in the findings, that are in contrast with the common 
results reported in developed countries. However, these studies have 
t 
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generally attributed the differing results to environment-related reasons, 
suggesting the necessity of understanding the political, legal, economic, 
and accounting environment in which the research will be conducted. 
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Since the late 1970s, there has been a large volume of empirical 
research which has adopted the costly-contracting and political cost theories 
in an attempt to provide empirical evidence on the existence of economic 
consequences associated with actual or proposed accounting standards. 
Most of the published evidence (relating almost exclusively to the USA) can 
be divided into three distinct categories: (1) the effects of existing or 
proposed accounting standards on the magnitude and direction of the 
abnormal returns of firms, and how these effects relate to firms' specific 
characteristics, (2) the effects of a new accounting standard on 
management's lobbying behaviour, and (3) the economic factors that 
motivate a firm to voluntarily adopt certain accounting policies. 
Although studies falling into the first two categories are not closely 
related to our study, their findings are important because they have 
demonstrated that some accounting standards give rise to economic 
consequences. For example, stock market studies show that there is a 
systematic relationship between cross-sectional stock price variations and 
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some political and contracting variables, particularly debt covenant 
variables. 
Our study falls into the third category. The findings as they relate to 
this category provide the strongest evidence consistent with the economic 
consequences of accounting policy choices. They generally demonstrate that 
firms' accounting policy decisions differ according to the size, concentration 
ratio, debt/equity ratio, earnings-based compensation plan, and insider 
ownership. These five factors have been found to be among the most 
important determinants of accounting policy decisions in developed 
countries. However, some empirical studies have failed to demonstrate the 
importance of these factors in explaining accounting policy choices in less 
developed countries. 
Our final conclusion from this literature review is that understanding 
the p olitical, legal, economic, and accounting environment in which the 
research has been conducted is fundamental to the implications and 
interpretations of the costly-contracting and political cost theories on the 
part of any economy. The following chapter is, therefore, designed to 
provide an understanding of the political and socio-economic environment in 
wl-&h. accounting policy choice occurs in Saudi Arabia. 
t 
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4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Accounting, like other social science disciplines and human 
activities, is largely a product of its environment. The environment 
of accounting consists of social-economic-political-legal conditions, 
restraints, and influences that vary from time to time (Kieso and 
Weygandt, 1989, p. 3). 
This chapter sets the scene for the study by surnmarising Saudi 
Arabia's political, legal, economic and accounting environment as well as 
the Saudi stock and labour markets. Such an examination of the Saudi 
Arabian environment serves three major purposes. First, it is instructive as 
an aid to understanding the environment in which the research is conducted. 
Second, it lays the groundwork for the development of the research 
hypotheses. Last, it provides a general frame of reference through which the 
reader can assess the importance of the research results to the development 
of the accounting profession in Saudi Arabia and other less developed 
countries. 
The chapter consists of six sections. The political and legal systems in 
Saudi Arabia are briefly described in section 4.1 and Saudi Arabia's 
economic and financial environment is summarised in section 4.2. Section 
4.3 provides an introduction to the. legal framework of the accounting and 
auditing profession. In this section we also review and assess Saudi financial 
accounting and reporting practices. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 describe the Saudi 
stock market and managerial labour market, respectively. Section 4.6 
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presents some concluding remarks which are written on the basis of their 
importance to the development of our research hypotheses. 
4.1 THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
This section describes the political and legal systems in Saudi Arabia. 
However, it does not deal comprehensively with these systems, but gives 
broad background information with special emphasis on some government 
institutions which are very important if one is to obtain a balanced-picture of 
the Saudi's political and legal environment. 
4.1.1 The Political System 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy. It is the 
creation of the King Abd al-Aziz Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al-Saud who 
was officially proclaimed as the King of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The present 
ruler of Saudi Arabia is King Fahd, who has inherited this position by virtue 
of the Saudi Constitution, which provides: 
A)- The system of government, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
monarchy. 
B)- Rule passes to the sons of the founding King, Abd al-Aziz Bin 
Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al-Saud, and to their children's children. 
The most upright among them is to receive allegiance in accordance 
with the principles of the Holy Koran and the tradition of the 
Venerable Prophet (Saudi Arabian Basic Law of Government, 1992, 
chapter two, article 5). 
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The King administers the country through the Council of Ministers. 
This Council was established in 1953 as a decision making body and has the 
following functions: (1) exercising the entire country's legislative, judicial, 
executive and administrative affairs, (2) establishing the organisation of and 
co-ordination between government bodies, and (3) enacting requirements to 
be fulfilled by Ministers. The King Fahd presides over the Council of 
Ministers as Prime Minister. The King's half-brother, Prince Abdullah, is 
Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister, whereas his full-brother, 
Prince Saultan, is the Second Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Defence and Aviation. 
There are no political parties, unions or franchises in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. However, the establishment of Majlis al-Shura (the 
Consultative Council) in 1992 is basically meant to enable selected sectors 
of the population to participate in the formulation of the Kingdom's foreign 
and domestic policies and to bring their opinions to the Government's 
attention. This new Council consists of 90 appointed members and a 
Chairman who are selected by the King. The establishment of the Nizam al- 
Muqata'at (provincial government) in fourteen provinces in 1992 is also 
intended to give more authority to the provincial governors and the local 
assemblies. It is also important to note the significant influence of Majlis 
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Hay'at Kibar al- Mama (the Council of the Assembly of Senior Ula=ý8) on 
the nation's political affairs. This Council is the head of the religious 
pyramid. Its members hold power by virtue of their special status in an 
Islamic state. 
4.1.2 The Le2al Svstem 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of a few independent 
monarchical states in the world where the principles of the Islamic religion 
constitute the social, economic, cultural, civil, legal and political codes of 
the country. The chief sources of the Kingdom's constitution and law are: 
(1) Al-Quran Al-KariM49 ; and (2) Al-Sunnah Al-Sharifa5o. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arabic Islamic state 
with Islam as its religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of his 
Prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution, 
Arabic is its language and Riyadh is its capital (Saudi Arabian Basic 
Law of Government, 1992, chapter one, article 1). 
The King is the final authority on which new policies to follow or 
which proposed laws to promulgate. He is the point of reference for the 
three authorities; the judicial authority, the regulatory authority and the 
"Wanza refers to the religious scholars who are the authorised interpreters of At-Quraln Al-Karint 
and of its application with Al-Sunnah Al-Sharifa, to everyday life. 
19 op. cit. (1). 
so Op. Cit. (2). 
t 
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executive authority 51 . 
Under certain circumstances, members of Majfis al- 
Shura and Majlis Hayat Kibar al-Ulama may influence the King's 
decisions. They often legitimise decisions on matters of importance in 
addition to those related to religious affairs which require consensus. 
In general, the King administers the Kingdom's affairs through two 
types of decrees. The first is Royal Decrees which are enacted by the King 
himself and usually cover the appointment of Deputy Prime Ministers, 
Ministers, judges and those of higher rank, and the termination of their 
appointmentS52 . 
The second is Ministerial Decrees which are enacted 
through the Council of Ministers and reflect the prerogatives of the Council 
regarding internal and external affairs. The Basic Law of Government also 
gives each Minister and head of key departments the right to take decisions 
and to enact laws on matters that relate to their responsibilities; but such 
laws must not be in conflict with the principles of Islam or to the Royal and 
other Ministerial Decrees. 
Saudi Arabian Basic Law of Government, 1992, chapter six, article 44. 
Ibid., articles 52,57a and 58. 
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4.2 THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
This section is about the economic and financial environment in Saudi 
Arabia. It is divided into two sub-sections. The first chronicles the planning 
efforts that have become the basis for the present economic environment. 
The second places special emphasis upon the role of some ministries and 
government-operated credit institutions in promoting the Kingdom's 
financial system. 
4.2.1 The Economic Environment 
The economy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been developed 
through a series of five-year plans. During the pre-oil period, livestock of the 
nomadic tribes, agriculture and funds brought in by the annual pilgrimage to 
the Holy cities, Makkah and Madinah, were the mainstay of economic 
activity in Saudi Arabia. The vast production of oil in commercial quantities, 
which took place in the period that immediately followed the end of the 
Second World War, and the vast increase in oil prices in the 1960s instituted 
a race towards a modernisation and made possible the launching of a 
domestic development plan on a wholly different scale. 
The Kingdom's first five-year development plan (1970-1975) called 
for budgeted expenditure of SR 41,314 million (in constant 1970 prices) and 
had the following broad aims: (1) maintaining a high rate of economic 
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growth; (2) developing and creating opportunities for the country's human 
resources; (3) building up a social services infrastructure; and (4) 
diversifying the economy's industrial base 53 . 
Like the first plan, the second five-year development plan (1975- 
1980) had a character and direction of its own.. It had the following in 
goals: (1) to maintain a high rate of economic growth; (2) to reduce 
expenditure and dependence on oil; (3) to build up a national industrial and 
social services infrastructure; and (4) to develop human resources through 
education and improve the standard of living of the Saudi people 54. Its 
budgeted expenditure was SR 498,270 million (in constant 1970 prices)55. In 
sum, the key aspect of the second plan was the expansion of oil-related 
production with an emphasis on the petrochemical and mining industries and 
the development of the private sector. 
The third development plan (1980-1985) called for budgeted 
expenditure of SR 782,700 million (in constant 1979/80 prices) and had the 
same fundamental objectives as the first and second plans, but with more 
53 Central Planning Organization (CPO), First Development Plan: 1970-1975, (the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: CPO, 1970) p. 43. Note that in October 1975 the CPO was elevated to the 
Ministry of Planning. 
"Ministry of Planning, Second Development Plan: 197S-1980, (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Riyadh: Ministry of Planning, 1976) pp. 34. 
" Ministry of Planning, Third Development Plan: 1980-1985, (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Riyadh: Ministry of Planning, 1980), p. 88. 
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emphasis on productive sectors; specifically industry, agriculture and 
mining, and relatively less on infrastructure5'. In general, at the end of this 
plan, four distinct structural changes became apparent (Wright, 1996, pp. 
20-22). First, for the first time emphasis was placed on the importance of 
human resources. This is indicated by: (1) the allocation of 19 percent of the 
third plan's budget for the development of human resources, and (2) the 
establishment of the Manpower Council in 1980, where nine of its twelve 
members are key Ministers. Second, the service sector became the mainstay 
of growth in the economy, gaining 64 percent of the economy's output in 
1985 57 . Third, the non-oil manufacturing sector took on a somewhat new 
identity, changing from large industrial projects to medium-sized and small 
manufacturers. It was estimated that at the end of 1985 there were about 
2,000 producing entities in the Kingdom. Last, the agriculture sector became 
much more productive, making the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a wheat 
exporter. 
The fourth development plan, covering the period 1985-90, has given 
increasing priority to private sector activities. This is because infrastructure 
construction had reached a satisfactory level due to previous plans. The 
s6 Ibid., pp. 34 and p. 88. 
" Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report No. 32, (the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Riyadh: SAMA, 1996), p. 198. 
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budget for this plan was about SR 1000 billion, with approximately 50 
percent of it allocated to development programmes that would: (1) increase 
the productivity of agriculture, finance and manufacturing; (2) maintain a 
high rate of economic growth through encouragement of private sector 
investment activities; (3) reduce the expenditure and dependence on oil 
production; and (4) improve human resources and reduce the number of 
unskilled foreign workers (Al-Farsy, 1990, pp. 159-164). The fourth plan's 
success is indicated by the fact that the share of the oil sector in total GDP 
declined from 56 percent at the end of the first plan to 30 percent in 1990, 
while the non-oil sector's share increased to about 70 percent by the end of 
the 199058. 
The fifth development plan (1990-1995) represented a basic 
continuation of the objectives set forth for the fourth plan. The notable 
difference was that efforts towards education and training have intensified. It 
is estimated that 19 percent of the fifth plan's total budget was allocated to 
human resource development. This reflected the Government's intention of 
continuing to aid the private sector through supporting its managerial and 
training needs. This plan also gave more attention to the development of the 
financial system. 
581bid., pp. 196-199 and p. 202. 
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Although the financial system in the Kingdom has developed 
dramatically during the last two decades, it needs further 
strengthening in each of these dimensions to meet the investment 
requirements of the fifth plan more effectively... Thus, a need arises 
for a growing share of the banking system's financial assets to be 
invested in the Kingdom, and for the range of financial services 
supporting the business sector to be expanded QvIinistry of Planning, 
Fifth Development Plan: 1990-1995, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Riyadh: Nfinistry of Planning, 1990, p. 155). 
Abdel-Wahhab Attar (1997), the Minister of Planning, gives an 
example of the fifth plan's success: 
In 1971 Saudi Arabia had only 119 factories. By 1995 the 
number had leapt to 2303, with a total investment of capital of 
over US$ 27 billion. ... Electricity generation in 1971 was a mere 
344 Megawatts whereas by 1995 the output had reached the 
astounding figure of 17,400 Megawatts. Consumers linked to 
electricity network in 1971 numbered 216,000 but by 1995 the 
total of electricity accounts had reached 2.9 million. The storage 
capacity of grain silos in the kingdom was by 1995 2.38 million 
tons while flour mills capacity for the same year reached a 
staggering total of 1.35 million tons annually... Economists also 
affirm that the industrial sector in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
is expected to expand rapidly in the next decade increasing total 
investments in the Saudi industrial sector to some SR 670 billion 
(US$ 180 billion)... (Saudi Arabian Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 8, p. 6). 
Saudi Arabia is now in its sixth five-year development plan (1995- 
2000). The vast decrease in oil prices and the public antagonism toward the 
Government which took place during and after the 1990 Gulf crisis have 
given the sixth five-year development plan a character and direction which is 
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distinctly different from that of previous plans. In general, the 1995-2000 
development plan has four main strategic economic goals59: 
1. Privatisation, an end to subsidised provision of public utilities and a 
balanced budget; 
2. the development of human resources to ensure an increasing supply of 
manpower, the upgrading of its efficiency to meet the requirements of the 
national economy and replacement of foreign labour by Saudi workers; 
3. the promotion of economic growth through encouragement of the private 
sector to participate in the economic and social development process; 
and 
4. the continued restructuring of the economy through diversification, with 
special emphasis on industry and agriculture. 
To achieve these objectives, the plan identified the following guiding 
principles: (1) continue 'Saudization' of the labour force by modifying 
education and training curricula and programmes; (2) expand the 
privatisation programme by creating opportunities for the private sector to 
take over more economic responsibilities; and (3) rationalise subsidies 
provided by the Government for many services and commoditieS60. The 
59 Ministry of Planning, Sixth Development Plan: 1995-2000, (the Kingdom of Saudi I 
Arabia, 
Riyadh: Ministry of Planning, 1995), pp. 91-96. 
60 Ibid. pp. 87-88. 
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basic message of this plan is much more specific- that the Government 
wants the private sector to become the backbone of the Saudi economy and 
that the Government shall not carry out any activities that could be 
undertaken by the private sector. 
4.3.2 The Financial Environment 61 
The Ministry of Finance and National Economy is the backbone of 
the financial system in Saudi Arabia. It is responsible for drafting the annual 
fiscal budget and the allocation of finance to each government spending 
agency. Under its control is the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
which was created by Royal decree in 1952 to act as the Kingdom's central 
bank. Since its inception, SAMA has undertaken a wide range of functions; 
holding and managing the Government's foreign monetary reserves; 
controlling and overseeing the distribution of government revenues 
earmarked for public agencies; monitoring the money supply; printing and 
controlling local currency and managing the exchange rate of the Saudi 
-Riyal which is officially linked to the US dollar at SR 3.75. In general, 
SAMA's charter, which was issued in 1957, defines the two main objectives 
of the agency's mandate; to stabilise the value of the currency and to 
61 The figures presented in this section are based on the latest annual report released by the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report No. 32, (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Riyadh: SAMA, 1996). 
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regulate the domestic commercial banks and stock market. From a bank 
perspective, SAMA is free to manage the banking system in the Kingdom 
and in this regard its responsibilities were laid down in the 1966 Banking 
Control Law which still forms the basis of commercial bank regulation. This 
law sets banks' license requirements. In 1995, there were eleven joint-stock 
banks in the commercial banking sector in Saudi Arabia. These banks are 
either wholly Saudi-owned or at least have 60% Saudi ownership. The 
Banking Control Law also sets banks' reserves and liquidity requirements, 
regulates the maximum total of loans which a bank may grant, and sets 
banks' service fees. Before the development of the 1995-2000 plan, the 
main ftinction of the commercial bank sector was in providing short-term 
loans for trade financing purposes. Recently, the banking sector has also 
been responsible for funding the Government's budget deficit. Also, a trend 
in bank lending is now toward the provision of long-term credit to industrial 
projects. 
Besides the commercial banks, the financial system in Saudi Arabia 
also comprises six semi-government specialised credit institutions which 
have been created to improve the distribution of funds earmarked for the 
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development of the private sector. These six government funding institutions 
are: 
I. The Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank (SAAB) was established in 
1964 to act as the agent for the Ministry of Agriculture and Water. It 
provides interest free loans to the agricultural sector for a variety of 
purposes ranging from the purchase of farm machinery and well 
drilling, to the construction of large-scale dairy projects. The bank has 
provided 362.4 thousand loans valued at SR 27.5 billion since its 
inception in 1964. The total loans provided in 1993 by the bank were 
valued at SR 931 million. Medium-term loans alone accounted for 
about 96.4 percent of this total lending. The provision of water 
(comprising drilling and casing of wells, irrigation equipment, 
engines, pumps, and piping) accounted for over 30 percent of the 
loans extended, and agricultural projects and machinery for another 
56.7 percent. In addition, the bank offers agricultural subsidies which, 
since its inception and to the end of 1993, reached over SR 10 billion. 
Ii. The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) was founded in 1974 
with the objective of providing interest-free loans for periods of up to 
15 years and for up to 50 percent of the total costs of new industrial 
construction, expansion, modernisation and renovation schemes. In 
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general, the principal objective of the SIDF is to assist and encourage 
the private sector' to undertake industrial projects. Total loans 
provided by SIDF since its inception and up to the end of 1994, 
amount to SR 17.5 billion, of which over 67 percent was allocated to 
the financing of the cement, petrochemical, metal, building materials 
and food and beverages sectors. 
111. The Public Investment Fund (PIF) provides medium-, and long-term 
loans for up to 60 percent of the total costs of projects. It is mainly 
created to finance public corporations (such as electrical companies) 
and some public and semi-public industrial companies which ate 
engaged in the development of oil-refining capacity and the 
production of petrochemicals, iron, steel and aluminium. Total loans 
extended by the PIF since its inception in 1971 reached SR 67.6 
billion in 1994; SR 37.9 billion of this total was allocated to the 
financing of electrical projects. 
IV. The Real Estate Development Fund (RSDF), the Saudi Credit Fund 
for contractors (SCF) and the Saudi Credit Bank (SCB), whilst 
making a significant contribution to the Saudi economy, are less 
concerned with making a contribution to private sector activities. The 
RSDF and SCF were created in the late 1970s to eliminate the private 
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and public housing shortage. The RSDF extends interest-free housing 
loans for periods of up to 25 years. In total it disbursed credit of SR 
69 billion between 1976 and 1994, the loans being used by citizens 
for the construction of residential houses and by investors for 
building residential and commercial compounds. The SCF also grants 
long-term loans to Saudi building companies for purchasing building 
materials. The SCB made its first loans in 1973, its intention being to 
assist low-income citizens; the loans being used for both social and 
economic purposes. 
There are also a number of relevant government departments that 
have a significant effect on the financial system in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. Among them are the Ministry of Industry & Electricity, the Ministry 
of Commerce and the Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 
1. The Ministry of Industry & Electricity was established in 1975 with the 
objective of administering industrial policy. The two principal objectives 
of this Ministry are to function as a licensing bureau and to supervise, 
regulate and encourage national industries. The number of licenses issued 
by the Ministry of Industry & Electricity for manufacturing projects 
increased from 119 factories in 1971 to 2,355 factories by the end of 1995 
with an accumulated capital of over SR 157 billion. The major industries 
t 
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involve basic metal processing, representing 28 percent of the total 
number of licenses and around 9 percent of the authorised capital, 
followed by chemicals and plastic, and food and beverages, with 18 and 
15 percent respectively of the total number of licenses issued and about 
63 and 6 percent of the authorised capital, respectively. 
2. The Ministry of Commerce was created in 1975 to ftmction as a regulator 
of companies operating in the Kingdom, to regulate, supervise and 
encourage the auditing and accounting profession, and to deal with trade 
marks and foreign consultation. By law, business companies must register 
with the Commercial Register Office in the Ministry of Commerce. The 
latest Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency's Annual Report reveals that by 
the end of 1994, there were 7,815 companies registered in Saudi Arabia 
of which 92 are joint stock companies with a combined paid-up capital of 
SR 71.7 billion. 
3. The Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry consists of 18 domestic 
chambers, of which three are located in major cities. These chwnbers 
provide a variety of functions ranging from developing training 
programmes suitable for entrants to the private sector, to defining 
investment opportunities for both Saudi and overseas companies. By law, 
companies importing and exporting goods and services to Saudi Arabia or 
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bidding for government contracts, must be a member of one of the 
chambers of commerce. 
4.3 THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENVIRONMENT 
The accounting and auditing profession in, Saudi Arabia is in its early 
stages of development. The period before the establishment of the Saudi 
Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) in 1992 can be 
described as being marked by a complete absence of authoritative support 
for accounting and auditing practices. However, this does not mean that 
there were no accounting and auditing regulations in Saudi Arabia before 
1992. In fact, the current legal and institutional framework surrounding the 
Saudi accounting and auditing profession has origins in the 1950 Income 
Tax and Zakat Law, the 1965 Companies Act and the 1974 Accountants 
Law, as well as in the legislation introduced in 1986 with the objective of 
building up a conceptual framework for financial accounting and reporting. 
In this section we look at the accounting and auditing environment in 
Saudi Arabia through two main themes. We first examine the current legal 
framework of the accounting and auditing profession. Then, the present 
financial accounting and reporting practices are reviewed and assessed 
through the findings of two recent exhaustive studies. 
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4.3.1 Accounfine and Auditing RegulatiOns 
The current legal framework of the accounting and auditing profession 
in Saudi Arabia has been the result of (1) a few rules contained in the 
Income Tax and Zakat Law and the Companies Act, (2) the 1986 Ministerial 
decision concerning "Auditing Standards" and "Statement of Financial 
Accounting Objectives, Concepts and General Standard of Presentation and 
Disclosure", and (3) the 1992 Certified Public Accountants (CPA) 
Regulations. 
1. The Income Tax and Zakat Law was first introduced by the Royal 
Decree No. 17/2/28/3321 dated 21/1/1370 A. H. (1950). This law 
contained a number of accounting and auditing requirements which had 
not previously been subject to legislation. However, the 1950 law has 
been amended several times and added to by further Ministerial decisions 
and memoranda and Department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT) 
circulars. In general, the Income Tax and Zakat Law requires non- 
Muslim-owned companies and entities jointly owned with non-Muslims 
to pay taxes, and Saudi nationals, both companies (wholly Saudi owned 
or on the Saudi share of corporate profits of entities jointly owned with 
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Non-Muslims) and individuals, to pay Zaka t62 . The 
law defines the Zakat 
as a religious duty (tax) charged in accordance with Al-Quran Al-Karim 
and AI-Sunna Al-Sharifa and levied on proceeds, profits, and gains from 
all sources: business, industry or personal work, and property or 
monetary acquisitions of whatever type or description, including 
commercial and financial transactions and dividends,, livestock, crops, 
capital, and income from capital. In the area of Zakat regulation, the 
major provisions contained in this law with respect to companies can be 
summarised as follows: 
" Every company is required to maintain organised accounting records 
which should be sufficient to show and explain the company's 
transactions and to disclose at any time with reasonable accuracy the 
amount of Zakat due. These accounting records should be prepared in 
accordance with what is termed "internationally accepted practices" 
and certified by "a commercial court or a public notary". 
" The law specifies the rate of the Zakat to be 2.5% of the net invested 
fimds, 'total amount subject to Zakat'. Circular No. 2/8443/2/1 issued 
in 8/8/1392 A. H. (1972) required the 'total amount subject to Zakat' 
62 Because the sample used in our empirical research is composed of Saudi joint stock companies, 
our emphasis in this section is placed upon the Zakat provisions. 
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be calculated as follows: income and property (including equity 
invested in operations) minus long-term investments and net fixed 
assets that are not held for resale. This can be simplified as follows: 
1). Paid-in Capital- Jan., I X)COM 
2). Reserves- Jan., I xxxxxx 
3). Retained Earnings- Jan., I XXX= 
4). Net Profit-Dec., 31 Xxxxxx 
5). Credit Current Account- Dec., 31 xxxxxx 
------------ X)CKXXX 
Less: 
6). Net Loss-Dec., 31 xxxxx 
7). Long-term contracts-Dec. 31 xxxxxx 
8), Net Fixed Assets-Dec. 31 xxxxxx 
9). 80% of Raw Materials and Spare-parts* xxxxxx 
------------ (xxxxxx) 
----------- 
Net Invested Funds (Total Amount Subject to Zakat) xxxxx 
----------- 
* This is only applied on electrical, transportation and pilgrim companies. 
Source: The Minister of Finance, circulars No. 2/8443/2/1 dated 8/8/1392 A. H. (1972) and No. 
687/2/1 dated 22/1/1393 A. H. (1973). 
The Ministerial Decree No. 104 issued in 30/1/1408 A. H. (1988) 
required companies to charge Zakat to the profit and loss account as 
an expense rather than to the retained earnings account. Prior to that 
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time, managers of Saudi companies could choose which of the two 
3 
accounting treatments they wished to apply' . 
2. The Companies Act was first introduced by the Royal Decree No. "6 
dated 22/3/1385 A. H. (1965) in response to the accelerating growth of 
companies in the early 1960s. This Act has been described as being the 
first statute to define the types of business organisations in Saudi Arabia 
and it also determined the legal framework for companies and 
accountants. However, the 1965 Act has been subject to many revisions 
and extensions. It was most recently amended in 1992 when 233 
provisions were introduced, of which 100 are in the area of the regulation 
of joint stock companies. The following paragraphs briefly highlight the 
major accounting and auditing provisions contained in the joint stock 
companies section: 
Every company is required to present annually to the auditor, a set of 
accounts, which should comprise a balance sheet, a profit and loss 
account and a report on the company's activities and financial 
situation during the financial year, together with the proposed method 
63 The difference between these two treatments is fully explained by a numerical example in 
chapter six (section 6.1.2.3). 
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for the allocation of the net profit64 . 
These documents, a summary of 
the board of directors' report and the full text of the auditor's report 
should together be placed at the disposal of shareholders at least 
twenty-five days prior to the annual general meeting. They must also 
be published in a newspaper distributed in the locality of the head 
office of the company 65. 
The entries appearing in the financial statements of a company must 
be consistently measured and classified over time 66 . 
Each year, companies are required to set aside 10 percent of their net 
profits to form what is called "a statutory reserve" which shall be 
used to cover future losses or to increase capital. The Act also gives 
each company the right to set aside a certain percentage of its net 
profit to build up "a contractual reserve" which shall be used in 
67 accordance with the company's by-laws 
Companies' by-laws shall specify dividend distributions which have 
to be a percentage of net profit, after setting aside amounts required 
64 Companies Act 1992, (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: Ministry of Finance, 1992), Article 
123. 
65 Ibid., Article 89. 
66 Ibid., Article 124. 
67 Ibid., Articles 125 and 126. 
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for the statutory and contractual reserves. Such a percentage has to be 
not less than 5 percent of the company's capita168. 
Companies' by-laws shall also specify the way in which directors are 
to be remunerated. Article 74 states that: 
The company's by-laws shall specify the manner of remunerating 
directors. Such remuneration may consist of a specified salary, or of 
an attendance fee for the meetings, or of material benefits, or of a 
certain percentage of the profits, or of a combination of two or more 
of these benefits. If, however, such remuneration represents a 
certain percentage of the company's profits, it must not exceed 10% 
of the net profits after deduction of expenses, depreciation, and 
such reserves as are determined by. the general meeting pursuant to 
the provisions of these Regulations or of the company's bylaws, and 
after distribution of a dividend of not less than 5% of the 
company's capital to stockholders. 
The Act requires the ordinary general meeting of each company to 
appoint an auditor(s) who is (are) to examine, at any time, the 
company's books, records and other documents and to report whether 
the financial statements provide "a real view" of the company's 
financial position at the end of the period and profitability during that 
period. The AcO also provides for the auditor's appointment, 
remuneration, independence, responsibilities, and removal. 
68 Ibid., Article 127. 
69 Ibid., Articles 130,131,132 and 133. Note that the Ministerial Decree No. 903 dated 12/8/1414 
A. H. (1994) requires the general meeting of each joint stock company to create an audit committee 
within the company. The principal objectives of this committee shall include the appointment of 
the company's auditor(s). 
t 
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3. The 1986 Ministerial Decision came as a direct response to extensive 
public criticism of accounting and auditing practices. It was issued by the 
Minister of Commerce's Decision No. 692 dated 28/2/1406 A. H. (1986) 
and published in two volumes; "Accounting Objectives and Concepts 
and General Standard of Presentation and Disclosure" and "Auditing 
Standards". This decision can be described as being the first statute to 
define the framework of the accounting and auditing profession in Saudi 
Arabia. The significance of this decision can be assessed by looking at 
the main elements of its provisions: 
Users of financial statements. The 1986 decision divides users of 
financial statements into two main categories; "users directly involved 
in the business enterprise" and " users indirectly involved in the 
business enterprise". The first category includes present and 
prospective investors, lenders, the Zakat and Income Tax Department, 
Government, Government ftitids, management and personal clients 
and suppliers of the company. The second category of users involves 
Governmental control agencies and Government agencies - concerned 
with planning and directing the national economy. 
Financial accounting objectives. According to the 1986 decision, 
the basic objectives of financial reporting in Saudi Arabia are to 
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provide information (1) that is useful in investment and credit 
decisions, (2) that is useful to present and potential investors and 
lenders in assessing cash flow prospects, (3) about enterprise assets, 
liabilities and owner's equity, and (4) about the sources and utilisation 
of the enterprise's cash or other liquid resources. 
Qualitative characteristics of accounting information. Seven 
characteristics that make accounting information useful for decision 
making are determined and defined in the 1986 decision. These are 
relevance, reliability, neutrality, comparability, timeliness, 
understandability and materiality. 
Basic elements of financial statements. Ten elements that are most 
directly related to measuring the performance and financial position of 
an enterprise are formally stated and defined in the 1986 decision. 
These elements include assets, liabilities, equity, investment by 
owners, distribution to owners, revenues, expenses, gains, losses and 
net income (net loss). 
Accounting principles. The decision specifies that the general 
principles to be followed in preparation of accounts are the economic 
entity, going concern, periodic reporting, monetary unit, revenue 
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recognition, measurement basis (historical cost) and matching 
principles. 
General standard of presentation and disclosure. This standard 
became mandatory in mid-1989 and requires companies to prepare a 
complete set of financial statements, which should comprise a 
statement of financial position, a statement of income (loss), a 
statement of retained earnings (or alternatively, a statement of 
changes in owner's equity), a statement of sources and applications of 
Rinds and notes to the financial statements. The standard also defines 
six disclosure requirements. These are nature of business, significant 
accounting polices, accounting changes, contingencies, commitments 
and subsequent events. In addition, the presentation and disclosure 
standard prescribes a large number of formats for presentation of 
financial statements. In the case of combined and individual financial 
statements, there are four possible formats for the statement of 
financial position and the income statement, one format for the 
statement of retained earnings and the statement of changes in 
owners' equity and three formats for the statement of sources and 
applications of funds. 
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Limitations of financial statements. The 1986 decision specifies 
that information contained in financial statements may need to be 
adjusted by some Government agencies such as the Zakat and Income 
Tax Department and Government credit institutions. Furthermore, it is 
specified that although financial statements provide information 
necessary for evaluating an enterprise's performance, they do not 
provide direct information that may help users to evaluate its 
management perfon-nance or to measure its market value or the risk 
associated with holding its equity. 
Auditing standards. The second volume of the 1986 Minister of 
Commerce's Decision defines seven auditing standards. These are: 
1. Standard of adequate professional competence; 
2. standard of auditor's neutrality and independence' 
3. standard of due professional care; 
4. standard of audit planning; 
5. standard of documentation and control; 
6. standard of audit evidence; and 
7. standard of audit reporting. 
However, fixther discussion of these standards is beyond the scope, of 
the present study. 
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4. The 1992 Certiried Public Accountants Regulations were enacted by 
the Royal Decree No. M/12 dated 13/5/1412 A. H. (1992). These 
regulations were introduced with the objective of replacing the 1974 
Accountants Law and establishing the Saudi Organisation for Certified 
Public Accountants (SOCPA). They consist of 38 articles, of which 29 
specify the requirements for persons to be licensed as auditors in Saudi 
Arabia. In general, these 29 requirements deal with registration 
procedures and fees and the auditors' qualifications, responsibilities and 
penalties. However, amongst the major articles contained in the 1992 
CPA Regulations are articles 19 to 27 which state the foundation, 
objectives and structure of the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA). The following paragraphs briefly highlight some 
of these articles and specify the main activities undertaken by the 
SOCPA since its inception in 1992 and to the end of 1998: 
Article 19 states that an organisation shall be established under the 
name of the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants 
(SOCPA). SOCPA shall operate under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Commerce and act as a Governmental regulatory agency promoting 
and administrating the accounting and auditing profession and all 
practical matters. Its main objectives include (1) to review, develop 
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and approve accounting and auditing standards, (2) to prepare and 
grade the Certified Public Accountants examinations and determine 
the educational qualifications and other criteria to be met by persons 
who wish to take the examinations, (3) to organise courses of 
continuous accounting and auditing education, (4) to conduct research 
studies and to publish periodicals, books and bulletins covering all 
matters that may lead to the development of the accounting and 
auditing profession, (5) to establish an appropriate quality review 
programme in order to ensure that the provisions of the 1992 Certified 
Public Accountants Regulations as well as the present and future 
accounting and auditing standards are implemented by members of 
SOCPA, and (6) to participate in local and international committees 
and symposia relating to the accounting and auditing professions. 
I 
To ensure that public accounting firms support and implement 
SOCPA's pronouncements, article 20 requires all managing partners 
of these fmns to be members of the SOCPA. 
Article 24 requires that SOCPA's Board of Directors must comprise 
(1) the Minister of Commerce (chairman), (2) the Deputy Minister of 
Commerce, (3) the Deputy Minister of"Finance and National 
Economy for Financial Affairs and Accounts, (4) the Vice President 
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of the General Controller's Bureau, (5) a representative from the 
Council of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, (6) two Saudi 
academicians selected from Saudi universities, and (7) six 
practitioners selected from Saudi firms of public accountants. 
Article 26 specifies that SOCPA's financial resources are to include 
subscriptions, government subsidies, gifts and donations and proceeds 
from the Organisation's publications. 
In 1993, SOCPA's Board of Directors enacted Decision No. 4/2 
dated 29/6/1414 A. H. (1993) which stated the foundation, objectives 
and structure of six technical conitnittees working under the 
supervision of SOCPA. These committees include (1) Accounting 
Standards Committee,, (2) Auditing Standards Committee, (3) 
Training and Education Committee, (4) CPA Examination Committee, 
(5) Professional Ethics Committee, and (6) Quality Review 
Committee. 
in 1993, SOCPA's Board of Directors enacted Decision No. 4/2/3 
dated 15/5/1414 A. H. (1993) which requires Saudi Companies to use 
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). However, 
this memorandum is effective -only until SOCPA creates, its own 
standards. 
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In 1994, SOCPA issued its first standard; "Quality Control Standard 
for the Certified Public Accountants Firms". This standard became 
mandatory by SOCPA's Decision No. 3/3 dated 26/1/1415 A. H. 
(1994) and required CPA firms to establish adequate quality control 
policies and procedures necessary to provide reasonable assurance 
that they meet their responsibilities to clients and the public. 
A principal factor in maintaining high professional standards of 
practice was the development of "A Code of Professional Ethics" in 
1994 under the leadership of the Professional Ethics Committee. This 
code was endorsed by SOCPA's Decision No. 3/5 dated 27/4/1415 
A. H. (1994). It provides practical guidance to individual members in 
maintaining a professional attitude. In a broad sense, this code sets 
forth the basic responsibilities of CPA firms to the public, clients and 
fellow practitioners. 
By mid-1997, a total of 6 standards had been developed. These 
standards, which become mandatory by the end of 1998, are: (1) 
Foreign Currency Translation, (2) Inventories, (3) Cash Flow 
Statements, (4) Related Party Disclosures, (5) Preliminary & Pre- 
operating Expenses, and (6) Auditing Electronic Data Processing 
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(EDP) Activities7o. However, apart from these standards, SOCPA's 
Decision No. 4/2/3 dated 15/5/1414 A. H. (1993) requires the 
financial statements of Saudi joint stock companies to be prepared in 
accordance with the 1986 "General Standard of Presentation and 
Disclosure" and US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). 
4.3.2 Financial Accountina and Reportint! Practices 
Financial reporting in Saudi Arabia has long been criticised by 
practising accountants and academicians as well as by individuals and 
groups outside the accounting and auditing profession. This criticism has 
been based on grounds that the financial statements of Saudi companies are 
based upon what can be termed as 'imported accounting standards' and so, 
the information provided by these statements is misleading, inadequate, and 
above all, not homogenous. Merei (1985, p. 43) when referring to these 
imported standards stated: 
Since the Tax Authority has not yet defined the term 
"internationally accepted", any support for an accounting 
treatment is accepted. Some firms in Saudi Arabia make reference 
to the standards issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Committee; others are using the US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP); a few are using Canadian Standards; possibly 
others use the British GAAP. 
70 Detailed discussion of these standards is beyond the scope of the present study. 
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Another recent insight with respect to the application of imported 
accounting standards in Saudi Arabia was provided by Al-Rehaily (1992)'s 
survey. Al-Rehaily found that International Accounting Standards (IASs) 
were widely used by practitioners in Saudi Arabia, followed respectively by 
the US and UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Al- 
Rehaily also demonstrated. that the "quality" of financial reporting in Saudi 
Arabia varies considerably from one company to another. He examined the 
accounting systems of 25 Saudi industrial joint-stock companies and found 
that,, contrary to the requirements of the 1986 Ministerial decision 
concerning "Statement of Financial Accounting Objectives, Concepts and 
General Standard of Presentation and Disclosure", some reports such as the 
statement of changes in owners' equity and the statement of sources and 
applications of funds, were not commonly prepared. In this context, we also 
examined the 1995 financial statements of 48 Saudi joint stock companies 
and found that, contrary to the requirements of the Ministerial Decree No 
1041,16 companies still treated the annual Zakat as income distributions 
rather than as an expense. 
4.4 THE STOCK MARKET 
The Saudi Arabian stock market is in its early stages of development. 
In 1975, there were 14 listed Saudi joint stock companies with a combined 
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paid-up share capital of SR 2 billion. However, prior to 1984, stock trading 
in Saudi Arabia was unregulated. At that time, prospective buyers and 
sellers had to search for brokers who were unregulated and informally 
trading in stocks. In June 1984, the Government introduced the first 
regulations which limited brokerage activities to domestic banks and 
required listed companies to publish quarterly financial statements (Al- 
Saleh, 1997). In 1990, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
required all shares to be traded through domestic banks and share ownership 
to be registered with the Saudi Share Registration Company (SSRC) which 
is wholly-owned by the eleven national banks. The domestic banks' 
franchise and SSRC are linked electronically with the central computer at 
SAMA. In discussing the process by which shares are bought and sold in 
Saudi Arabia, SAMA (1993) states: 
I 
... , buyers and sellers place their orders with the banks which, in 
turn, process the transactions through their Centralised Trading 
Units (CTUs). Once the bid and offer is matched, a deal is struck. 
The flow of information passes through the SAMA Banking 
Technology Processor to SSRC where hard copy print outs are 
produced next day. Banks send their representatives to collect 
applications (Ishaarat) for onward delivery to the 
buyer ... Unmatched bids and offers are kept in the electronic 
market until either matched by the system or taken out from the 
market by the CTU traders. If the buyer wishes to have share 
certificates instead of "Ishaarat". then SSRC sends share 
certificates to the issuing company which endorses them and 
sends them back to SSRC for delivery (Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency, the Saudi Stock Market, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Riyadh: SAMA, p. 181). 
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At the end of 1995, there were 69 publicly listed companies. Table 
(4.1) shows the total volume and value of the traded shares of the 69 
companies for the 1995 fiscal year. 
Table (4.1) 
Number of Saudi igint stock companies classirted bv economic 
sectors and their shares traded in 199S71 
Shares Traded 
Economic Number of 
Sectors Companies 
Volume Value 
(Million Shares) % (SR Million) % 
Banks 11 27,190 23.3 7,832 33.7 
Electricity 10 1,326 1.2 120 0.5 
Agriculture 9 5,279 4.5 288 1.2 
Services 16 35,203 30.2 3,199 13.8 
Industry 23 47,620 40.8 11,787 50.8 
Total 69 116,618 100 23,226 
In common with some stock markets in less developed countries, the 
Saudi stock market has been characterised by 'iffational expectations' [Al- 
Saleh (1997); Al-Rwita. (1993); Azzam. (1993); Butler and Malaikah (1992); 
Abdelsalam and Satin (1991 and 1988)]. This characteristic may be 
attributable to the following factors: 
" Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce & Industry, Saudi Corporations: Financial Data and 
Analytical Indicators (1993-1995), (the Kingdom Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: Research Department, 
CCI, Edition No. 9,1996), p. 284. f 
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1. The current share trading system is operationally inefficient. This is 
evidenced by the fact that: (i) orders of buyers and sellers often take 
several days before they are filled, and (ii) such orders are often matched 
in banks rather than through the SSRC's central exchange (Butler and 
Malaikah (1992). The following three striking characteristics of the Saudi 
stock market also enhance the operational inefficiency problem (Al- 
Rwita, 1993). First, there is no information intermediary industry and/or 
specialised financial publications. Second, there are no specialised 
analysts promoting liquidity. Third, there are no official market makers 
specialised in establishing an effective market for corporate control. 
Typically, the result of these institutional factors is imperfect access to 
information needed by participants in the stock market, poorly monitored 
share prices, and a low degree of control over corporate managers' 
behaviour. This, in turn, reduces liquidity and efficient pricing. As Butler 
and Malaikah (1992, p. 210) stated: "institutional factors contributing to 
operational inefficiency in Saudi Arabia ... 
have a major impact on the 
allocational efficiency of the Saudi stock market". 
2. At the end of 1995, about one-third of the shares of publicly traded 
companies or'about 40 percent of the stock market's capitalisation was 
t 
181 
Chapter Four: Saudi Arabian Environment 
owned by the Saudi Government'. This means political conditions often 
have a strong impact on share prices. For example, the number of 
transactions dropped from about 150,000 per month in 1981 to about 750 
transactions during the years 1984 to 1985 when the Government's oil 
revenues and economic activity were very weak (Al-Dukheil, 1988, p. 
53). Another example is that the NCFE173 index dropped by 10 percent in 
the third quarter of 1990, reflecting the political and economic uncertainty 
arising out of the Gulf crisis. Furthennore, the existence of the six semi- 
government specialised credit institutions which grant interest free loans 
to individuals and companies has reduced the importance of the Saudi 
stock market as a mechanism for raising capital; i. e. it has reduced the 
importance of competition in both the stock and loan markets. 
3. Share trading is restricted to Saudi citizens and, in a few cases, citizens of 
other Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries74. Most Saudi investors 
do not have trammg in accounting and therefore are unaware of the 
72 The figures presented in this sentence are an amalgamation of our own research and information 
taken from Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce & Industry, Saudi Corporations: Financial 
Data and Analytical Indicators (1993-1995), (the Kingdom Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: Research 
Department, CCI, Edition No. 9,1996) 
73 The NCFEI index was initiated by the National Center for Financial & Economic Information at 
the Ministry of Finance and uses the methodology of the Standard and Poor's index of the US stock 
market. 
74 The first time non-Saudi citizens were allowed to purchase Saudi stocks was in 1984 when a 
speciric portion of SABIC's shares were made available to citizens of other GCC countries 
(Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman). 
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importance of understanding and interpreting financial reports properly. 
This is compounded by the fact that financial reports of Saudi companies, 
which are generally based upon 'imported accounting standards', provide 
heterogeneous information, and "disclose less infon-nation with a greater 
time gap than is the norm in most developed markets" (Al-Rwita, 1993, p. 
17ý5. 
Because the sample used in our empirical analysis is selected from 
publicly traded Saudi joint stock companies operating in the agricultural, 
industrial and services sectors, it may be useful if W676 shed some light on 
the characteristics of these three sectors and the size and variety of the joint 
stock companies of which they are comprised. 
75 The presence of naive investors as well as the absence of homogeneous financial information may 
explain why 11[e]xcessive speculation and inflated share prices have been a continuous feature of 
the Saudi stock market" (Al-Rwita, 1993, p. 11), and why Abdelsalam and Satin (1991 and 1988), 
in their empirical studies of the impact of Saudi Companies' financial reports on stock prices, 
found that published earnings information has no effect on either share prices or share trading 
volume. 
76 The following figures and discussion of the Saudi private sectors are an amalgamation of our 
own research and information taken from: (1) Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce & 
Industry, Saudi Corporations. Financial Data and Analytical Indicators (1993-1995), (the Kingdom 
Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: Research Department, CCI, Edition No. 9,, 1996); (2) Saudi Share 
Registration Company (SSRC), Saudi Corporations: General information, Financial Data and 
Analytical Indicators, (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: SSRC, June 1996); and (3) the 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report IV& 32, (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Riyadh: SAMA, 1996). Other references will be cited directly. 
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4.4.1 The Auicultural Sector 
The Saudi agricultural sector has grown rapidly since 1970 when the 
Government first decided to foster agricultural and industrial development. 
In general, the best way to look at the agriculture sector is through its four 
distinct characteristics. 
First, by the end of 1995, there were 9 agricultural companies whose 
shares were publicly traded. These 9 companies had a combined paid-up 
share capital of SR 1.9 billion, of which about 9 percent was owned by the 
Saudi Government. 
Second, although the agricultural sector's share of total GDP rose 
from 3.9 percent in 1975 to, on average, 13 percent during the 1985-1990 
development plan, this strong performance has been, to a great extent, 
traced to the Government's programme of incentives which can be classified 
into three parts: a price support policy; extensive state subsidies; and a land 
distribution and reclamation programme. On the price support side, the 
Saudi Government as represented by its agency, the Grains, Silos and 
Flour Mills Organization (GSFMO), has implemented a price support 
policy which involves the purchasing of local wheat and barley at 
guaranteed prices which are above the world market, prices for these 
products. 
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Since its inception in 1964 and to the end of 1993, the Saudi Arabian 
Agricultural Bank (SAAB) has also granted interest free loans and 
subsidies valued at SR 27.5 billion to agricultural organisations. These loans 
are provided for a variety of purposes ranging from the purchase of farm 
machinery to the construction of large-scale dairy projects. 
In addition to the above incentives, in 1968 the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water started a land distribution and reclamation 
programme with the objective of disbursing reclaimed land to Saudi citizens 
for cultivation and to joint stock companies for the establishment of large- 
scale agricultural projects. Between 1968 and to the end of 1994, over 2.4 
million hectares were distributed; the share of the agricultural companies in 
this land distribution programme reached more than 261 thousand hectares. 
The third characteristic of the Saudi agricultural sector is that it had 
been considered the least developed sector of the economy during the 1990- 
1995 development planning period. Its share of total GDP declined from 
15.4 percent in 1987 to 8.9 percent in 1994. This poor performance might 
be partially due to political factors that arose after the Gulf crisis in 1990. 
I 
However, during the first year of the 1995-2000 development plan, an 
extreme decline in the growth of the agricultural sector became much more 
visible than at any time before. This is indicated by the fact that the total net 
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profits of the nine agricultural companies was over SR 128 million in 
December 1994, before falling to a total loss of SR 82.6 million by the end 
of 1995. Table (4.2) gives details of the net profit/loss of each company 
during the 1994 and 1995 fiscal years. 
Table (4.2) 
The nine ag-ricultural Mint stock companies and their 
Performance during the 1994 and 1995 riscal vears 
Name of Companies 
Net Profit (Loss) 
as at 31/12/1994 
(S Million) 
Net Profit (Loss) 
As at 31/12/1995 
R Million) 
1. NADEC 54.5 49.3 
2. GACO (23.7) (37.6) 
3. HADCO 22.6 (124.2) 
4. TADCO 53.5 5.8 
5. Saudi Fisheries 11.4 9.3 
6. Eastern 3.4 (0.6) 
7. AI-Jouf 5.4 7.7 
S. Beshah (2.7) (4.0) 
9. Jazan 4.1 11.7 
Total 128.5 (82.6) 
The last major characteristic is that the agricultural sector is 
dominated by two companies; the Saudi Fisheries Company and the 
National Agricultural Development Company (NADEC). In December 
1995,40 percent of the total shares of the Saudi Fisheries Company was 
held by the Saudi Government. NADEC had, in December 1995, the largest 
I 
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total capital of all the agricultural companies valued at SR 400 million, of 
which 20 percent was owned by the Government. 
4.4.2 The Industrial Sector 
Since the mid-1970s Government planning has primarily been 
directed at diversifying the Kingdom's economic structure. Since that time 
and up to the present, the industrial sector is widely perceived as being the 
most likely route to reduce the Kingdom's excessive dependence on oil and 
to create self-sustaining economic activities that are not directly affected by 
fluctuations in world oil prices. Therefore, the industrial sector has long been 
perceived as a critical component of the Saudi economy in need of extensive 
government support. Hence, this sector benefits from medium- and long- 
term interest free loans of up to 60 percent of the total cost of new industrial 
construction, expansion, niodernisation and renovation schemes. In addition, 
Government instrumentalities provide subsidised land leases, a 20 percent 
protective duty in the early stages of production, exemption from tariff 
duties on most imported raw materials and machinery and subsidised ffiel 
and electricity. 
As a result of this wide range of government incentives and benefits, 
the industrial sector is now considered to be the largest sector in terms of the 
size and variety of joint stock companies. By the end of 1995, there were 40 
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industrial joint stock companies with a total paid-up capital of SR 23 billion. 
These 40 companies are operating in three different industrial sub-sectors; 
conversion industries, cement and building materials and oil and gas. 
1. The conversion industries consist of 24 companies which, as can be 
seen from Table (4.3), account for about 66 percent of the total capital of 
the industrial sector. This sub-sector also occupies the leading position 
among all economic sectors in terms of the size of the Government's loan 
commitments. Since its inception and up to the end of 1994, the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) approved long-term loans to 
projects in this sub-sector amounting to SR 6.6 billion or 37.5 percent of 
the Fund's loan commitments to all industrial projects. 
Table (4.3) 
The number of industrial ioint stock companies and 
their capital classiried bv economic sub-sector 
Economic Sub-Sector Number of 
Compýnies 
Total Paid-In Capital 
(SR Million) % 
1. Conversion Industries 24 15,174 66 
2. Cement and Building 11 7,080 31 
3. Oil and Gas 
-- 
5 
- 
740 3 
Total 40* 1 22,994 100 
* This figure includes three new companies established in 1995: two being conversion industries 
and one being a cement company. 
Of these 24 conversion companies, 11 companies were publicly traded 
on the stock market by the end of -1995. 
'The remaining 13 'companies 
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were either new companies or privately held77 . 
The eleven publicly 
traded companies produce a wide range of products including 
petrochemicals, fertilisers, iron and steel, aluminium., hydrocarbons, 
plastics, paper, engineering products, food and beverages and 
pharmaceuticals and other medical products. By the end of 1995, their 
annual sales were worth more than SR 27 billion. These eleven, 
conversion companies were, however, dominated by just two companies; 
the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and the Food Products 
Company, with total paid-up capital, which in December 1995, was 70 
and 15 percent state owned, respectively. 
2. The cement and building materials sub-sector consists of 9 cement 
companies and 2 building materials companies. Apart from a new cement 
company established in 1995, the remaining ten companies are publicly 
traded in the stock exchange and, in 1995, their total paid-up share 
capital was about SR 6.9 billion, of which more than 13 percent was 
owned by the Saudi Government. Table (4.4) gives details of the total 
paid-in capital and net profits of these ten companies as at 31 December, 
1995. This Table shows that the Yamama Cement Company is the largest 
77 Article No. 100 of the 1992 Companies Act states, "Cash shares subscribed for by the founders 
and shares for contributions in kind, as well as founders' shares shall not be negotiable before the 
publication of the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement [s] for two complete financial 
years, each consisting of at least twelve months as from the date of incorporation of the company". t 
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in terms of profitability with about 19.3 percent of the total net profits, 
followed by the Saudi Cement Company with 19.2 percent and the 
Southern Cement Company with 17.4 percent. 
Table L4.4) 
The total capital and net Prorits of the ten cement and 
buildinz materials companies as at 31 December, 1995 
Total Paid-In Capital Net Profit 
Name of Companies 
n) % (SR M Ilion) % 
I. Arab Cement 600 
__ 
8.6 133.1 6.8 
2. Yamama Cement 900 13.0 380.2 19.3 
3. Saudi Cement 1,591 22.9 377.6 19.2 
4. Qaseern Cement 450 6.5 160.3 8.1 
5. Southern Cement 700 10.1 342.1 17.4 
6. Yanbu Cement 1,050 15.2 157.3 8.0 
7. Eastern Cement 645 9.3 284.7 14.4 
8. Tabouk Cement 700 10.1 53.2 2.7 
9. Saudi Ceramic 150 2.2 39.4 2.0 
10. National Gypsum 144 2.1 43.3 2.1 
Total 6,930 100 1971.2 100H 
3. The oil and gas sub-sector is comprised of five large-scale oil and gas 
joint stock companies with total share capital of SR 724 million, of which 
more than 30 percent was owned by the Saudi Government in December 
1995. However, of these companies only two are publicly traded on the 
Saudi stock market; the Saudi Arabian Refinery Company (SARCO) and 
the National Gas and Industrialisation Company (GASCO). SARCO was 
190 
Chapter Four: Saudi Arabian Environment 
established in 1959 to work in all petroleurn-related activities, including 
the procurement, transportation, refining and marketing of oil. By 1995 
its total capital was SR 40 million and its annual net profit was close to 
SR 8 million. GASCO began business in 1976. Its main activities include 
the production, marketing and distribution of gas, locally and abroad. By 
1995 its total capital was SR 500 million, of which more than 15.5 
percent was owned by the Saudi Government. 
4.4.3 The Services Sector 
At the same time that the Saudi Government was implementing 
programmes designed to foster agricultural and industrial development, it 
was also pursuing policies to encourage the services sector. The best way to 
look at this sector is through the size and variety of the major service joint 
stock companies. I 
By the end of 1995, there were 24 services companies with a total 
paid-up share capital of SR II billion, annual sales of SR 4.5 billion and 
total net profits of SR 591.4 million. However, of these 24 companies, only 
16 are traded on the Saudi Stock Exchange. The activities of these publicly 
traded services companies include wholesale and retail trade, transport and 
communication, hotels and restaurants and reconstruction, acquisition, 
hiring, and management of lands and commercial and residential buildings. 
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In general, the services sector is dominated by ten publicly traded 
companies. Table (4.5) shows the total paid-in capital of these ten services 
companies and gives details of their total sales and net profits as at 31 
December, 1995. 
Table (4.5) 
The total capital and sales and the net Prorits of the ten 
large services companies as at 31 December, 1995 
Name of Total Paid-In Capital Total Sales Net Profit 
Companies 
(SR Million) % (SR M Ilion) (SR Million) 
1. NSCSA 1,994 20.9 1,080 11.6 
2. NUKKAH 1,387 14.5 146 113.0 
3. Al-Mawashi 1,009 10.6 421 18.3 
4. Riyadh Develop. 1,000 10.5 41 32.2 
5. SAPTCO 1,000 10.5 527 64.2 
6. Al-Azizia Panda 900 9.4 495 66.7 
7. Taibah 737 7.7 78 51.2 
8. SRECO 600 6.3 100 48.1 
9. Saudi Hotels 500 5.2 135 40.5 
10. SASCO 420 
11 
4.4 
1 
90 
1 
14.1 
1 
Total 1 9,547 1 100 1 3,113 1 459.9 
The total paid-up share capital of these ten large companies accounts 
for 87 percent of the services sector's total capital. In 1995, these companies 
also generated 68 percent of the sector's total sales. Furthermore, as of 
December 1995,18 percent of the total paid-up share capital of these ten 
service companies, which represents 15 percent of the whole sector's total 
I apital, was owned by the Saudi Government. 
t 
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4.5 THE LABOUR MARKET 
The Saudi labour market may best be discussed through the following 
three important characteristics: 
One major feature of the labour market in Saudi Arabia is the threat to 
high-level Saudi manpower, defined in its broadest context to include 
managers and technicians. At the end of 1994 the civilian workforce, as 
derived from US sources, was estimated to be 5.5 million, of whom 2.8 
million (51%) were non-Saudis. At present, almost all firms operating in 
the private sector rely on foreign managers and technicians. In this 
context, Wright, Khashoggi and Vaughn (1996, pp. 99-100) write: 
... thousands of expatriates coming to Saudi Arabia... and 
agriculture, construction, engineering and maintenance are 
dependent by as much as 60-90 per cent or more on foreign 
labour,..., compared with 8-12 per cent in 1963. 
2. The last official census, 'which was conducted in 1992, showed the Saudi 
population to be 12.3 million, of whom around 7.4 million (60%) were 
under 12 years of age 78 . This young generation is having a profound 
impact on Government plans in general, and on economic development in 
particular. Under the 1995-2000 development plan, the Saudi workforce 
is targeted to expand at an annual rate of 4%. The Government now 
" Op. Cit. (59), p. 178. 
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requires that 75% of all employees in an entity should be Saudi citizens 
and/or that 51% of a business's payroll should be paid to Saudis. This 
condition is reflected by the Government's commitment to continue the 
'Saudization' of the labour force by modifying the education curricula and 
encouraging the private sector to provide training programmes and job 
opportunities for Saudi citizens. In this context, Garawi and Schmidt 
(1996, p. 87) state: 
Saudi Arabia's strategy for overcoming deficiencies in both the 
quality and quantity of human resources is well known: after 
decades of importing labour a policy of 'Saudization', or replacing 
foreign employees with Saudi workers, is now in place. 
3. The Saudi Government has long been guaranteeing employment for every 
Saudi university graduate. The result of this is a large number of low- 
productive public sector jobs. This is coupled with the Government's 
failure: (1) to develop well functioning capital markets which are 
fundamental "for the managerial labor market's evaluation of the fin-n's 
management" (Fama, 1980, p. 292), and (2) to provide information 
regarding managerial job opportunities, managers' qualifications, and 
managerial turnover. 
4.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As the primary purpose of this chapter is to provide a good 
understanding of the environment in which the research is'conducted, this 
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section summaries the Saudi Arabian environment in terms of six basic 
characteristics. These six characteristics are written on the basis of their 
importance to the development of our research hypotheses which are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
1. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an absolute Islamic monarchy. Its 
constitution is based on Al-Quran Al-Karim and AI-Sunna Al-Sharifa 
and defmes the powers and duties of the King. The Council of Ministers 
is presided over by the King, who is also responsible for selecting its 
members. There are no political parties, unions or franchises in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, the establishment of MajUs al- 
Shura (the Consultative Council), Majfis Hayat Kibar al-Ulama (the 
Council of the Assembly of Senior Mama) and the Nizam al-Muqataat 
(provincial government) is intended to enable selected sectors of the 
population to participate in the formulation of the Kingdom's foreign and 
domestic policies and to bring their views to the Government's attention. 
Members of these Government Councils, as well as the Princes of the 
ruling family, exert significant influence over the Kingdom's political, 
legal and economic systems. Therefore, they are always the focus, of 
public attention. 
t 
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2. The economy of Saudi Arabia has been developed through a series of 
five-year plans, the first of which commenced in 1970. The sixth five- 
year development plan, covering the period 1995-2000, officially 
commits the Government to four principal economic goals: (1) a 
balanced budget, (2) further privatisation, (3) an end to the subsidisation 
of Saudi industry and public utilities, and (4) the replacement of foreign 
labour by Saudi workers. These represent significant changes to the goals 
of earlier development plans, probably reflecting the public antagonism 
_r 
toward the Government wbich took place during and after the 1990 Gulf 
crisis. 
3. By the end of 1995, there were 94 Saudi joint stock companies with a 
combined paid-up share capital of SR 72.9 billion. In December 1995,69 
1 of these 94 Saudi joint stock companies were traded on the Saudi stock 
I 
market, with a total capitalisation of SR 155.9 billion. These traded 
companies were operating in five different sectors; 11 banks, 10 
electrical companies, 9 agricultural companies, 23 industrial companies 
and 16 services companies. The most important characteristics of these 
69 companies are the following: (1) they have benefited from extensive 
government support and financial contributions expressed in terms of 
medium- and long-term interest free loans, reclaimed land and subsidised 
I 
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fuel and electricity; (2) as of December 1995, one-third of their shares 
(about 40 percent of the stock market's capitalisation) was held by the 
Saudi Government, and (3) they rely heavily on foreign managers and 
technicians. 
4. The total volume and value of the traded shares of the 69 Saudi 
companies for the 1995 fiscal year were 116,618 million shares and SR 
23,226 million. SAMA (the kingdom's central bank) requires all shares 
to be traded through Saudi banks and that share ownership must be 
registered with the Saudi Registration Company (SSRC). The most 
striking characteristic of the Saudi stock market is its 'irrational 
expectations'. This characteristic can be attributed to the following: (1) 
the operational inefficiency of the current share trading system, (2) the 
heavy involvement of the Government, (3) the absence of specialised 
analysts and official market makers, (4) the presence of naive investors, 
and (5) the absence of homogenous financial information and specialised 
financial publications. 
5. According to the last official census, the Saudi population is estimated to 
be, 12.3 million, of whom around . 7.4 million (60%) are under 12 years 
of age. This young generation is placing -a considerable political and 
economic strain on the Government. -,, To, cope with this problem, the 
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1995-2000 development plan now requires that 75% of all employees in 
an entity operating in the private sector should be Saudis and/or that 51% 
of a business's payroll should be paid to Saudi citizens. However, the 
Saudi labour market is still suffering from the absence of official 
information regarding, for example, job opportunities and managerial job 
qualifications. 
6. The accounting and auditing profession in Saudi Arabia is still in its 
infancy. Before the promulgation of "Accounting Objectives and 
Concepts and General Standard of Presentation and Disclosure" and 
"Auditing Standards" in 1986, there was no legislation dealing 
specifically with accounting and auditing practices except for a few rules 
to be found in the Income Tax and Zakat Law and the Companies Act. In 
1992, the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
was established by the Saudi Government with the principal objective of 
setting accounting and auditing standards. Since its inception, SOCPA 
has issued eight standards, six of which will be effective in 1998. Until a 
comprehensive set of standards exist, SOCPA requires the financial 
statements of Saudi joint stock companies to be prepared in accordance 
with the 1986 "General Standard of Presentation and Disclosure" and US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
i 
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5.0 INTRODUCTION 
The belief that management's accounting policy choices are likely to 
be affected by the political and regulatory environment in which companies 
operate and the financial contracts (debt and compensation contracts) into 
which they enter has provided an extensive source of testable hypotheses. In 
this context, we address the question of whether or not managers of Saudi 
companies use economic criteria in choosing their accounting procedures. 
The answer to this question is intended to provide empirical evidence on our 
general research question, whether or not the accounting standards which 
exist in Saudi Arabia give rise to economic consequences. 
Having introduced the Saudi Arabian. environment in the previous 
chapter, we now devote this chapter to linking the Saudi socio/economic 
environment to the political and contractual cost frameworks proposed by 
the positive accounting theory. Such a linkage motivates us to develop five 
hypotheses and is intended to provide a general frame of reference against 
which these five hypotheses can be assessed. 
5.1 THE POLITICAL COSTS FRAMEWORK 
In Saudi Arabia there are a number of distinct groups who have a 
considerable influence on the nation's political and legal systems in general 
-, ý 11 ý: III.. 
and on the economic system in particular. The first group includes the 
200 
Chapter Five: Formulation of Hypotheses 
Princes of the ruling family who hold the true reins of power by virtue of 
their relationship with the Kingdom's founder, King Abd al-Aziz, and also 
because of their specific ministerial posts. The second group consists of the 
members of Majlis al-Shura (the Consultative Council) and Majfis Hayat 
Kibar al-Ulama (the Council of the Assembly of Senior Ulama) who are 
selected by the King and chosen for their ability, experience and integrity. 
The members of this group enjoy special status and control all aspects of 
everyday life in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the great respect in which they are 
held, and their ability to access the King and all the senior Princes and 
Nfinisters. The last group includes individual ministers and powerful state 
officials whose views, whilst influential, hinge on their government position 
as well as their relationship with the King and senior Princes. 
The members of these three distinct groups are always the focus of 
public attention. Following the positive accounting theory, one may call 
these members the politicians and Government bureaucrats in Saudi Arabia, 
and assume that they, like everyone else, act to maximise their own welfare 
and hence "have incentives to seek wealth transfers via 'the political 
process" (Watts and Zimmennan, 1986, p. 226). In the period 1991-1994 
which immediately followed the Gulf crisis, the Saudi Government was 
confronted with severe public criticism regarding the internal political and 
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economic situation. This placed a heavy strain on the Government. Given 
that, by assumption, it is costly for individuals to gather information 
regarding the causes of the poor economic performance, and individuals 
have little incentive to incur such information costs, this public antagonism 
toward the Government has induced some politicians and Government 
bureaucrats in Saudi Arabia to create impressions of impending disaster 
(crises). These crises, in turn, have provided opportunities for them to come 
to "the rescue" with the 1995-2000 development plan. The principal 
economic goals of this five-year development plan are to end the 
subsidisation of Saudi industry, the Rifther privatisation, the replacement of 
foreign labour with Saudi citizens (Saudization), and a balanced budget. 
There is no doubt that the 1995-2000 development plan is a politically 
sensitive subject in Saudi Arabia. More specifically, the goals of this five- 
year plan encompass potential wealth transfers (political costs). On the one 
hand, the goals of 'an end of subsidisation' and 'privatisation' will enable 
the Government to reduce its budget deficits. Against this, they will increase 
the. uncommitted financial resources available to the Government and hence 
the - resources controlled 
by politicians and Government bureaucrats. In 
addition, these two goals, as well, as , the 
'Saudization' goal, provide an 
0 pportunity for politicians and Government bureaucrats: (1) to reduce public 
i 
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antagonism toward them and hence increase the probability of their re- 
appointment, and/or (2) to reduce the chance of the termination of their 
appointments. 
On the other hand, the goals 'an end of subsidisation', 'privatisation', 
and 'Saudization' will impose unfavourable wealth transfers on firms 
operating in the private sector. First, consider the strategic economic goal of 
an end to subsidisation'. Once this goal takes place, the extensive 
government support and financial contributions which include medium- and 
long-term interest free loans, reclaimed land and subsidised fuel and 
electricity, will no longer be available to Saudi companies. As a 
consequence, companies which are used to relying on these government 
assistance programmes will have to: (1) borrow from banks and hence pay 
interest if they want to finance their short- and long-term projects, and/or (2) 
raise the prices of their goods and services which may lead to losses and 
consumer dissatisfaction, at least in the short-run. Second, one aspect of 
privatisation is the sale of state-held shares. Given the characteristics of the 
Saudi stock market and that one-third of Saudi companies' shares (about 40 
percent of the stock market's capitalisation) is held by the Saudi 
Government, there exists some probability that the sale of state-owned 
shares will lead to lower stock prices. Third, another aspect of privatisation 
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is deregulation of monopolies, i. e. forestalling monopoly activities and 
enhancing competition. This implies that the Saudi Government will 
encourage other firms to enter the affected industries; and therefore, there 
, will 
be a possibility that the value of the existing companies shares will 
decline. Last, the 1995-2000 five-year development plan commits the 
Government to one key principle favoured by the public but not by firms: the 
replacement of foreign labour by Saudi citizens (Saudization). Given that 
almost all firms operating in the private sector rely heavily on foreign 
Managers and workers, and that the Saudi Government now requires that 
75% of all employees in a firm operating in the private sector should be 
Saudis, the 'Saudization' goal will place a considerable financial burden on 
firms' payrolls because: (1) Saudi workers with equal qualifications and 
experience with foreign workers tend to require higher salaries, and (2), in 
I 
some circumstances, firms may allocate resources and incur considerable 
costs, to improve the skills of their potential Saudi workers. 
5.1.1 Political Costs Wpotheses 
The above analysis motivates us to hypothesise that once the 1995- 
2000 five-year development plan is implemented, some Saudi companies 
will bear considerable political costs; and as a consequence, these fmns will 
have an incentive to forestall the 1995-2000 plan or at, least delay its 
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implementation. In this context, Government bureaucrats appointed to 
administer the 1995-2000 plan generally use the numbers in financial 
accounting reports as a guide for determining when and how the principal 
economic goals of the 1995-2000 plan are to be assessed and implemented. 
More specifically, Government bureaucrats place particular attention on 
Saudi firms' reported earnings. Hence, one would expect that managers of 
Saudi companies which are more likely to be affected by the political costs 
of the 1995-2000 plan will have an incentive to adopt accounting policies 
that decrease current reported earnings, i. e. lower reported earnings will 
reduce the likelihood that Government bureaucrats will implement the 1995- 
2000 plan. Given that, by assumption, monitoring costs in the political 
process are non-zero and that there is some probability that Government 
bureaucrats will not adjust the reported profits to undo the effect of 
managers' earnings reducing accounting policies, we expect that managers 
ofthe affected Saudi firms will use accounting policies that report lower 
earnings during the period 1995-2000. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and others argue that large companies 
are more politically visible than small companies and thus are more likely to 
be subject to wealth transfers resulting-from Government intervention. It is 
hypothesised that managers of those companies have incentives to favour 
I 
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income-reducing accounting policies because such policies minimise the 
possibility of government intervention and thus minimise the effect of wealth 
redistribution away from the companies and the salaries and emoluments the 
managers receive. In general, this hypothesis is supported by the results of 
numerous studies [e. g. Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986 and 1990), Christie (1990, Table 1)]. We suggest that the 
size variable might also be a relevant proxy for Saudi companies' political 
visibility. As already noted above, Saudi Government bureaucrats generally 
use reported accounting earnings as a guide for determining when and how 
subsidisation will be ended, when the state-owned shares will be sold, and 
the possibility of imposing more regulations regarding the replacement of 
foreign labour with Saudi citizens. In this context, there is a possibility that 
Saudi Government bureaucrats place particular attention on reported 
eanungs of large Saudi companies; and as a consequence, managers of those 
companies may attempt to adopt accounting policies that reduce current 
accounting earnings, thereby reducing their political visibility. This line of 
reasoning motivates us to test the following hypothesis: 
Hi Ceteris paribus, the larger a company's size, the more likely the 
company's managers are to choose accounting policies that 
decrease current reported earnings. 
206 
Chapter Five: Formulation of Hvpotheses 
I Generally speaking, given that the size variable is likely to be one of 
the most important determinants of accounting policy choice, we need to be 
extremely cautious in assuming that Saudi companies' political visibility is a 
fimction of size alone: 
... , political costs are likely to be a function of numerous 
factors-of 
' 
which 
size may be only one. For example, the nature of the industry (capital- vs. 
labour-intensive, strategic importance), the number of employees and 
customers (potential voters), geographical location (managerial vs. 
electorate), and time (impending election) may all be important 
determinants of the level of political costs (Whittred and Zimmer, 1988, p. 
37). 
Ac 
As the above quotation implies, companies' accounting policy decisions are 
explicitly or implicitly related to the environment in which they operate. In 
this context, two political environment-oriented variables of direct concern 
are introduced as likely to be relevant proxies for Saudi companies' political 
visibility. First, we hypothesise that companies which have Government 
debts and/or donations in their capital structures will incur relatively larger 
political costs than other companies. Aswe have noted in section 5.1, this is 
because the implementation of the 'an end of subsidisation' goal will force 
companies, which are used to relying on the extensive Government support 
and financial contributions., to: (1) borrow from banks and hence pay 
interest, and/or (2) raise the prices of their goods and services and hence 
bear losses and incur consumer dissatisfaction, at least, in the short-run. 
207 
Chapter Five: Formulation of Hypotheses 
Second, the implementation of the 'Saudization' goal may also generate 
another component of political costs which may be borne by some Saudi 
companies. As already noted in section 5.1, once this goal takes place, Saudi 
companies which rely heavily on foreign employees will have to allocate 
resources and incur considerable costs in order to appoint Saudi workers 
and improve their skills. This motivates the hypothesis that the higher a 
company's foreign employees/total employees ratio, the higher are the 
potential political costs that the company will have to bear. Collectively, 
Saudi companies with these two specific characteristics will bear relatively 
larger wealth transfers (political costs) as a result of the Government's 1995- 
2000 development plan; and as a consequence, managers of these firms will 
have an incentive to forestall, or at least delay, the implementation of the 
plan. One tactic managers of these firms can employ to forestall/delay the 
implementation of the 1995-2000 plan is by using accounting policies that 
i 
reduce current reported earnings. The reasonableness of this tactic is clear 
when one considers: (1) the fact that Saudi Government bureaucrats 
appointed to administer the 1995-2000 plan generally use Saudi companies' 
reported earnings as a guide for determining when and how the principal 
economic goals of the 1995-2000 plan will bp assessed and implemented, 
and (2) the possibility that Government bureaucrats will not adjust the 
t 
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reported earnings to undo the effect of managers' income reducing 
accounting policies. The following hypotheses are based on this line of 
reasoning: 
H2 : Ceteris paribus, managers of companies with Government debts 
and/or donations are more likely to select accounting policies that 
decrease current reported earnings. 
H3 : Ceteris paribus, the larger a company' s, foreign employees/total 
employees ratio, the more likely the company's managers are to 
use accounting policies that decrease current reported earnings. 
5.2 THE CONTRACTING COSTS FRAMEWORK 
As we have noted in chapter two (section 2.3.3), the positive 
accounting theory adopts the view that: (1) a firm is a nexus of explicit and 
implicit contracts embodying the property rights of all individual participants 
in that fmn, and (2) each set of participants will seek to pursue their own 
self-interest at the expense of other participants. In the context of a fm-n in 
the private sector, the self-interested behaviour of a firm' s participants 
produces two possible conflicts; the conflict between management and 
shareholders whereby managers may take decisions that maxiniise their own 
expected utility rather than the shareholders' expected utility, and the 
conflict between shareholders and debtholders whereby shareholders may 
take decisions that are not in the best interests of debtholders. 
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5.2.1 Manager-Shareholder Conflicts of Interest 
The conflict of interest between a firm's managers and shareholders 
C auses a reduction in the firm's value (the agency costs of equity). Stock and 
managerial labour markets serve a key role in mitigating these agency costs. 
In a stock market characterised by rational expectations, managers bear the 
costs of their value-reducing decisions because "shareholders are price 
p rotected... They buy at a price that incorporates" the managers' firm 
value-reducing decisions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 183). Therefore, 
because they bear the agency costs, managers will have incentives to 
voluntarily enter into monitoring and bonding contracts which seek to 
guarantee that they will not exploit shareholders. 
Fama (1980) also noted the key role of the market for managerial 
labour in disciplining management behaviour. He (p. 288) argues that 
managers who own a small percentage of the shares of a firm "face both the 
discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services". The 
theme that underlies this argument is that, in a perfectly competitive 
managerial labour market, the present value of managers' future 
compensation would be adjusted to'reflect the costs arising from their 
opportunistic value-reducing decisions, i. e. managers bear the agency costs 
arising from their decisions. As a consequence, they will have incentives to 
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voluntarily enter into bonding contracts and have both their behaviour and 
those contracts monitored. 
5.2.1.1 Contracting Cost Hypotheses 
The above interpretation of the disciplinary role of stock and 
managerial labour markets could be restated to make it potentially valid in 
the context of Saudi Arabia. That is, if the disciplinary mechanisms of 
capital and labour markets are weak, managers would have little incentives 
to pay attention to the costs associated with their firm value-reducing 
decisions. Given the 'irrational expectations' of the Saudi stock market and 
the 'thin' nature of the Saudi managerial labour market, we argue that the 
capacity of the Saudi stock and labour markets to discipline opportunistic 
managerial behaviour is limited. Now, if this is correct, it can be argued that 
managers of Saudi companies, compared with managers of firms in well- 
developed markets, are much freer to practice opportunistic behaviour. 
Management compensation packages often include bonus or stock 
option plans in which financial statement-based, variables are a key 
component. Thus, management's wealth, can be affected by accounting 
policy choices. In this context, management has an incentive to influence the 
remuneration they receive by , choosing accounting policies that are 
perceived to increase the present value of their compensation packages, 
t 
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even in the absence of an explicit link between financial statement variables 
and a management compensation plan. Watts and Zimmennan (1978) were 
the first to hypothesise that if a company bases its incentive plans on 
reported earnings, managers would have an incentive to use accounting 
policies that increase accounting earnings. Although Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) find no statistically significant relationship between the presence or 
absence of an incentive compensation plan and the choice of accounting 
methods, Christie (1990) finds, in his aggregated study, that managerial 
compensation is one of six variables with significant explanatory power 
across the studies he examines. This suggests testing the following 
hypothesis: 
H4 : Ceteris paribus, managers of companies with bonus plans are 
more likely to choose accounting policies that increase current 
reported earnings. 
Our examination of the annual financial reports of the 69 Saudi joint 
stock companies which were publicly traded at the end of 1995 reveals that 
40 companies had managerial compensation plans and packages in place. 
This may indicate the importance of ownership structure as an alternative 
disciplinary force to the stock and managerial labour markets. Again, if this 
is correct, it can be argued that the lower, the percentage of stock owned by 
directors of a Saudi company, the higher. is the probability that the managers 
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of this company will take decisions (such as accounting policy decisions) 
which are not in the best interests of the shareholders. 
Using the results of Williamson (1964 and 1967), amongst others, 
Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1982) and Ayres (1986), found that, ceteris 
paribus, managers of owner-controlled (OC) companies are less likely than 
managers of management-controlled (MC) companies to adopt accounting 
methods which increase the present value of their compensation packages 
because high insider ownership reduces the importance of accounting 
numbers in compensation contracting. The economic logic for this argument 
is described by Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1982, p. 44) as follows: 
In OC firms, the owners can motivate and monitor the behavior of 
managers directly so the need for incentive compensation schemes 
based upon reported income is not great. On the other hand, the 
outside owners of MC firms must devise mechanisms to motivate 
the firm managers to act in a manner which does not ignore the 
interests of the outside owners. One common mechanism used for 
this purpose is the adoption of incentive compensation schemes (of 
either the cash bonus or stock option type) which depend upon 
reported income. Consequently, it is likely that MC firms are 
more likely than OC firms to have incentive compensation 
schemes based upon reported income. This means that the 
managers in MC firms are more likely to benefit than are the 
managers of OC firms from the selection of accounting methods 
which result in high and/or early reported income. 
We follow this line of reasoning in fonnulating the following 
hypothesis: 
H5 Ceteris paribus, managers of companies with a lower percentage 
of stock owned by directors are more likely to select accounting 
policies that increase current reported earnings. 
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5.2.2 Shareholder-Debtholder Conflicts of Interest 
The conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders gives 
, rise to the agency costs of 
debt which typically arise because of, for 
example, excessive dividend payments, disposal of all or part of tile assets 
of the firm, under-investment, bankruptcy and reorganisation. These agency 
costs are bome by shareholders if no action is taken to reduce them by 
monitoring and bonding devices. Therefore, it is assumed that shareholders 
have incentives to enter into monitoring and bonding contracts which usually 
include covenants restricting their ability to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour. Given that almost all Saudi joint stock companies receive most of 
their external finance from the Government in the form of medium- and 
long-term interest free loans, we do not believe that Saudi companies' 
lending agreements include restrictive covenants; in particular, borrowing 
and dividend limitationS79 . In fact, even if there are restrictive covenants, 
one would find it very difficult to believe that these covenants exhibit a 
strong reliance on financial. accounting variables, given the limitations of 
Saudi financial reporting which were described in chapter four (section 
4.3.2). Therefore, we do not expect that Saudi shareholders' opportunistic 
decisions (or managers on their behalD would be influenced by the 
79 Note that lending agreements are not publicly published in Saudi Arabia. 
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restrictive covenants of their fmns' debt contracts as has been hypothesised 
in North America. However, it should be emphasised that we do expect that 
this issue will become important when the 1995-2000 development plan goal 
ccan end of subsidisation" is implemented. 
5.3 KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
In analysing economic factors influencing managerial behaviour, 
positive accounting studies rely on two core assumptions. First, a company 
is considered as "a nexus of contracts" embodying the property rights of the 
various parties that make up the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Second, a company's shareholders and management, and its debtholders are 
assumed to be (1) aware of the nature of their relation with each other, (2) 
rational expected utility maximisers who pursue self-interest, and (3) able to 
form unbiased expectations regarding the company's future value (Whittred 
and Zimmer, 1988, p. 27). This assumption means that managers will 
e xercise divergent behaviour in choosing between accounting policies. This 
behaviour can be considered ex-ante efficient even though consequential ex- 
post opportunism may result. The shareholders and debtholders recognise 
these tendencies as being contrary to their own interests and hence attempt 
to partially price protect themselves by assuming an average amount of 
t 
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opportunism on the part of managers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, p. 136). 
To limit management's opportunistic behaviour, shareholders will provide 
appropriate incentives and incur expenditure in monitoring managers' 
actions (such as the cost of employing a qualified auditor). The managers 
may seek to guarantee that they will act in the best interests of shareholders 
and agree to incur expenditure in bonding themselves (such as the cost of 
preparing annual financial statements), (Bromwich, 1992, p. 320). 
Debtholders will similarly seek to limit divergence from their interests. 
Thus, lending agreements often impose restrictions liniiting the opportunistic 
behaviour by managers in respect of the debtholders' interests. Such 
restrictions may, for example, limit the managers' ability to pay dividends, 
issue new debt, and consummate mergers (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, 
p. 86). 
These interrelated assumptions are explicitly or implicitly invoked to 
develop our hypotheses and to interpret the empirical results we obtain. 
Under the political cost hypotheses, it is assumed that managers of 
politically sensitive companies have incentives to adopt accounting policies 
that have the effect of decreasing reported earnings in order to reduce the 
likelihood of being subject to negative wealth transfers. Underlying these 
hypotheses is the implicit assumption that politicians and Government 
t 
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bureaucrats who propose such negative wealth transfers will not adjust for 
the accounting choices unless the marginal benefits of doing so exceeds the 
marginal costs. 
Management's compensation is often assumed to consist of salaries, 
': bonuses and share options (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p. 114). 
Therefore, where managers are rewarded by accounting-based compensation 
schemes they will in general seek to choose those accounting policies which 
imaximise the total expected value of these compensations components. 
However, the compensation plan hypotheses depend on the implicit 
assumption that either the plans do not specify the accounting policy set ex- 
ante or that the compensation committees who typically administer such 
plans do not adjust, ex-post, for changes in accounting policies. 
Finally, managers are assumed to trade-off the expected impact of the 
economic influences of political costs and compensation when selecting an 
accounting policy because the selection of a particular accounting policy 
often has opposing effects on compensation variables versus political 
, variables. 
For example, the selection of a particular accounting policy may 
increase benefits under the bonus plan but also increase the probability of 
political intervention. Thus, managers are assumed to choose the accounting 
policy that best balances these conflicting interests. 
t 
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6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the' study design in two sections. The first 
section outlines the data used in the study and describes the dependent and 
independent variables used in our empirical work. The second section 
presents a description of four univariate tests and three types of multivariate 
analyses used to test the research hypotheses. 
6.1 DATA COLLECTION AND VARIABLES SELECTION 
The number of joint stock companies in Saudi Arabia has increased 
substantially in the last fifteen years from 37 joint stock companies with a 
combined paid-in capital of SR 21.2 billion in 1980, to 94 companies at the 
end of 1995 with a total capital of SR 72.9 billion. Table (6-1) summaries 
the 94 Saudi companies with their total paid-in capital as at 31 Dec, 1995. 
Table (6. D 
Number of Saudi companies classiried bv economic sectors" 
Economic Sectors Number of 
Companies 
Total Paid-In Capital 
(SR Million) 
Banks 11 13,900 
Electricity 10 23,153.38 
Agriculture 9 1,875.40 
Services 24 11,002.21 
Industry 40 22,993.47 
Total 94 72,924.46 
Op. Cit. (71), p. 13. 
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6.1.1 Sample Siz 
Of these 94 joint stock companies, only 69 were listed on the Saudi 
stock market. The remaining 25 were either new companies8lor privately 
held. The sample used in our empirical analysis is selected from the 69 
companies listed on the Saudi stock market as of December 31,1995. Of 
these 69 companies, however, companies operating in the banking and 
electrical sectors are eliminated from the sample because they are regulated 
by special unified accounting rules. Hence, the data on which the study is 
based are taken from the remaining 48 publicly traded companies for which 
the 1995 annual reports are available at the commencement of the study and 
which also disclose their choices of accounting procedures. Our 48-company 
sample is comprised as follows: 
Economic Sectors Number of Sample as Sample as 
companies % of total % of total 
in sample population paid-in capital 
(69 companies) (69 companies) 
Agriculture 9 13.04 2.64 
Services 16 23.19 14.96 
Industry: 
" Cement & Construction 10 14.49 9.73 
" Oil & Gas 2 2.90 0.76 
Conversion 11 15.94 18.92 
Total 48 69.56 47.01 
ý' Op. Cit. (77). 
t 
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6.1.2 Dependent Variables 
To test whether or not managers of Saudi companies use economic 
criteria in choosing their accounting procedures, it is necessary to select 
accounting methods which are the most likely to be manipulated. Hence, our 
choice is limited to three accounting methods. These are the accounting for 
inventory, research and development and Zakat. The logic behind this 
limited selection is based on two major criteria. The first emerges from the 
fact that these three accounting methods have a significant impact on net 
income and have been most frequently used in a number of accounting 
policy choice studies 82 . The second criterion is that these methods were 
exhaustively disclosed in the 1995 annual reports of Saudi companies and 
had enough variation in their accounting treatment to justify the use of the 
three types of univariate and multivariate tests which we introduce in the 
methodology section (6.2). 
6.1.2.1 Inventorv Methods 
I, The Saudi inflation rate was estimated to have been 1% in 1993,0.9% 
in 1994 and 5.1% in 1995 83 . Hence, during this period companies using 
82 : See, for example, Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), Watts and Zimwrman (1986), Christie 
(1990), and Kadous and Tawfik (1991). -; 
83 Business Monitor International (BMI) Ltd, Annual Report on Saudi Arabia 1996-98, (London: 
BMI, June 1996) p. 55. 
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either the average or LIFO methods to account for the cost of goods sold 
would report lower net income relative to the FIFO method 84 . In our 
empirical work we therefore treated the average and LIFO methods as 
income decreasing policies and FIFO as an income increasing policy. 
6.1.2.2 Research and Development (R&D) Methods 
Accounting for research and development expenditure is chosen as 
the second accounting policy variable. According to FASB 85 Statement No. 
2, Accounting for Research and Development Costs, companies are 
required to expense, rather than capitalise, all research and development 
costs when incurred. This accounting treatment is contrary to the practice 
followed by many Saudi companies which capitalise and then subsequently 
amortise research and development costs. Companies that capitalise R&D 
costs increase their reported incomes relative to companies which expense 
R&D costs. Hence, in our empirical work we treated the capitalising method 
as an income increasing policy and the expensing method as an income 
decreasing policy. 
"' Because of the absence of Saudi accounting standards regulating major accounting and 
auditing practices, SOCPA's Decision No. ' 
4/2/3 dated 15/5/1414 A. H. (1993), which is described in 
chapter four (section 4.3.1), implies that inventory and R&D expenditure should be accounted for 
using U. S. A Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, GAAP. 
85 Ibid. 
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6.1.2.3 Zakat Methods 
Finally, the choice of Zakat policy is also selected for investigation. 
Saudi Arabia is the custodian of the most sacred of Islamic locations, 
Makkah and Madinah, and actively practises a good form of Islam. This has 
economic and accounting implications because Islam prescribes social, 
economic, cultural, civil, and political codes that integrate the Islamic code 
for life within the structure of society. Specifically, the economic and 
accounting systems practised in Saudi Arabia are derived from Islamic law 
(shari'a), i. e. from the Holy Quran and Al-Sunna Al-Sharifa. 
Zakat is the third pillar of Islam and so its practice is required of all 
Muslims living in Saudi Arabia. In practice it is levied on Saudi nationals, 
both companies (wholly Saudi owned or on the Saudi share of corporate 
profits and properties of entities jointly owned with non-Muslims) and 
individuals. Zakat on the invested funds is due only after one full annual 
cycle of the investment, calculated from the date of inception of the 
company. It is imposed at a rate of 2.5% on income and property (including 
equity invested in operations) minus incomplete long-term contracts and net 
fixed assets that are not held for resale86. 
The system of Zakat and corporate tax which only applies to non- 
86 See chapter four (section 4.3.1). 
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Muslim-owned companies and entities jointly owned with non-Muslims, is 
promulgated through a series of Royal decrees, Ministerial decisions, and 
Department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT) circulars. According to the 
Royal Decree No. 1W76 issued in 30/10/1396 A. H. (1976), half of the Zakat 
should be paid to the DZIT, and the other half is to be distributed directly 
by the Zakat payer to the poor. Saudi joint stock companies, however, must 
pay the full Zakat to the DZIT. 
The Ministerial Decree No. 104 which was issued in 1408 A. H. 
(1988) required companies to charge Zakat to the profit and loss account as 
an expense rather than to the retained earnings account. Prior to that time, 
managers of Saudi companies could choose which of the two accounting 
treatments they wished to apply. The difference between these two 
treatments can be significant in financial terms and can be illustrated as 
follows. Assume that X company reported the following financial 
information for the 1415 (1995) fiscal year: 
I 
224 
Chapter Six: Research Methodoloav 
Share Capital. 3,000,000 
Statutory Reserve- Jan., 1 400,000 
Retained Earnings- Jan., 1 700,000 
Dividends (5% of Share Capital) 150,000 
Net Sales during the period 500,000 
Cost of Goods Sold 200,000 
Expenses 100,000 
Zakat 150,000 
Table (6.2) shows below the profit and loss account, the shareholders' 
equity section and the accounting entries belonging to each method. 
Table (6.2) 
Effects of the distributing and expensina methods on income 
Financial Information Distributing Method Expensing Method 
Profit and Loss Account: 
Net Sales 
Cost of Goods Sold 
Gross Profit 
Expenses 
Zakat 
Net Profit 
500,000 
(200,000) 
300,000 
(100,000) 
200,000 
500,000 
(200,000) 
300,000 
(100,000) 
(150,000) 
50,000 
Shareholders' eguity section: 
Share Capital 
Statutory Reserve- Dec. 31 
Retained Eamings- Dec. 31 
Total Shareholders'Equity 
. 
3,0 
, 
00,000 
420,000 
580,000 
4,000,000 
3,000,000 
405,000 
595,000 
4,000,000 
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Entries: 
Profit & Loss Account 
Zakat 
No Entry Dr. 150,000 
Cr. 150,000 
Profit & Loss Account 
Retained Earnings Account 
Retained Earnings Account 
Dividends Payable 
Statutory Reserve Account 
Zakat 
(10% of Net Profit) 
Dr. 200,000 
Cr. 200,000 
Dr. 320,000 
Cr. 150,000 
Cr. 20,000* 
Cr. 150,000 
200,000 * 10% = 20,000 
Dr. 50,000 
Cr. 50,000 
Dr. 155,000 
Cr. 150,000 
Cr. 5,000* 
50,000 * 10% =5,000 
We examined the 48 annual reports for the 1995 fiscal year and found 
that, contrary to the requirement of the Nfinisterial Decree No. 104., 16 
companies still treated Zakat as income distributions rather than as an 
expense. This practice suggests again that the decision to expense Zakat 
would result in lower net profit, as indicated by Table (6.2), for most 
companies relative to the use of the distributing method. Hence, expensing 
the Zakat is treated as an income decreasing policy. The distributing method 
is, obviously, treated as an income increasing policy. 
6.1.3 Independent Variables 
The following explanatory variables 8,7 will be used to test the 
hypotheses developed in chapter, five: -, -- 
1. Size. Company size, which is used as a proxy for political visibility, is 
87 Note that transformations of some of these variables may be used when it is appropriate. 
t 
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measured by total reported assets and derived from data in the 1995 
companies' balance sheets. 
2. GDebt. This explanatory variable is a dummy (0/1) variable and used as 
an indicator for the existence of Government debts and/or donations in 
companies' capital structures. It is derived from data in the 1995 companies' 
balance sheets and the notes to the companies' annual reports. 
3. Employee. This independent variable, proposed as the third proxy for 
Saudi companies' political visibility, is measured by the ratio of foreign 
employees to total employees. Because Saudi companies do not report 
information about their employees, the ratio of foreign employees to total 
employees for each of the 48 companies in the final sample is obtained from 
the Saudi Security Organisation (SSO) as at December 31,1995, and from 
the Saudi Share Registration Company Report for the year 1995. 
4. Bonus. This is an indicator variable for the existence of a bonus plan and 
is represented by a dummy (0/1) variableAt is obtained from the notes to 
88 
the Saudi companies' annual reports for the fiscal year 1995 
'5. Owner. This variable is measured by the percentage of ownership by 
directors as a group. Saudi companies' annual reports do not contain 
"' In few cases, this was not clear and a judgement was required to classify the company's 
compensation plan. 
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information about stock ownership. This information is, however, obtained 
from the Saudi Share Registration Company as at December 31,1995. 
Information about the directors of companies is obtained from the Saudi 
Share Registration Company and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Reports for the year 1995. 
6.1.4 Summarv 
Based on the theoretical, discussions cited above, Table (6.3) lists the 
dependent and independent variables of the study and summarises how they 
are measured. 
Table (6.3) 
Summarv of Variables 
Variables Description Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variables: 
(1). Inventory Method is coded I if the company 
, 
uses the FIFO n/a 
method and coded 0 if the company uses the 
average or LIFO cost methods. 
(2). R&D Method is coded I if the company capitalises the n/a 
expenditure of R&D, otherwise coded 0. 
(3). Zakat Method is coded I if the company's Zakat expenditure n/a 
is treated as income distributions, otherwise 
coded 0. 
Independent Variables: 
Political Visibility: 
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(1). Size is measured by total assets. -ve 
(2). GDebt is an indicator variable for the existence of a -ve Government debt and/or donations and 
represented by a dummy (0/1) variable. 
(3). Employee is the ratio of foreign employees to total -ve 
employees. 
Compensation Plans: 
(4). Bonus is an indicator variable for the existence of a +ve 
bonus plan and represented by a dummy 
(0/1) variable. 
(5). Owner is the percentage of ownership by directors as -ve 
a group. 
6.2 METHODOLOGY 
This study will be conducted in two phases involving two kinds of 
tests. These two phases are: (1) Univariate tests, and (2) Multivariate tests. 
, 
6.2.1 Univariate Tests 
Four types of univariate tests will be performed: (1) t tests, (2) Mann- 
Whitney U tests, (3) Median tests, and (4) Chi-square tests. The first three 
univariate tests will be used to assess the relationship between the 
continuous independent variables (Size, Employee, and Owner) and the 
methods used to account for inventory, R&D, and Zakat. The Chi-square 
tests will be used for examining the effects of the dichotomous GDebt and 
i 
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Bonus variables on the three accounting policies. These four univariate tests 
are very useful for this study because "they prevent measurement errors in 
one independent variable from affecting test results on another" (Chow, 
1982, p. 280). 
6.2.1.1 t tests 
The most appropriate univariate test for our study is the t test for 
unrelated or independent samples. This test can be used to determine 
whether there is a significant difference between the means of two 
independent populations. Basically, the t test is based on drawing two 
independent random samples from different populations and comparing the 
means of the two samples with the standard error of the difference in the 
means. The box below summarises the assumptions and the appropriate 
hypothesis underlying the t, test: 
Tests of the DitLerence between the Means of two Independent Sample 
(i) Data: 
X and Y are two samples with T and Y means and of n and m 
observations from distributions with means ýLx and gy, respectively. 
(ii) Assumptions: 
(1). The X and Y samples are random samples from their respective 
_ 
populations. 
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(2). The X and Y respective populations have a normal distribution. 
(3). There is mutual independence between the X and Y samples. 
(4). The variances of the X and Y samples are equal. 
(iii) Hypotheses: 
(A). Upper-tailed test 
Ho: ýLX - 9Y '=- Do 
Hi : [tX - ýLy > Do 
The Decision rule is 
Reject Ho if 
[S2 
(X- Y) - Do >- tn+m-2, a 
xx 
(n + [S2 X (m _ 1)] 11 yx (- + -) 
n+m-2 nm 
(B). Lower-tailed test 
The Decision rule is 
Reject Ho if 
Ho: 9x - ýly = Do 
'Hi: ýIxlty<Do 
(X- Y) - Do 
-'< - tn+m-2, a 
[S2 x (n + [S2 X (M , 1)] 11 xyx (- +- 
n+m-2 nm 
Where 
tn+m-2, m 
is the number for which P( tn+m'-2 tn+m-2 (x) = cc, and tn+m-2 has a 
Student's t distribution with (n +m- 2) degrees of freedom. Do is any specified 
value. I 
t 
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6.2.1.2 Mann-Whitnev U test 
The natural non-parametric procedure to compare with the t test is the 
Mann-Whitney U test. The U test, like the t test, is based on drawing two 
independent random samples from different populations. However, instead 
of testing for the difference between the means of the two populations, the U 
test determines whether the two populations are identical. On theoretical 
grounds, the U test may be considered a safer test to use and preferable to 
the t test because it makes no assumptions about the population distributions 
(namely, that both populations are normally distributed and that the 
variances of the two populations are equal). The only requirement of this test 
is that the measurement scale for the data generated by the two independent 
random samples be at least ordinal. Another advantage of the Mann- 
Whitney U test is that its power is not much below the t test when the 
normal distribution assumption is satisfied (Conover, 1980, pp. 215-216). 
Our null hypothesis for the U test is that the two independent samples 
come from identical populations. As a first step in testing this null 
hypothesis, the two samples are pooled and the observations are ranked in 
ascending order. Ranks for tied observations are averaged, and the mean 
rank is then assigned to each of the tied observations. Now, if the null 
hypothesis were not true, we would expect the sum of the ranks assigned to 
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the values of the first sample to be quite different from the sum of the ranks 
assigned to the values of the second sample. This implies that our decision is 
based on the ranks assigned to the values of the two samples. Specifically, 
the decision is based on the value of U shown in the following box: 
The Mann-Whitney U Statistic 
n, n,, 111 ("1 +l) - 2 
where 
ni= Number of observations in sample 1. 
n2= Number of observations in sample 2. 
Ri= Rank sum assigned to the first sample89. 
Furthermore, when the popplation distributions are identical, it can be shown 
that the U statistic has expected value 
E(U) = 41h 
2 
and variance 
,- 
iAn, (A+112+1) 
Vnr (TT. -- - k- I 
12 
39 Note that Ri is the rank sum for the smaller sample which we call it the 'Tirstl% 
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and the distribution of 
Z= 
U- E(U) 
4 -Var (-U) 
tends to normality with zero mean and unit variance as ni and n2become 
large". Hence, this allows tests to be carried out using the standard normal 
distribution, as described in the box below: 
(a) The Mann-Whitney U Statistic: 
U=n, n2 
1ý(Iý+l) 
-R, 2 
(ii) HIpotheses: 
(A). One-tailed test 
Ho : 91 92 
Hi: 91 ý12 
The Decision rule is 
Reject Ho if 
<- Z(x 
74712(t4+1ý2+1) 
12 *, 
(B). One-tailed test 
90 The approximation is adequate when ni and n2 are both greater than or equal to 10. 
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Ho: 91 ý ýt2 
Hi: 91 -4ý ýt2 
The Decision rule is 
Reject Ho if 
> Zct 
12 
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6.2.1.3 Median tests 
The median test is another non-parametric test which can be applied 
to the data of the present study. By means of a r*c contingency table one 
may use the Chi-square test to examine whether there is a significant 
difference between the medians of two independent samples drawn from 
different populations. 
To perform the median test, one must make sure that the samples are 
random samples and are independent of each other. A 2*2 contingency 
table is then constructed as follows: 
SamDle 2 Total I Total 
> Median nij M12 Tj 
:5 Median n2l M22 T2 
Total n m N 
I 
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Where n and m are the number of observations in samples I and 2, 
respectively; N=n+m, i. e. the total observations in both samples 
combined; nij is the number of observations in sample I that exceed the 
global median; n2l is the number of observations in sample I that are less 
than or equal to the global median; M12 is the number of observations in 
sample 2 that are above the global median; m22 is the number of 
observations in sample 2 that are less than or equal to the global median; Tj 
is the total number of observations above the global median in both 
samples; T2is the total number of observations below or equal to the global 
median in the two samples and Tj + T2 =N. * 
The Chi-square test is then applied to the above contingency table. If 
2 (n,, - 
)2 (M 
12 - 
MXTi )2 
N X{ 
N2 
Tj X T2 nm 
with 1 degree of freedom, then the null hypothesis that the two populations 
from which samples I and 2 are drawn have, the same median would be 
rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the two populations 
have different medians. 
ý. 6.2.1.4 Chi-scluare -tests 
Another useful application of the Chi-square test is to examine the 
issue. of independence or dependence between two qualitative variables. 
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Such a test is basically based on drawing a sample, each of whose 
observations can be cross-classified, according to a pair of attributes, in an 
r*c contingency table. For example, consider Table (6.4) which is a general 
form of a two-way contingency table containing r rows and c columns. Note 
that the observed frequency in the (y) cell is denoted by nij, the ith row total 
is ri, thejth column total is cj , and the total sample size 
is n. 
Table (6.0 
General r*c continvencv table 
Column 
1 
2 
Row 
r 
12c Row Totals 
nij n12 nic ri 
n2i n22 nic r2 
nrl nr2 .. nrc 
rr 
Column Totals cl C2 ... Cc n 
Using this notation, the box below summarises the assumptions and 
the appropriate hypothesis underlying the XI test: 
A Test for Independence 
(i) Hypotheses: 
Ho The two classifications are independent. 
'Hi The two classifications are dependent. 
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The Decision rule 
Reject Ho if 
Research Methodolou 
r2 c [nj -E (nj)]_ X2 2: Ea 
i=l j=l E (nj) 
GO Assumptions: 
(1). The n observed values are a random sample from the population of 
interest. 
(2). The sample size, n, is sufficiently large so that, for every cell, E (nij 
will be equal to 5 or more. 
Where E (nij )= 
r-c -. 
and X2 has (r - 1)(C - 1) degree of freedom. 
. 
6.2.2 Multivariate Tests 
Three multivariate estimation techniques will be employed; ordinary 
I 
least squares (OLS), probit, and logit. These multivariate models are 
desirable for this study because they allow us to simultaneously test the 
significance of the five independent variables and to verify the results of the 
univariate tests. 
6.2.2.1 OLS, Probit and LoOt Models 
I 
In section 6.1.2 we discussed three accounting policy choices and 
their effect on net income. We assumed that a company chooses a specific 
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policy over another to either increase or decrease its income. Although each 
policy choice has a specific monetary effect on net income for each 
company, only the increasing/decreasing effect is, in fact, observed. Hence, 
if we denote the increasing effect by one and the decreasing effect by zero, 
we will have a Linear Probability Model (LPM) which may be written, in 
the general form, as follows: 
K 
-yi=F-PkXik+Ei k=l 
where Y is a dichotomous variable, taking aI or 0 value, Xk for k=1,2, 
K are the independent variables, F, is the disturbance tenn, Ok are 
unknown parameters, the subscript i refers to the P' observation from the 
sample of size N, and 
K 
: 5ý 1PkXik: ý1 or 0:! ýE(Y&51 
k=l 
smce 
E(Yj) =0x P(Y, = 0) +Ix P(Yj = 1) 
K 
P(yj = 1) =I Ok Xik 
k=l 
-The unknown parameters, Pk ' of this LPM model can then be 
estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique. In general, a 
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powerful justification for the use of the OLS estimation procedure exists 
when the following key assumptions are met: 
(1). The disturbance terms, 6, . are random variables with mean 
0. that is 
E(Si) =0Q=1,2, ..., N) 
2 (2). The disturbance ten-ns, 6,, are all have a constant variance, say (y., so 
that 
E (f. j2) = Cy, 
' Q=1,2, 
..., N) 
(3). The disturbance terms, 6,, are not correlated with one another, so that 
E(6i26j)=o for all i #j 
(4). Each independent variable is uncorrelated with the disturbance terrn, 
that is 
COV (Xik ý F' d0 (i = 1,2, ..., N and 
k=1,2,..., K) 
1 
(5). The disturbance terms, F,,, are normally distributed. 
(6). There is no exact linear relationship between two or more independent 
variables (i. e. there is no perfect multicollinearity). 
However, although the OLS technique may give a reasonable fit to 
our data base, it has three ma or problems. The first is that the assumption 
that the disturbance terins, 6jý 'have a constant variance cannot be 
maintained. This can be demonstrated as follows. Since y, takes on only 
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two values, either I or 0, the disturbance term, 6i ý also can take on only two 
values; 
K 
I Pk Xik 
k=l 
when Yj = 0, and 
K 
1-lPkXik 
k=l 
when Yj =I 
Now, using the above results and assuming that E (6j) =0 we then get: 
var(F, j) = E[Ej - E(Fi )] 
2= E(Fj2 ) 
P(Yj 1) ]2 + p(yi ]2 x El Pk Xik 0) x Ok Xik 
k=l k=l 
p(y i 1) x [1 _ p(y i= 1)]2 + [1 _ p(yi = 1) x [p(yi = 1)]2 
P(Yi 1) x [I - P(Yi = 1)] 
KK 
1ý Pk Xikl X El - 
2: Ok Xjkl 
k=l k=l 
This result implies that the variance of the disturbance tenn, F., , is 
heteroskedastic because it varies systematically with 'the values of the 
independent variables. As a result, - the OLS estimates, ^ will not be bk ' 
efficient, i. e. they will not have the smallest possible variance. Furthermore, 
the usual tests of significance will be potentially ifivalid. However, the 
econometric literature provides two approaches to overcome this problem. 
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The first is by estimating equation (1) with Goldberger (1964)'s Weighted 
Least Squares (WLS) procedure rather than OLS method. This procedure is 
based on the fact that although the OLS estimators of the Linear Probability 
Model (LPM) will be inefficient, they will still be unbiased since the 
expectation of the disturbance term will be equal to zero, that is 
KK 
E(Ei) = P(Yi = 1) x El -1 
ßk Xikl + P(yi = 0) x E-y- ßk Xikl 
k=I k=l 
= P(Yj = 1) x [I - P(Yj = 1)] - [1 - P(Yj = 1) x [P(Yi = 1)] =0 
The Goldberger (1964)'s Weighted Least Squares (WLS) procedure can be 
summarised as follows: 
Step 1. We run the usual OLS regression on equation (1) and obtain 
. the estimate of yi, say fi. From these estimates, we calculate 
Wi = y, (1 - y, ), the estimates of unknown weights, W,. 
I 
Step 2. We then divide both sides of equation (1) by and run 
OLS regression as follows- 
YI K Vik ei l'ßk ' 
k=l 
This two-step correction for the presence of heteroskedasticity will yield 
new estimates, bk ' which will not only 
be unbiased butalso efficient, and 
t 
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the usual tests of statistical inference can be applied in an asymptotic sense. 
Another way of correcting the OLS estimates for heteroskedasticity is White 
(1980)'s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation 
procedure which, unlike Goldberger (1964)'s WLS approach, does not 
require knowledge of the form of heteroscedasticity (ai2)91. 
The second major problem with using OLS estimation procedure on 
dichotomous variables is that the assumption of normality for the 
disturbance term,, 6, , 
is not tenable. This can be demonstrated in a 
straightforward manner. Since the F,,, like yi, takes, on only two values, 
that is 
K 
lPkXik 
k=l 
when Yj = 0, and 
K 
1-2: 0ýXik 
k=l 
when Yj =I 
then it follows that it has a binomial distribution. However, violation of the 
normality assumption may not be as critical as it appears since the OLS 
parameters still remain unbiased. Furthermore, as the sample size increases, 
it can be shown that the OLS estimators tend to be approximately normally 
91 Since several computer econometric software packages (e. g. SHAZAM, TSP, SAS) automatically 
correct for heteroskedasticity using White's correction approach, the mathematical details of 
White's procedures are not discussed here. 
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distributed (Malinvauld, 1966, pp. 195-197), so that hypothesis tests can be 
conducted in the usual manner- on "large" sarnples, at least. 
K 
The third major problem is that since the unconstrained 2: Ok Xik is 
k=1 
used to approximate a probability number, P, = E(YI = 11 Xik ). which must 
necessarily range from 0 to 1, it is expected that with extreme values of 
K 
2: Pk Xik neither the OLS technique nor the WLS procedure would 
k=1 
guarantee that fi, the estimators of E(yi), will lie between 0 and 1. 
However, there are two ways of correcting this problem. The first is that by 
resorting to computer econometric software packages we can estimate the 
linear probability equation (1) by the usual OLS estimation method and find 
out whether the estimated y^ j lie in the 0- 1 interval. If some are greater than 
1, is assumed to be on6 for those cases; if they are less than 0, they are 
assumed to be zero. The more common and more sensible procedure, 
however, is to use an estimating technique that helps to satisfy the 0-1 
constraint on P,. Probit and logit models both guarantee that the estimated 
probabilities will lie between zero and one. Both these models are now 
sketched below. 
t 
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K 
1 Ok Xjk 
ek=l 
In our empirical work yi is a dichotomous variable taking a1 or 0 
value, and so we model the probabilities, P,, by the cumulative logistic 
distribution function which may be formulated as: 
Pi = E(Y = 11 Xik) = 
or for ease of exposition, 
Research Methodolozy 
1 
KK 
lOkXik -lOkXik 
1+e k=l 1+e k=l 
I 
&1+ exp(-Zi) 
P; = 
K 
where Z! I Ok Xik- . Clearly, Pi is now continuous and can take on any 
k=1 
value between I and 0. Specifically, as Zi (i. e. Xik) increases from -oo to 
+co, Pi increases from 0 to 1 but never falls outside the 0-1 interval. 
Furthermore, Pi, unlike the LPM, is nonlinearly related to Zi and thus it is 
expected to approach zero at slower and slower rates as Xik becomes 
smaller and to approach one at slower and slower rates as Xjk becomes very 
large. However, this creates an estimation problem since P, is nonlinear not 
only in Xik but also in the parameters, k. But'since Pj, the probability that 
the ith company uses an income increasing policy, is given as: 
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1+ 
exp(-Zi) 
then (1-P, ), the probability that the i th company uses an income decreasing 
policy, is: 
=1- 
I 
I I+exp(-Zi) 
I+exp(-Z, )-l 
I+exp(-Z, ) 
exp(-Zi) 
1+exp(-Z, ) 
I 
I+exp(Zi)' 
and the odds ratio (P, /I- Pj) is: 
pi 
1-pi = exp(Zi)2 
taking the natural log we then obtain: 
P; K 
In( ")=Z 
I Pi i 
Pk Xik 
k=l 
Thus, the logarithm of the odds ratio (P, /1- Pj) is an exact linear fimction 
Of Xik and the parameters, Pk - Specifically, 
it is easy to verify that as P, 
goes from 0 to 1 (i. e. as Zi varies from -oo to +oo) the log of the odds ratio 
goes from -co to +co and although the log of the odds ratio is linear in Xik 
246 
Chapter Six: Research Methodolop-Y 
the probabilities themselves are not. Hence, these characteristics motivate 
'use of the logit model as a seemingly logical alternative to the Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) for dichotomous dependent variables. 
An alternative to the cumulative logistic fimction is to model the 
probabilities, Pi, by the cumulative normal distribution function. The 
estimating model that emerges from this normal distribution approach is 
popularly known as the probit model which is commonly formulated as: 
K 
ýOkXik 
k-I K 
P(Y = 1) f exp (-e 2) de = (D(I Ok Xik) 77C 
_00 
ý27C 
k=l 
where (D(. ) is used to denote the standard normal distribution. Obviously, 
the model alleviates the problem of a dichotomous dependent variable, i. e. it 
is transformed in such a way that it has an underlying continuous 
distribution, and satisfies the constraints 
K 
"M (ZPkXik) P(y = 1) = 1) 
K 
k=l 
UkXik-ý'+Oo 
k-1 
"M ýD(Y-PkXjk)ý P(y -0 
k-I 
UkXik-ý'-'Oo 
k=l 
On theoretical grounds, the probit model is similar to* the logit model 
I and both tend to give similar results. In practice, both models use the 
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Maximum Likelihood Estimation technique to develop asymptotically 
efficient estimates of coefficients and standard errors, and, hence, 
asymptotic t tests can be applied to assess statistical significance of the 
important parameters. 
6.2.2.2 Trade-offs in the choice among the three multivariate anaivses 
The violation of the assumptions underling OLS regression 
significance tests and the sensitivity of OLS parameter estimates to the range 
of the data sampled 92 have led to recommendations that logit or probit 
estimation procedures rather than the OLS technique be used when the 
dependent variable is dichotomous and the sample size is large. However, 
despite the theoretical limitations of OLS, logit and probit may not be 
practical alternatives when the sample size is small, as in our study. 
McFadden (1984, pp. 1441-42) suggests that "sample sizes which yield less 
than thirty responses per alternative, produced estimators which cannot be 
analysed reliably by asymptotic methods". 
In fact, the choice between logit and probit or OLS is not as clear 
when the sample size is small. The statistics and accounting literature 
suggest that the choice among the three models should be based upon the 
" See section 6.2.2.1. 
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overall sample size, the number of predictor variables, and the degree of 
their covariation and skewness. Aldrich and Nelson (1984, p. 81) suggest 
that the choice among the three techniques for small samples "depends upon 
the number of variables, the degree of their covariation, and so forth,... ". 
Two Monte Carlo studies have provided empirical insights on assessing the 
effect of these factors. Stone and Rasp (1991) used three continuous 
independent variables and one dummy variable for investigating how large 
the sample size must be for using logit when response group sizes are 
disparate and data are skewed and collinear. They found that a sample size 
of 200 observations or more is the minimum required for satisfying the 
asymptotic properties of the logit model. They conclude that 
... when sample sizes are smaller, logit test statistics will be 
modestly miscalibrated. However, much of the miscalibration 
actually will be attributable to skewness rather than to small 
sample size ... using OLS rather than logit for sample sizes of 100 
or less will result in test statistics that are somewhat better 
calibrated. However, the empirical error rates for these statistics 
also will differ from nominal rates when data are skewed and 
response group sizes disparate. The cost of using OLS will be 
parameter estimates that are sensitive to the range of observations 
sampled and reliance on a model with a fundamental form that 
may not reliably represent accounting choice (Stone and Rasp, 
1991, p. 184). 
Noreen (1988) also reports, for a simulation study, that the overall 
sample sizes should be "large' enough" to make use of the asymptotic 
properties of probit. He used three accounting independent variables similar 
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to those used in many accounting choice studieS93, one dummy variable and 
a dichotomous dependent variable generated with the probit model using the 
four explanatory variables. He concludes for sample sizes of 50 and 100 that 
... when the null hypothesis is true, the empirical distributions of 
the OLS regression test statistics conform quite closely to their 
theoretical distributions in the tails, which cannot be claimed for 
the probit test statistics. When the alternative hypothesis is true, 
OLS regression appears to be as powerful as probit (Noreen, 1988, 
p. 13 2). 
In general, these two simulation studies demonstrate empirically that 
OLS regression is superior to the logit and probit estimation procedures in 
research involving small sample sizes. But the OLS model is a specification 
that preserves linearity while one knows in advance that the imposition of its 
assumptions cannot be maintained. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) note the 
following basic conclusion concerning whether one should use OLS, logit or 
probit: I 
First, all the three techniques yield estimations 
' 
that have quite 
similar properties (e. g. asymptotically unbiased, efficient and 
normal), so that there is little to gain from one technique over 
another in terms of inferences that can be, made... [But] the 
linearity assumption may be the key to that choice (Aldrich and 
Nelson, 1984, p. 80). 
In short, the only real conclusion we reach from the above discussion 
is that there is no important practical reason to choose one model over 
93 Net sales, current ratio and leverage. For a more detailed description, see Noreen (1988, p. 122). 
I 
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another since the "true" relationship between yj and Xik is not known and 
our research involves the relatively small sample size of 48 observations. 
6.2.3 Summarv 
This study will use the t tests, Mann-Whitney U tests, and Median 
tests to examine the relationship between the continuous independent 
variables (Size, Employee, and Owner) and the methods used to account 
for inventory, R&D and Zakat. The Chi-square test will be used for 
assessing the effects of the dichotomous GDebt and Bonus variables on the 
three accounting policies. 
Because we think that using only one of three multivariate estimation 
procedures (OLS, probit, and logit analyses) would be unjustified, given the 
small sample size involved in our study and the probability of mis-specifying 
the relationship between yiand Xik, all three procedures will be employed 
in the present study to simultaneously test the combined predictive power of 
the five independent variables and to verify the results of the univariate tests. 
t 
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7.0 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we empirically examine the ability of five political and 
contracting cost variables to explain and predict why managers of Saudi 
companies prefer some accounting policies over others. These political and 
contracting cost variables (the independent variables) include: (1) total 
assets, (2) the presence of Government debt and/or donations in a 
company's capital structure, (3) ratios of foreign employees to total 
employees, (4) the existence of management compensation plans tied to 
reported profits, and (5) insider ownership. The research findings are 
presented in five sections. Section 7.1 provides summary statistics for and 
the correlation matrix of the five political and contracting cost variables for 
the entire sample. In Section 7.2, univariate and multivariate tests are used 
to predict the choice of inventory methods as a function of the five 
independent variables. The same tests are then applied to predict the choice 
of research and development (section 7.3), and Zakat (section 7.4) 
procedures. Finally, section 7.5 provides a summary and discussion of the 
study's overall results. 
7.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The sample used in our empirical analysis consists of 48 companies 
listed on the Saudi stock market as of December 31,1995. The variables t 
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Size, GDebt, Employee, Bonus, and Owner which were previously defined 
in Table (6.3) are computed for each firm. Table (7.1) provides summary 
statistics for these five independent variables. Note that the descriptive 
statistics for the Size and Employee variables were found to be considerably 
skewed; to the point of causing problems in applying some of the univariate 
and multivariate tests. The logarithm to the base 10 is therefore applied to 
the Size and Employee variables. This transformation is used throughout our 
analysis. 
Table (7.1) 
Summarv statistics of mlanatorv variables 
Description N Mean ST. Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Size 48 8.7802 0.6163 8.8545 7.2493 10.789 
GDebt 48 0.4583 0.5035 - 0.0000 1.0000 
Employee 48 -0.2989 0.2677 -0.2255 -1.0458 0.0000 
Bonus 48 0.5625 0.5013 - 0.0000 1.0000 
Owner 48 0.1814 0.2841 0.0545 0.0017 0.9526 
In order for univariate and multivariate tests to yield meaningful 
results, one has to make sure that -the - independent variables are not 
substantially correlated to the extent of causing high multicollinearity among 
t 
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the variables. Because of the potential adverse effects of this problem, two 
tests are performed to determine whether high multicollinearity might exist. 
A preliminary analysis is first performed by examining the pairwise Pearson 
correlation among the independent variables presented in Table (7.2). 
Table (7.2) 
Correlation matrix of variables (n=; 48) 
Variables Size GDebt Employee Bonus Owner 
Size 1.0000 
GDebt 0.1491 1.0000 
EMployee 0.3445* 0.1064 1.0000 
Bonus 0.3907* 0.1370 0.0278 1.0000 
Owner -0.0695 0.1765 0.1598 0.1505 1.0000 
0.3062 0.0608 0.1773 0.2099 0.1159 
*Significant at. 01, two-tail test. , 
Table (7.2) indicates that two of the reported correlations are 
statistically significant. However, the highest Pearson correlation among the 
variables is about 0.39 which is less than the'critical value of 0.8 suggested 
by Gujarati (1995, p. 335) above which "multicollinearity [becomes] a 
serious problem". This preliminary analysis is, however, not conclusive 
because the simple correlation matrix does not take into account the possible 
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correlation between any one independent variable with all the other variables 
as a group. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to regress each 
independent variable on the remaining independent variables and "to note 
whether any of the resultant R2 values is near P (Kohler, 1985, p. 629). If 
we follow this procedure and examine the R2 values obtained from the 
auxiliary regressions and reported below the correlation matrix in Table 
(7.2), we find that the largest R" value is about 0.30, suggesting that, in 
general, the results of this study do not appear to be indicative of high 
multicollinearity. Furthermore, since high multicollinearity would cause the 
results of the univariate and multivariate tests to diverge, three multivariate 
techniques are used to confirm the findings obtained from the univariate 
tests. 
7.2 INVENTORY METHODS 
We have examined the notes to the 48 annual reports for the fiscal 
year 1995 and found that 15 companies used the FIFO method and 32 
companies used the average/LIFO cost method to account for inventory. 
Note that one company is dropped from the sample because it operates 
t 
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mainly in the security investment industry and hence did not hold significant 
inventorieS94. 
7.2.1 Univariate Tests 
Three univariate tests (t tests, Mann-%itney U tests, and Median 
tests) are perfonned to examine the relationship between the continuous 
independent variables (Size, Employee, and Owner) and the methods used 
to account for inventory. The Chi-square test is used for assessing the effects 
of the dichotomous GDebt and Bonus variables on the accounting policy for 
inventory. 
Table (7.3) 
Results of Nests on the independent variables 
(1) Average or LIFO (2) FIFO 
Hypothesis Mean Mean 1-test* 
I& Predicted (ST. Deviation) (ST. Deviation) 
Variable Result n-- 32 n-- 15 tP 
_ 
Hi. Size 1>2 8.854 8.671 0.95 0.20 
(0.64) (0.55) 
H3. Employee I>2 -0.183 -0.545 4.87 0.000 
(0.19) (0.26) 
H5. Owner I>2 0.231 0.003 3.63 0.000 
(0.31) (0.03) 
For a description of the variables, see Table (6.3). 
The t-statistics; shown are for the differences in means between the two groups. The p-values shown 
are for one-tailed test versus the null hypothesis 
94MUltiCollinearity was tested for this 47 firm sample and the pairwise Pearson correlations yielded 
similar results to those reported in Table (7.2); hence, they are not reported here. 
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Table (7.3) reports the results of t-tests of differences in means for the 
independent variables of interest. It indicates that the differences in the 
means between companies using FIFO and averageUFO methods are in the 
hypothesised direction. The t-statistics for the Employee (H3) and Owner 
(H5) variables are statistically significant beyond the one percent level, while 
the t-statistic for the Size (Hi) variable is not significant at conventional 
levels. 
Table (7.4) 
Results of Mann-Whitnev U tests on the independent variahles 
(1) Avera2e or LIFO (2) FYFO 
Hypothesis. U-test 
& Predicted Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Variable Result n-- 32 n-- 15 Z Score P** 
_ 
Hi. Size I>2 24.84 22.20 -0.616 0.30 
H3. Employee I>2 29.81 11.60 -4.246 0.000 
H5. Owner I>2 27.69 16.13 -2.693 0,005 
For a description of the variables, see Table (6.3). 
The p-values shown are for one-tailed test versus the null hypothesis. 
The Mest is based on the assumption -of asymptotic normality. 
However, an equivalent test which avoids the normality assumption is the 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test. This test is conducted to determine if 
companies using FIFO and averagAIFO, methods are drawn from the same 
population. The results are shown. in Table (7.4). Inspection of the Mann- 
I 
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Whitney U test results shows that the Employee (M) and Owner (H5) 
variables have the hypothesised signs and are significant at the one percent 
level or better. However, whilst the Size (Hi) variable has the hypothesised 
direction, it is insignificant. These results are consistent with the findings of 
the t-test recorded in Table (7.3). 
Table (7.5) 
Results of median tests on the independent variables 
Accounting Methods 
Avera2e/LIFO FIFO Total 
< Grand Median is 5 23 
Size 
Grand Median 14 10 24 
32 is 47 
Chi-square =2.15 
< Grand Median 20 3 23 
Emplo3: ee 
Grand Median 12 12 24 
32 is 47 
Chi-square =7.38* 
< Grand Median 20 3 23 
Owner 
Grand Median 12 12 24 
32 15 47 
Chi-square =7.38* 
* Significant at . 01, one-tail test. 
Tables (7.3 and 7.4) seem to indicate that die results of the Mest and 
Mann-Whitney U test of the Size hypothesis are less consistent than are 
tests of the Employee and Owner hypotheses. The non-parametric median 
I 
259 
Chapter Seven: EmiDirical Results and Interpretation 
test lends support to this conclusion, as can be seen from Table (7.5). The 
x2 statistic for a test of differences in medians between the two groups of 
companies is 7.38 for the Employee (H3) and Owner (H5) variables, which 
is significant beyond the one percent level. The Size (Hi) variable, however, 
has an insignificant X' statistic. 
Table (7.6) 
Continjeencv table relatinma methods of accountinz for inventorv tO tile 
presence of Government debt andlor donations and a bonus plan. 
Accounting Methods 
Averai! ePLIFO FIFO 
GDebt 
Total 
YES 16 6 22 
NO 16 9 25 
32 15 47 
Chi-square =0.770 
Bonus 
YES 17 9 26 
NO 
Chi-square =0.195 
15 6 21 
32 15 47 
Since the GDebt (H2) and Bonus (H4), variables are not continuous 
the Chi-square test is used to examine the relationship between the presence 
of Government debt and/or donations and management compensation plans 
tied to reported earnings and the choice of inventory method. The results 
are shown in Table (7.6). The' X' 2 statistics for the GDebt (1h) and Bonus 
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(H4) variables are 0.77 and 0.195, respectively, which are statistically 
insignificant using a one-tailed test and a 10 percent significance level. 
7.2.2 Multivariate Tests 
To simultaneously test the combined predictive power of the five 
independent variables, three multivariate models are employed; OLS, 
probit, and logit. These three multivariate techniques have been frequently 
used in the accounting choice literature and serve as a check on the results 
of the univariate tests. 
The individual effect of each independent variable is examined by 
including them all in the following cross-sectional regression: 
Yi =a+, 81 Sizei +, 82GDebti +, 83 Employee +, 84Bonusi + fl5 Owneri, 
where Yi =I if the i th company used the-FIFO method, and 0 if the th 
company used the average or LIFO method. The Size, GDebt, Employee, 
Bonus, and Owner variables are as previously defined in Table (6.3). The 
predicted signs are negative for fli , fl2,63, and 85 and positive 
for P4. Table 
(7.7) presents the results of the OLS and probit 95 estimation techniques. 
9s The logit model yielded similar results to those based on the probit estimation procedure and 
hence results relating to it, are not reported here. 
t 
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Table (7.7) 
OLS and probit analvses of the relation between the flve political and 
contractinZ cost variables, and the accountine inventorv Policies. 
Explanatory variables 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
p-values* 
Technique Size GDebt Employee Bonus Owner Constant R2 
-2 
(F) 
OLS** 
0.172 
(0.25) 
0.135 
(0.13) 
-1.043 
(4.42) 
0.000 
0.932 
(0.83) 
-0.455 
(-2.01) 
0.05 
-0.126 
(-0.21) (0.41) (7.30), 
0.000 
PROBIT 
Model (1) 0.794 -0.791 -7.125 0.114 -9.517 -8.789 0.74 35.11 
(0.88) (-1.19) (-2.76) (0.15) (-2.55) (-1.07) 0.001 
0.005 0.01 
Model (2) 0.285 -0.066 -8.743 -6.677 0.34 12.92 
(0.71) (-0.15) (-1.99) (-0.77) 0.01 
0.05 
The p-values shown arc for one-tailcd test versus the null hypothesis. 
ee kedastic, The variance of the disturbance terms produced by the OLS technique is found to b het ros 
As already discussed in chapter six (section 6.2.2.1), this problem can be corrected either by White's 
(1980) correction procedures, or by estimating our cross-sectional equation with Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS) rather than OLS. The econoTetric software package used in this study, SHAZAM, automatically 
corrects for this problem using White's correction procedures. 
We first deal with the OLS technique results. Note that the results of 
I 
the OLS estimation procedure appear to be less consistent with the findings 
of the univariate tests than are the results of the probit technique. However, 
there is one major problem preventing us from relying on the results of the 
OLS estimation procedure. We investigated the estimators of E(yj), ý,, and 
found that seven estimated values are less than 0 (negative) and five values 
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are in excess of one, demonstrating that the OLS estimation model does not 
fulfil the 0-1 restriction. Because of this problem, the use of the t-statistics 
provided by the OLS procedure may be questionable. Therefore, one would 
be wise to be cautious of the OLS technique results and concentrate on the 
findings of the probit model96. 
The standard Goodness of fit test using the likelihood ratio statistic 97 
shows that the probit model (1) is significant with X'of 35.11, implying that 
the null hypothesis of no statistical relation between the independent and 
dependent variables is rejected at the O. OQI level. The model (1)'s 
explanatory power, which is measured by the likelihood ratio index (R' )98 
is 74%. Consistent with the results of the univariate tests,, the t-statistics for 
the Employee (H3) and Owner (H5) variables are negative and significant at 
96 For a discussion of the problems associated with using the OLS estimation technique on 
dichotomous dependent variables and the use of probit/logit models as alternative procedures, see 
chapter six (section 6.2.2). 
97 The likelihood ratio statistic (X 2) is used to test the null hypothesis that all the coefficients 
except the constant are simultaneously equal to zero. Under the null hypothesis, the X2 statistic 
has a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equalling the number of independent 
variables in the model. 
"There are different ways of computing R2 measures for probit models. The R2 shown is proposed 
by Cragg and Uhler (1970) and has a similar interpretation to that Of R2 in linear regression 
analysis. It is defined as j1-exp[2[L(0)-L(P)j / N])/'(I-exp[2L(O)/N]), where L(O) = log likelihood 
when all coefficients except the constant are zero, L(ft) log likelihood when the full model is 
fitted, and N= sample size (Cragg and Uhler, 1970, p. 400). 
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the 0.01 level or better. The coefficients for the GDebt (H2) and Bonus (H4) 
variables have the predicted sips, but are not statistically significant. The 
insignificance of these two variables is, however, consistent with the results 
of the univariate tests. The Size (111) variable has a statistically insignificant 
positive coefficient. This positive sign is inconsistent with the t-tests and 
Mann-Mitney U tests. Because of this, one would suspect that the relative 
importance of the Size variable might be obscured by its significant 
correlation with the Employee and Bonus variables. To provide evidence on 
this, we run a reduced model (2) by deleting the Employee and Bonus 
variables. Inspection of the results of this model (2) indicates that the 
coefficients of the Size, GDebt and Owner variables show little change in 
size and none in their signs, but the explanatory power measure (R') and 
goodness of fit statistic (X') decrease significantly. This result suggests that 
0 
neither the Size variable nor the other explanatory variables do appear to be 
indicative of high multicollinearity. Consequently, we conclude that the 
results of the probit estimation technique confirm - the findings of the 
univariate tests in that the foreign employees/total employees ratio and 
ownership concentration are the most'highly associated variables with 
companies' choice of an accounting method for inventory. 
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7.2.3 Summary 
The results of the univariate and multivariate tests strongly support 
hypotheses 3 and 5 and indicate that the Employee and Owner variables are 
quite important determinants in the choice of inventory methods. The results 
of the Employee variable suggest that the larger a company's foreign 
employees/total employees ratio, the more likely the company is to choose 
the average or LIFO cost method to account for inventory. These results 
lend support to our argument that such a company may wish to understate its 
earnings to avoid the potential political costs associated with the 
implementation of the 1995-2000 Saudi development plan. Such findings are 
new results in the positive accounting literature. 
The results of the Owner variable are also consistent with reasoning 
that managers of owner-controlled companies are less likely to use the FIFO 
method, probably because. they are less likely to benefit than are managers 
of management-controlled companies from the selection of this income- 
increasing accounting method. These findings are consistent with the results 
of Niehaus (1989) and with Dyl's (1989, p. . 144) conclusion that "managers 
of widely held firms are more likely to select the alternative that increases 
reported income (FIFO) than are the managers of closely held [firms]". 
265 
Chapter Seven: Empirical Results and Interpretation 
The remaining variables are generally not significant at conventional 
levels. The insignificance of the Size and Bonus variables is, however, 
consistent with results in a number of prior studies which have attempted to 
predict the choice of inventory methods [e. g. Hagerman and Zimijewski 
(1979); and Tawfik and Kadous (1991)]. The relationship between the 
existence of Government debt and/or donations in a company's capital 
structure and its choice of inventory methods is not statistically significant, 
although the sign of the coefficient is in the hypothesised direction. 
7.3 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) METHODS 
The choice of research and development (R&D) method is the second 
accounting policy selected for investigation. Our examination of the 48 
annual reports for the 1995 fiscal year revealed that 20 companies 
capitalised R&D costs whilst 28 companies expensed them. 
7.3.1 Univariate Tests 
L 
The results of the t-tests, ' reported in Table (7.8), show that the 
differences in the means between the two groups of companies are in the 
hypothesised direction. The t-statistics are statistically significant beyond the 
one percent level for the Size (Hi) and Employee (H3) variables, and at the 
one percent level for the Owner (H5) variable. 
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Table (L8j 
Results of Nests on the independent variables 
(1) Expensers (2) Capitalisers 
Hypothesis Mean Mean t-test* 
& Predicted (ST. Deviation) (ST. Deviation) 
Variable Result n-- 28 n-- 20 tP 
Ill. Size I>2 8.993 8.482 3.08 0.002 
(0.56) (0.58) 
H3. Employee I>2 -0.180 -0.466 3.76 0.000 
(0.13) (0.32) 
115. Owner I>2 0.259 0.007 2,61 0.01 
(0.33) (0.15) 
For a description of the variables, see Table (6.3). 
The t-statistics shown are for the differences in means between the two groups. The p-values shown 
are for one-tailed test versus the null hypothesis. 
Table (7.9) 
Results of Mann-Whitnev U tests on the independent variables 
(1) Expensers (2) Capitalisers 
Hypothesis. U-test 
I& Predicted Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Variable Result n-- 28 n-- 20 Z Score P" 
_ 
Hi. Size I>2 28.93 18.30 -2.599 0.005 
113. Employee I>2 30.04 16.75 -3.243 0.000 
Hs. Owner I>2 28.96 18.25 -2.614 0.005 
For a description of the hypotheses and variables, see Table (6.3). 
The p-valucs shown are for one-tailed test versus the null hypothesis. 
Because one would suspect that the normality assumption which 
underlies the mest is violated, the Mann-Whitney U test is perfonned io 
determine if companies which expense and capitalise R&D costs are drawn 
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from the same population. Inspection of the Z-scores and their signs 
reported in Table (7.9) indicates that the results of the Mann-%ýtney U 
tests are consistent with the results of the t-tests in that all the variables have 
the hypothesised signs and are highly statistically significant. 
Table (7.10) 
Results of median tests on the independent variables 
Accountiniz Methods 
Expensers Capitalisers 
< Grand Median 18 6 24 
Size 
Grand Median 10 14 24 
28 20 48 
Chi-square =5.49** 
< Grand Median 19 5 24 
Employee 
Grand Median 9 15 24 
28 20 48 
Chi-square =8.57* 
Total 
I 
Owner 
< Grand Median 19 115 24 
Z: Grand Median 15 24 
28 20 
Chi-square =8.57* 
* Significant at .01, one-tail test. * *Significant at . 02, one-tail test. 
48 
The results of the nonparametric median tests reported in Table (7.10) 
generally lend support to both the Mests and Mann-Whitney U tests and 
confirm the strong relationship between a company's size, foreign 
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employees/total employees ratio, and ownership concentration and its choice 
of accounting research and development procedures. 
Table (7.11) 
Continzencv table relating methods of accountiniz for R&D costs to the 
Presence of Government debt andlor donations and a bonus plan. 
Accounting Methods 
GDebt 
Chi-square =0.627 
Bonus 
Chi-square =1.763 
28 20 48 
To test the relationship, between the presence of Government debt 
and/or donations (GDebt) in a company's capital structure and the existence 
of incentive compensation plans tied to reported earnings (Bonus) and the 
method chosen for research and development, a 2*2 contingency table is 
constructed for each variable. The results are reported in Table (7.11). The 
X2 statistics for the GDebt (H2) and Bonus (H4) variables are 0.627 and 
1.763, respectively, which are not significant, at conventional levels. These 
Týsults suggest that the presence of Government debt and/or donations and a 
Expensers Cavitalisers Total 
YES 13 7 20 
15 13 28 NO 
28 20 48 
YES 18 9 27 
NO 10 11 21 
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bonus plan and the accounting method chosen for research and development 
expenditure, are unrelated. 
7.3.2 Multivariate Tests 
Because the OLS and logit estimation procedures yielded similar 
results to those based on the probit technique, only the probit results are 
reported and discussed here. Setting the dependent variable to one for the 
capitalising method and zero for the expensing method, the following probit 
regression is estimated: 
Probit (1) =a+ 81 Size +, 82GDebt +, 83Employee +, fl4Bonus +, 65 Owner, 
where P is the probability that the dependent variable equals one. The Size, 
GDebt, Employee, Bonus, and Owner variables and their predicated signs 
are as previously defined iý Table (6.3). 
The X' value of 27.71 reported in Table (7.12) indicates the null 
hypothesis, that all the coefficients of the independent variables are 
simultaneously equal to zero, is rejected at the 0.001 level. The model's 
explanatory power (R') is 59%. The, signs"of'all the coefficients are as 
predicted. The regression coefficient for the Employee (H3) variable is 
significant at the 0.01 level, while the coefficients for the Size (M) and 
Owner (H5) variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The 
I 
270 
Chapter Seven: Empirical Results and Interpretation 
GDebt (H2) variable has an insignificant, though negative coefficient, while 
the Bonus (H4) variable has an insignificant positive coefficient. In 
summary, the results of the probit technique confirm the findings of the 
univariate tests, and both univariate and multivariate results give support to 
our argument that there is a significant relationship between a Saudi 
company's choice of accounting method for R&D expenditure and its size, 
foreign employees/total employees ratio, and ownership concentration. 
Table (LIQ 
Probit anaNsis of the relation between the rive political and contractill 
cost variables, and the R&D policies. 
Explanatory variables 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
p-values* 
Technique 
PROBIT 
Size GDebt Employee Bonus Owner Constant 
-1.152 
(-1.92) 
0.05 
-0.417 
(-0.85) 
+ 
-2.865 
(-2.49) 
0.01 
0 
'. 
037 
(0.07) 
-3.519 
(-1.95) 
0.05 
9.610 
(1.85) 
0.05 
0.59 
*** 
27.71 
0.001 
The p-values shown are for onc-tailed test versus the null hypothesis. 
** The R2 shown is proposed by Cragg and Uhlcr (1970) and has a similar interpretation to that of 
R2 in linear regression analysis. 
*** X2 is the likelihood ratio statistic and tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the 
intercept are simultaneously equal to zero. It possesses an asymptotic Chi-square distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of explanatory variables. 
1 1, -'' .'"ý. II 
i 
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7.3.3 Summarv 
Both univariate and multivariate tests provide three major results 
supporting hypotheses 1,3, and 5. Consistent with earlier work by Daley 
and Vigeland (1983), the first result 'suggests that managers of large 
companies tend to expense, rather than capitalise, their R&D costs. Daley 
and Vigeland (p. 197)'s results support the belief that if North American 
firms capitalise their R&D costs and hence "report higher income, regulators 
will be more likely to place tighter constraints on such firms' operations". 
Our findings support the notion that managers of large Saudi companies tend 
to expense their R&D costs in order to minimise the impact of the 1995- 
2000 Saudi development plan and thus reduce the effect of the 1995-2000 
plan's wealth redistribution away from companies and the salaries and 
emoluments their managers receive. 
The second result suggests that Saudi companies with higher ratios of 
foreign employees to total employees are more likely to expense their R&D 
costs. This result is consistent with our argument that managers of Saudi 
companies with this characteristic wish to understate their reported earnings 
to avoid incurring the potential political costs associated with the 
implementation of the 1995, -; 000. developmqnt plan. This result introduces 
-a new enviromnent-oriented variable into the positive accounting literature. 
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Our results also support the hypothesis that managers of owner- 
controlled companies are less likely to capitalise R&D costs. This finding 99 
introduces the important effect of ownership control status of companies on 
the choice of accounting research and development methods. 
Finally, the results of both univariate and multivariate tests lend no 
support for hypotheses 2 and 4, which predict that the presence of 
Government debt and/or donations and a bonus plan are significant 
determinants of research and development expenditure accounting policies. 
Our results of the bonus hypothesis are, however, consistent with results in a 
number of prior studies with respect to the relationship between accounting 
policy choice and the existence of a bonus plan (see Watts and Zimmerman 
1986, p. 260). 
7.4 ZAKAT METHODS 
The choice of Zakat policy is selected for investigation as the third 
accounting choice variable. In chapter six (section 6.1.2.3) we noted that the 
Ministerial Decree No 104 requires Saudi joint stock companies to charge 
Zakat to the profit and loss account as an expense rather than to the retained 
99 Note that we are not aware of any research that has reported empirical evidence about the effect 
of ownership structure on the choice of an accounting policy for research and development 
expenditures. 
t 
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eanungs account. We have examined the 48 fmancial reports for the fiscal 
year 1995 and found that 32 companies treated Zakat as an expense, while, 
contrary to the requirements of the Ministerial Decree No 104,16 
companies charged Zakat to the retained earnings account. Because the 
decision to treat Zakat as an income distribution rather than as an expense 
increases the current period's reported income, we treat distributing Zakat as 
an income-mcreasing accounting method and expensing the Zakat as an 
income-decreasing method. 
7.4.1 Univariate Tests 
Table (7.13) presents the results of the t-tests and indicates that the 
differences in the means between the two groups of companies are as 
hypothesised. The t-statistics are significant beyond 0.01 level for the Size 
(Hi) and Employee (H3) yariables, and at the 0.025 level for the Owner 
(H5) variable. 
The results of the Mann-Whitney U tests reported in Table (7.14) 
confirm the findings of the Mests and show that the Z-scores for all the 
variables have the predicted signs and are statistically significant beyond the 
0.025 level. 
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Table (7.13) 
Results of Nests on the independent variables 
(1) Expensers (2) Distributors 
Hypothesis Mean Mean t-test** 
& Predicted (ST. Deviation) (ST. Deviation) 
Variable Result n-- 32 n-- 16 tP 
Hi. Size I>2 8.943 8.454 2.77 0.005 
(0.54) (0.65) 
H3. Employee 1>2 -0.194 -0.510 3.71 0.000 
(0.15) (0.32) 
H5. Owner I>2 0.231 0.008 2.14 0.025 
(0.32) (0.17) 
For a description of the variables, see Table (6.3). 
The t-statistics shown are for the differences in means between the two groups. The p-values shown 
are for one-tailed test versus the null hypothesis. 
Table (Z. 14D 
Results of Mann- Whitnev U tests on the independent variables 
(1) Expensers (2) Distributors 
Hypothesis. U-tes 
& Predicted Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Variable Result n-- 32 n-- 16 Z Score P** 
Hi. Size I>2 27.44 18.63 -2.056 0.02 
H3. Employee I>2 29.53 14.44 -3.522 0.000 
Hi. Owner I>2 27.28 18.94 -1.946 0.025 
For a description of the hypotheses and variables, see Table (6.3). 
The p-values shown are for one-tailed test versus the null hypothesis. 
Table (7.15) presents the results of the median tests. The X2 StatiStiCS 
for the variables Employee (H3) and Owner (H5) lend support to both the t- 
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tests and the Mann-Whitney U tests and confirin the significant relationship 
between a company's foreign employees/total employees ratio and 
ownership structure and its choice of Zakat accounting policies. The XI 
statistic for the Size (Hi) variable is also significant, but at the ten percent 
level. 
Table (7.15) 
Results of median tests on the independent variables 
Accounting Methods 
Expensers Distributors 
< Grand Median 19 5 
Size 
Grand Median 13 11 
32 16 
Chi-square =3.38** 
* Grand Median 20 
Employee 
* Grand Median 12 
32 
Chi-square =6.00* 
Owner 
< Grand Median 20 
; -> Grand Median 12 
4 
Total 
24 
24 
48 
24 
12 24 
16 48 
12 
16 
24 
24 
48 32 
Chi-square =6.00* 
Significant at . 02, one-tail test. 
* Significant at. 10, one-tail test. 
Table (7.16) presents the results of the Chi-square tests of the GDebt 
and Bonus (H4) variables. The', X1, statistics shown are not significant 
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at conventional levels, suggesting that the presence of Government debt 
and/or donations on the balance sheet and management compensation plans 
tied to reported earnings, do not affect the choice of Zakat methods. 
Table (7.10 
Continzencv Table relatiniz methods of accountiniz for Zakat to the 
presence of Government debt andlor donations and a bonits plan. 
Accounting Methods 
GDebt 
Expensers Distributors Total 
YES 16 6 22 
NO 16 10 26 
32 16 48 
Chi-square =0.671 
Bonus 
YES 19 7 26 
NO 
Chi-square =1.049 
13 9 22 
32 16 48 
7.4.2 Multivariate Tests 
To simultaneously test the significance, of the five independent 
variables, the following cross-sectional regression 4s estimated using the 
OLS, probit and logit procedures: 
Yi =a+ fli Sizei +, 62GDebti +, 63 Employeei +, 64Bonusi +, 650wnen, 
where Yi =I if the i th company charged the Zakat to retained earnings 
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account, and 0 if the th company treated the Zakat as an expense. The 
explanatory variables and their predicated signs are as previously defined in 
Table (6.3). Because the probit and logit estimation procedures yielded 
almost identical significance levels, and because the results of the OLS 
technique were found to be different from those based on the probit and logit 
models, only the OLS and probit results are reported and discussed. 
The results of the OLS estimation technique reported in Table (7.17) 
seem to be consistent with the results of the univariate tests. Furthermore, 
the p value of the computed Jarque-Bera XI statistic in the OLS model is 
found to be about 20%. which implies that, asymptotically, the disturbance 
ten-, ns are normally distributed. This suggests that the OLS procedure gives 
a reasonable fit to our data base. However, our investigation of the 
estimators of E(yi), P, indicates that nine estimated values are less than 0 
0 
(negative) and seven values are in excess of one, implying that the OLS 
estimation model does not fulfil the 0-1 restriction. Because of this problem, 
the OLS estimation procedure results Must be treated with caution and we 
therefore rely on the findings of the probit model alone. ý 
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Table (7.17) 
OLS and Probit analvses of the relation between the flve political and 
contractinja cost variables, and the Zakat policies. 
Explanatory variables 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
p-values* 
Technique 
OLS* 
PROBIT 
Size Gdebt Employee Bonus Owner Constant R'** 
-2 
+ (R) 
-0.163 
(-1.83) 
0.05 
-0.825 
(-1.51) 
0.10 
0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.165 
(-0.34) 
-0.818 
(-4.37) 
0.000 
-2.823 
(-2.75) 
0.005 
-0.053 
(-0.51) 
-0.055 
(-0.10) 
-0.309 
(-2.39) 
0.01 
-2.315 
(-1.44) 
0.10 
1.607 
(1.90) 
0.05 
6.250 
(1.32) 
0.10 
(0.32) 
0.53 
x2*** 
(F) 
(5.47) 
0.001 
22.79 
0.001 
* The p-values shown are for one-tailed test versus the null hypothesis. Note that the variance of the 
disturbance terms produced by the OLS technique is found to be heteroskedastic. However, the 
econometric software package used in this study, SHAZAM, automatically corrects for this problem 
using White's correction procedures. 
** The R2 shown is proposed by Cragg and Uhler (1970) and has a similar interpretation to that of 
R2 in linear regression analysis. 
***X2 is the likelihood ratio statistic and tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the 
intercept are simultaneously equal to zero. It possesses an asymptotic Chi-square distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of explanatory variables. 
.., -, 
The results. of the probit procedure reported in Table (7.17) are 
generally consistent with the univariate tests in that the Size (Hi), 
Employee (M), and Owner (115) variables have statistically significant 
negative coefficients. Furthennore, whilst the coefficients for the Size (Hi) 
and Owner (H5) variables are less significant than in the univariate tests, 
they are still significant at conventional levels and have the correct signs. 
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The GDebt (H2) variable has an insignificant negative coefficient, while the 
coefficient for the Bonus (H4) variable is insignificant and has the opposite 
sign to that predicted. The model's goodness of fit statistic is significant 
with ap value of 0.001 and its explanatory power measure (R2) is 53%. 
7.4.3 Summarv 
The results of the two sets of tests (univariate and multivariate) 
generally support hypotheses 1,3, and 5. Hypotheses I and 5 are supported 
moderately to strongly. The univariate results strongly support the Size (Hi) 
and Owner (H5) variables, while the multivariate tests provide at least 
moderate support for these variables. Taken together, the results provide 
empirical support for the hypothesis that managers of Saudi companies 
which have large assets and higher insider ownership, tend to charge Zakat 
to the profit and loss account rather than to the retained earnings account. 
Hypothesis 3, which predicts that the - larger a company's foreign 
employees/total employees ratio, the more likely the company is to expense 
Zakat, is strongly supported by both the ufiivariateand multivariate tests. 
These findings provide two'eiten'sions to-previous research. First, 
contrary to the earlier Saudi study conducted by Tawfik and Kadous (1991 
our findings show that the Size variable is a significant determinant of Zakat 
policies; large Saudi'compames would be'in'danger of suffering political 
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costs during the 1995-2000 period, and hence managers of these companies 
will have incentives to expense Zakat. Second, the findings relating to the 
Employee (H3) and Owner (H5) variables introduce new results into the 
positive accounting literature and extend the importance of these variables to 
the choice of Zakat policies. 
Finally, the results of both the univariate and multivariate tests 
provide no evidence to support hypotheses 2 and 4 which predict that 
managers of Saudi companies with Government debts and/or donations and 
incentive compensation plans are more likely to expense the annual Zakat. 
7.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In chapter five we hypothesised that managers of Saudi companies 
which have: (1) large total assets, (2) Government debts and/or donations, 
(3) higher ratios of foreign employees to', total - employees, (4) no 
management compensation plans tied to reported profits, and (5) higher 
insider ownership, are more likely to use income-decreasing accounting 
policies. In this chapter we em I pirically I 'examined the ability'of these five 
firm-specific variables to explain and-predict the cross-sectional variation in 
each of the following three accoýnting policies: (1) inventory methods, (2) 
research and development methods, 'and_. (3) Zakat methods. These three 
methods are selected because they have a significant effect on reported 
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income and were exhaustively disclosed in the 1995 annual reports of Saudi 
companies. Furthermore, they vary significantly across the companies in our 
sample and so there is sufficient variation to apply some standard univariate 
and multivariate statistical tests. We treated FIFO, the capitalisation of 
research and development expenditure, and distributing of the annual Zakat 
as income-increasing accounting policies. Weighted average/LIFO for 
inventory and the expensing methods for research and development and 
Zakat were treated as income-decreasing accounting policies. 
Table (7.18) summarises the results of the univariate and multivariate 
tests and denotes whether the evidence is consistent or inconsistent with 
each of the five hypotheses. 
Table (7. It 
A summarv of univariate and multivariate results of the relation between 
the flve political and contractinz cost variables, and-three accountin 
polic 
Explanatojy variable 
p-values 
Technique Size Gdebt Employee Bonus Owner x2 R2 
(1) Inventoa Method 
mest NS 0.000 0.000 
U-test NS' -0.000 0.005 
Chi-square test NS NS 0.01 NS 0.01 
Probit Model (1) NS* , NS 0.005 NS -0.01 0.001 0.74 
Probit Model (2) NS* NS 0.05 0.01 0.34 
(2 R&D Method 
Mest 0.002 0.000 0.01 
U-test 0.005 0.000 0.005 
Chi-square test 0.02 NS 0.01 NS 0.01 
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Probit Model 0.05 NS 0.01 NS 0.05 0.001 1 Iq 0 0.59 
(3) Zakat Method 
Mest 0.005 0.000 0.025 
U-test 0.02 0.000 0.025 
Chi-square test 0.10 NS 0.02 NS 0.02 
Probit Model 0.10 NS 0.005 NS* 0.10 0.001 1 0.53 
Notes: 
1. The decimals reflect the levels of significance. 
2. NS signifies not significant, but sign in predicted direction. 
3. NS* signifies not significant and sign not in predicted direction. 
The conclusions we reach from the empirical analysis reported in this 
chapter can be summarised in terms of seven basic points: 
1. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that a company's foreign 
employees/total employees ratio and ownership structure affect its 
accounting policy choices. Since these two variables (Employee and 
Owner) do affect the choice of accounting policies on a consistent basis, 
these two factors are the most powerful explanatory variables. 
2. The results of the univariate and multivariate tests of the Size hypothesis 
are less consistent than are tests of the Employee and Owner hypotheses. 
However, since the Size variable is a significant determinant of two out of 
three accounting policies (research and development and the Zakat 
methods), the preponderance of tests confirms the predicted role of the 
Size variable and suggests that managers of Saudi companies with large 
total assets choose accounting procedures that reduce current reported 
eamings. 
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3. All the univariate and multivariate tests used to examine the GDebt 
hypothesis show that the existence of Government debt and donations in 
a company' s capital structure does not affect the company's choice of 
accounting policies. This may be explained by the fact that the use of a 
zero-one variable (rather than a continuous variable such as the proportion 
of Governnient debt and/or donations to a company's funds employed) 
may be simplistic because it does not distinguish sufficiently between 
Saudi companies which will incur relatively large political costs and 
companies which will bear relatively lower political costs. However, 
although the dichotomous GDebt variable may not be a good proxy for 
Saudi companies' political visibility, the consistency of the signs of its 
coefficients in our regression equations gives some support for our 
argument that Saudi companies which are used to relying on extensive 
Governinent support and financial contributions will incur relatively larger 
political costs than other companies, and hence their managers will have 
incentives to use income-decreasing accounting policies. It also confirms 
the political effects of the 1995-2000 $audi development plan on 
accounting policy choices. 
4. Consistent with a number.. of earlier positive, accounting choice studies, 
our research's overall results lend no support to the Bonus hypothesis, 
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which predicts a positive relationship between the presence of a 
management compensation plan tied to reported corporate earnings and 
the use of income-increasing accounting policies. This lack of significant 
association may be due to several reasons. First, the use of a dichotomous 
variable to measure a management compensation plan's effects may be 
simplistic (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Second, costs of contract 
renegotiations may be low. This leads to the third reason, that the 
compensation committees who typically administer management 
compensation plans may adjust the incentive pay for changes in 
accounting policies (Ball and Foster, 1982). Fourth, because details about 
management compensation plans are unknown, (1) the plans may specify 
the accounting policy set ex-ante, (2) ý current period reported earnings 
may be below or above the target earnings set by the incentive plans 
I 
(Healy, 1985), and (3) the compensation plans may include different types 
of remuneration, and managers may perceive trade-offs among these types 
of remuneration according to the ultimate 'effect'. an accounting policy 
could have on their wealth (Hunt, 1985). 'I, ý-, ' 
5. Given I and 2, the study's ov'erallresults suggest that managers of Saudi 
companies do use economic *. criteria "ý in choosing their accounting 
procedures. In other words, our findings provide empirical support for the 
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principal hypothesis of this dissertation that accounting standards which 
exist in Saudi Arabia give rise to economic consequences and managers 
of companies consider these consequences when selecting accounting 
policies. 
6. This study improves upon past research in the area in several ways. First, 
its hypotheses are based on the costly-contracting and political 
framework; thus, the empirical evidence not only addresses whether 
accounting standards which exist in Saudi Arabia give rise to economic 
consequences, but also addresses the issue of the applicability of the 
positive accounting theory's implications to Saudi Arabia. It also sheds 
some light on the factors that are most likely to influence a manager's 
accounting policy choices. Second, following suggestions by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986, p. 256), it introduces a "sophisticated political cost 
measure" (Employee) which "is more refined than size". Third, compared 
to the previous studies of accounting policy choice reviewed in chapter 
four, this study provides more powerful tests of the positive accounting 
theory because it: (1) develops an explicit link between the political 
process (the politicisation of the 1995-2000 Saudi development plan) and 
its effect on the accounting policy choices, and (2) identifies the forms in 
which wealth transfers take place and includes them in the analysis. 
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Finally, this research extends the important effect of ownership control 
status of companies to the choice of accounting research and development 
methods and Zakat methods 
7. Like many positive accounting studies, a limitation of our study may be 
the endogeneity of the independent variables (Watts and Zimmerman, 
- 1990). This suspicion is only increased when one considers the fact that 
the intercepts of the probit models have relatively high coefficient values. 
If the endogeneity problem is present in our study, the empirical evidence 
generated could be due partly to reasons other than those hypothesised. 
However, this concem may not be as critical as it appears since this study 
shows a high degree of consistency of results across models and between 
the univariate and multivariate tests. 
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8.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a review of the entire thesis. The first section 
summarises the theoretical and empirical foundations of the study. The 
second section outlines the study hypotheses, assumptions, and 
methodology. This section also presents conclusions on the study's major 
findings, contributions to knowledge, and limitations. The last section 
suggests areas for future research. 
8.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
An accounting policyrnaking body must develop alternative standards 
and procedures for its constituents. Some accounting researchers believe 
that the primary concern of policy makers should be to set accounting 
standards that improve the decision relevance and reliability of the reported 
infonnation for financial, statement users. Others reject this decision- 
usefulness approach in favour of a political and economic consequences 
perspective. 
Proponents of the economic consequences perspective generally use 
empirical evidence to justify their assertions. For example, some empirical 
researchers have demonstrated that the SFAS Nos. 2.5) 8, and 19 could 
impede national goals. Others have provided empirical evidence that SFAS 
Nos. 19,25, and 33 could reduce capital market efficiency. The strongest 
t 
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empirical evidence consistent with the adverse economic consequences of 
accounting standards is, however, developed by researchers who have 
examined such issues as to why managers of companies adopt certain 
accounting procedures and why they lobby forý or against certain accounting 
policies. Results from this research have generally indicated that managers 
do so because of the impact of reported financial accounting information on 
the users' decision-making behaviour and on companies' contractual 
relationships. The philosophy underlying this type of economic 
consequences research is based on the assumption that corporate managers 
will use (or lobby for) accounting policies which best serve their self- 
interest. Based on this assumption arguments are generated from what Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) call the political and contracting processes. From 
the former it is argued that if a company is politically sensitive, its managers 
have incentives to use income-decreasing accounting policies in order to 
reduce that political sensitivity and hence, the probability of suffering 
negative wealth transfers (political costs). Similarly, it is argued that if a 
company is subject to price and cost regulations, its managers have 
incentives to use income-decreasing accounting policies in order to minimise 
the impact of these regulations on its future cash inflows. 
Positive accounting researchers also argue that the terms of debt 
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contracts provide incentives for managers to adopt income-increasing 
accounting policies. It is argued that the higher the debt/equity ratio the more 
likely it is that managers will use income-increasing accounting policies in 
order to reduce the probability of violating restrictive covenants in such 
contracts. Similarly, it is argued that the terms of management compensation 
plan contracts provide incentives for managers to adopt income-increasing 
accounting policies. It is argued that if a company uses management 
compensation plans, its managers have incentives to adopt income- 
increasing accounting policies in order to increase the bonus payments they 
receive. It is also argued that manager-controlled companies are more likely 
to operate management compensation plans and hence their managers are 
more likely to adopt income-increasing accounting policies. 
8.2 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study documents empirical evi d ence of the economic 
consequences of accounting standards which exist in Saudi Arabia and of 
the relation between firm specific characteristics and accounting policy 
choices. 
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8.2.1 Research Hypotheses and Assumptions 
Using the political process theory, three hypotheses were generated 
for empirical testing: 
1. The size hypothesis. We argue that the political costs Saudi companies 
bear are a function of their total assets. Based on this argument and 
following the size hypothesis proposed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), 
we hypothesised that managers of Saudi companies are more likely to 
adopt income-decreasing accounting policies the larger the company's 
total assets. 
2. Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 144) describe company size as a noisy 
proxy for political costs and call for "more direct measures of political 
sensitivity than firm size" because such measures. would "provide more 
powerful tests of the political cost hypothesis". Following this suggestion, 
we developed two new political cost hypotheses. These are environment- 
oriented hypotheses and predict that managers of Saudi companies are 
more likely to adopt income-decreasing accounting policies: (1) if the 
company's capital structure contains Government debt and/or donations 
(the GDebt hypothesis), and/or (2) the higher the ý company's ratio of 
foreign employees to total employees (the, employee hypothesis). 
t 
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Using the contracting process theory, two other hypotheses were also 
developed and tested: 
1. The bonus plan hypothesis. Like USA companies, a large number of 
Saudi joint stock companies operate management compensation plans. 
This motivated us to hypothesise that managers of Saudi companies with 
bonus plans are more likely to use income-increasing accounting policies. 
2. The owner hypothesis. Based on the work of Dhaliwal, Salamon and 
Smith (1982), we hypothesised that managers of Saudi companies are 
more likely to use income-increasing accounting policies the lower the 
percentage of stock owned by the company's directors. 
As is the case with accounting research in general and with economic 
consequences research in particular, our hypotheses are based on a number 
of interrelated assumptions. Underlying the political cost hypotheses is the 
explicit assumption that some of the strategic economic goals of the 1995- 
2000 Saudi development plan encompass unfavourable wealth transfers and 
Saudi companies' political visibility varies with their reported earnings. It is 
also assumed that Saudi Government bureaucrats who administer the 1995- 
2000 development plan, will not adju st for changesl in managers' accounting 
policy choices unless the benefits exceed the costs of doing so,. An implicit 
assumption is also invoked to develop the bonus plan hypothesis. We 
t 
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assume that management compensation plans used by Saudi companies do 
not specify the accounting policy set ex-ante and that members of the 
compensation committees who administer such plans do not adjust, ex-post, 
for changes in accounting policies. Finally, we assume that managers of 
Saudi companies trade-off the expected impact of the economic influences 
of political costs and compensation when selecting an accounting policy. 
8.2.2 Research Methodoloav and Results 
The sample used consists of 48 Saudi joint stock companies which 
were listed on the Saudi stock market at the end of 1995. Three voluntary 
accounting policy choices were selected for investigation: 
1. Inventory valuation methods (Average/LIFO vs. FIFO). 
2. Research and Development methods (capitalising vs. expensing). 
3. Zakat methods (distributing vs. expensing). 
The research methodology adopted consists of two phases involving 
two kinds of tests; univariate tests, and multivariate tests. The univariate 
tests# tests, Mann-Whitney U tests, and Median tests) strongly support the 
employee hypothesis and the owner hypothesis. They reject the null 
hypothesis that the ratio of foreign employees to total employees and 
accounting methods are unrelated at the 0.01 level or better for inventory 
and research and development and at the 0.02 level or better for the Zakat 
t 
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methods. The three univariate tests also reject the null hypothesis that the 
percentage of stock owned by a company's directors and accounting 
methods are independent at the 0.01 level or better for inventory and 
research and development and at the 0.025 level or better for the Zakat 
methods. The univariate tests on the company size variable are not 
significant for every model. While we found no association between a 
company's total assets and the method chosen for inventory, the t tests, 
Mann-Whitney U tests, and Median tests reject the'null hypothesis that a 
company's total assets and accounting methods are unrelated at the 0.02 
level or better for research and development and at the 0.10 level or better 
for the Zakat methods. To that extent, the univariate test results support the 
size hypothesis. Finally, applying the Chi-square tests to examine the 
consistency of the GDebt hypothesis and the bonus plan hypothesis, our 
results lend no support for these two hypotheses. 
We used the five political and contracting cost variables- the total 
assets, the presence of Government debt and/or donations, the ratio of 
foreign employees to total employees, the existence of a bonus plan, and the 
percentage of stock owned by directors of a company- in a Probit analysis to 
predict the choice of inventory, research and development, and, Zakat 
accounting policies employed by Saudi companies. The results confirm the 
L 
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fffidings of the univariate tests in that the foreign employees/total employees 
ratio and ownership concentration are the most powerful explanatory 
variables, and that company size is a significant detenninant of research and 
development methods and Zakat methods but not of the inventory method 
used. They also confirm the weak association between the presence of 
Government debt and/or donations and the existence of a bonus plan and the 
choice of accounting methods. However, the results show a high degree of 
consistency of the signs of the presence of Government debt and/or 
donations dummy variable, suggesting that this company characteristic 
makes managers more likely to prefer income-decreasing accounting 
policies and that its lack of significance could be induced by a failure to use 
a continuous variable rather than a zero-one variable. Finally, the X' 
likelihood ratio tests result in rejection of the null hypothesis that the model 
cannot predict the choice of accounting methods at the 0.01 level or better 
for inventory and at the 0.001 level for the research and development and 
Zakat methods. 
In summary, our results confirm the consistency of the size 
hypothesis, the employee hypothesis, and the owner hypothesis. Table (8.1) 
provides a summary of the five hypotheses tested in this study and indicates 
whether the evidence is consistent or inconsistent with each hypothesis. 
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Table (8. 
V.. 
Summarv of hvpotlieses tested 
Hypotheses Inventory 
Methods 
R&D 
Methods 
Zakat 
Methods 
1) Political cost hypotheses: 
Hi: Ceteris paribus, the larger a 
company' s size, the more likely the Inconsistent Consistent Consistent 
company's managers are to choose 
accounting policies that decrease 
current reported earnings. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, manager 
*S 
of 
companies with Government debt 
and/or donations are more likely to Inconsistent Inconsistent Inconsistent 
select accounting policies that 
decrease current reported earnings. 
H3:, Ceteris paribus, the larger a 
company' s foreign employees/total 
employees ratio, the more likely the Consistent Consistent Consistent 
company's managers are to use 
accounting policies that decrease 
current reported earnings 
(2) Contracting cost hypotheses: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, managýrs of 
companies with a bonus plan are Inconsistent Inconsistent Inconsistent 
more likely to choose accounting 
policies that increase current 
reported earnings. 
H5: Ceteris paribus, managers of 
companies with a lower percentage 
of stock owned by directors are more Consistent Consistent Consistent 
likely to select accounting policies 
that increase current reported 
I earnings. 
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8.2.3 Implications for the Accounting Profession In Saudi Arabia 
Very little empirical research has been conducted in Saudi Arabia on 
the positive accounting theory. This may be because of- 
" The lack of generally accepted accounting principles and rules; and 
" the lack of easy access to financial information for researchers. 
However, circumstances have changed over the last fifteen years, or 
more precisely, since the issue of the 1986 Ministerial decision. This 
decision has established a conceptual framework for financial accounting 
and reporting in Saudi Arabia and set detailed disclosure requirements for 
Saudi companies. The most important change has resulted from the 
establishment of the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants 
(SOCPA). Under SOCPA's Decision No. 4/2/3 dated 15/5/1414 A. H. 
(1993) Saudi companies are required to use USA Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) until SOCPA creates its own standards. In 
1994, SOCPA issued its first standard; "Quality Control Standard for the 
Certified Public Accountants Firms". In 1997, SOCPA also issued six 
standards; (1) Foreign Currency Translation, (2) Inventories, (3) Cash Flow 
Statements, (4) Related Party Disclosures, (5) Preliminary & Pre-operating 
Expenses,. and (6) Auditing Electronic Data Processing (EDP) Activities. 
Whilst legislation has not yet provided extensive databases about Saudi 
I 
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companies, a series of annual accounts are now computerised by SOCPA 
and available in public fonn. 
All these recent changes provide a new framework for accounting 
researchers. They have encouraged us to carry out this empirical research 
with the primary objective of promoting the accounting profession in Saudi 
Arabia. The research's overall results show that our political and contracting 
cost hypotheses are able to explain and predict some accounting policies 
used by managers of Saudi companies. Managers of companies with large 
total assets, a high ratio of foreign employees to total employees, and high 
insider ownership are more likely to use income-decreasing accounting 
policies. These findings provide empirical support for the principal 
hypothesis of this dissertation. That is, accounting standards which exist in 
Saudi Arabia give rise to economic consequences and managers of 
companies consider these consequences when selecting accounting policies. 
In summary, the conclusion we have reached from this study is that 
accounting policy decisions have important implications for the attainment 
of national goals and contractual relationships. This principal conclusion is 
of critical importance to the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA), given that accounting standard setting processes are 
still in their early stages of development. It supports the view that the Saudi 
t 
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Organization , for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) should 
acknowledge the possible adverse economic consequences that may result 
from its accounting standards decisions. In fact, the results of this study 
justify, in the very least, a wider and more detailed study by SOCPA of the 
economic effects of its potential accounting standards. The findings may 
also call into question the financial accounting standards which have 
recently been promulgated. 
8.2.4 Contribations to Knowlehe 
Although we feel that the force of the empirical evidence in favour of 
the economic consequences hypothesis is substantial, this conclusion is 
perhaps not the only important implication of this research. The findings of 
this study provide several methodological improvements over previous 
positive accounting research. First, they provide empilical support for 
applying the positive accounting theory to less developed countries such as 
Saudi Arabia. Second, they emphasise the importance of developing an 
explicit link between the political process and its effect on the choice of 
accounting procedures. This importance is clearly reflected by the powerful 
explanation of the foreign employees/total employees ratio variable. Third, 
they show that total assets, 'the ratio of foreign employees `toý''total 
employees, and insider ownership are the most important factors that 
I 
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influence accounting policy choices in Saudi Arabia. Finally, this study is the 
first economic consequences study to show that the ownership control status 
of companies is a significant determinant of research and development and 
Zakat accounting policies. 
8.2.5. Research Limitations 
Most economic consequences studies, including ours, use 
econometric models to explain and predict variation in managers' accounting 
policy choice behaviour. Therefore, empirical evidence generated from these 
studies may be limited by the traditional econometric problems related to 
measurement errors and omitted variablesloo. To mitigate the potential 
adverse effects of these problems on our empirical results, we developed an 
explicit linkage between the political and contractual processes in Saudi 
Arabia and their potential, effects on managers' accounting policy choices. 
We then identified the forms in which wealth redistribution takes place and 
included them in our econometric models. This may reflect the high degree 
of consistency of results across models and between the univariate and 
multivariate testes adopted in our empirical testing procedures. In fact, even 
'00 Note that such limitations are frequently discussed and hence they need no special references 
here [A useful discussion of these limitations is to be found in Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, pp. 
100-109); and in Watts and Zimmerman (1990, pp. 140-146)]. 
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if our results do appear to be seriously affected by measurement errors 
and/or omitted variables problems, one would anticipate such limitations 
since this study is the first economic consequences study to adopt an in- 
depth empirical research in the Saudi Arabian context. 
Two important observations should also be noted here. One is that the 
sample used consisted of Saudi joint stock companies operating in the 
agriculture, industrial and services sectors, and hence our results may not be 
generalised to other business sectors and/or other environments. The second 
limitation is that the political cost hypotheses in this study are based on the 
politically sensitive effect of the 1995-2000 Saudi development plan. Thus, 
evidence on the consistency of these hypotheses is limited to the Saudi 
Arabian environment and to the 1995-2000 period. 
8.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Even though this study provides numerous improvements over 
previous related work, many research opportunities and unresolved 
questions remain: 
1. Future research could help in understanding why the presence of the 
Government debt and/or donations variable (GDebt) is insignificant 
although the signs of its coefficients are as predicted in all models tested; 
is it because of the use of a zero-one variable rather than a continuous 
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variable or because it captures an omitted variable effect? Future research 
could also help in understanding why we obtained different findings for 
the bonus plan variable from those generally documented in the positive 
accounting literature; is it because of "[our] failure to investigate the 
details of individual compensation plans" (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 
p. 280)? 
2. The relation between firm specific characteristics and variations in the 
firm's abnormal returns around the announcement of the new five 
financial accounting standards- Foreign Currency Translation, Inventories, 
Cash Flow Statements, Related Party Disclosures, and Preliminary & Pre- 
operating Expenses- is a broad area for future research. One could 
explore whether equity price reaction to an accounting standard, if there is 
any, is related to its reported earnings effects and potential economic 
consequences, or to its increase/decrease of the acceptable set of 
accounting policies. 
3. Research to explore how economic consequences of accounting standards 
can be incorporated into the process of setting or choosing standards is 
also a broad topic for future research. 
t 
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